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Abstract
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key option for economic growth in most, if not
all, developing countries. However, not all developing countries are equally open to
foreign investment. Some restrict foreign equity, while others encourage multinational
corporations to enter their markets. Because FDI involves outsiders entering national
markets and profits, it is very political. FDI can bring economic benefits, such as jobs
and new technology, but it may also entail economic costs, such as increased
competition for national businesses. FDI may also bring political costs, as governments
that open to foreign equity may see a popular backlash.
Most governments have policies to control FDI’s entry into their markets. These
policies have been inadequately explored in quantitative studies of FDI because of a
lack of available data. This study seeks to rectify that problem by introducing a new set
of data: The Foreign Equity Index. I develop a theory and model of FDI in developing
countries framed by the logic of two-level games. FDI requires agreement between
developing states and international firms, and therefore agreements are reached with
influence from domestic-level political and economic factors, as well as internationallevel factors. FDI policies are an indication of developing countries win-sets, or range of
agreements they are willing to accept when dealing with foreign multinational
corporations.
I test this theory quantitatively using the Foreign Equity Index, which covers 55
developing countries from 1976-2004. I first estimate the international and domestic
factors that influence the degree of openness to FDI indicated by FDI equity policies in
developing countries. I then test the effect these policies have on FDI inflows. I find
that both domestic and international factors affect developing countries’ FDI policies,
and in turn, policies are a significant factor determining the flow of FDI into national
markets. I also explore the ways in which FDI policies have played a role in economic
development strategies of El Salvador and Nicaragua. This research and the Foreign
Equity Index should aid in a better understanding of foreign direct investment and
growth in developing countries in general.

Keywords:

foreign direct investment, FDI, policy, policies, developing countries,
Foreign Equity Index, development, modernization, dependency,
corporation, multinational

vii

Chapter One
Introduction
Since 1976, Niger, Gabon and Swaziland appeared to be doing the right thing to
attract foreign direct investment. Niger, one of the poorest countries in the world, has
maintained a very open policy toward foreign equity, and puts few restrictions on the
entrance of foreign investment into its market. This developing country has participated
in workshops and talks on investment agreements in the international arena, and has
highlighted its efforts to improve education and literacy and create jobs for its population
(States News Service 2007, US Fed News 2007). Yet this country has gained very little
for its efforts. From 1976 to 2004, Niger has only averaged about $22 million a year in
foreign investment, or 0.59 percent of its GDP. Compare this to its neighbor, Nigeria,
which averaged $1.07 billion, or 2.64 percent of its GDP, a year in foreign investment
during that same time. Yet Nigeria had more restrictive FDI equity policies. Similarly,
Chad has maintained more restrictive policies, but FDI flows have been greater and FDI
makes up 5.33 percent of its GDP. Even Algeria and Cameroon have gained more FDI
inflows, though it makes up a smaller share of the GDP in those countries than in
Niger. 1
Gabon had limited restrictions until 1998, when it opened up its economy almost
completely to foreign equity. Yet Gabon only averaged about $26 million a year in
foreign direct investment between 1976 and 2004, despite the fact that India has
invested over $100 million in oil development projects there (Walker 2007). Gabon has
1

The main source of statistics on foreign direct investment throughout this dissertation is the World Development Indicators,
compiled by the World Bank. Both the subscription version and the online version of these statistics were used. The online version
can be found at http://www.worldbank.org.
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averaged less in the past thirty years than Cameroon ($64 million per year, 0.49 percent
of GDP) and even the war-torn Democratic Republic of Congo ($61million dollars, 0.39
percent of GDP).
Swaziland, nestled between Mozambique and economic giant South Africa,
should be doing well with foreign investment by all accounts. From 1976 to 2004, it
maintained an open foreign equity policy with very few restrictions. Yet Swaziland only
averages about $56 million (5.06 percent of GDP) a year in foreign direct investment
inflows. Lesotho averaged more than Swaziland over that period, pulling in $69 million
dollars (7.48 percent of GDP) in FDI even while maintaining more restrictions on foreign
investment. Even South Africa, despite a flight of investment during the apartheid
years, still managed to average ten times as much investment than Swaziland during
those years, though FDI’s percent of GDP in South Africa was a miniscule 0.49 percent.
On the other side of the coin, Brazil, China and Mexico appear to acting contrary
to conventional wisdom, and yet for all intents and purposes they are better off for it.
They all receive large amounts of foreign investment despite the fact that they have
relatively restrictive policies on foreign investment equity. Brazil allows 100 percent
foreign ownership, but it restricts a large number of industries to national investment,
thus limiting the industries in which foreign investment can take part. From 1976 – 2004
it has a more restrictive attitude toward foreign investment when compared with other
countries in its region, and yet it managed to pull in an average of almost $9 billion (1.55
percent of GDP) in foreign investment yearly during that time.
China’s record toward foreign investment has been even worse, comparatively.
From 1976 to 1984 China did not allow foreign investors to fully own a company.
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Foreign investors had to find local partners, and take a minority position. In 1985 it
opened its markets to 100% foreign ownership, but on a very restricted level. Yet China
has averaged $19 billion dollars a year (2.09 percent of GDP) in foreign investment
between 1976 and 2004 despite its restrictive policies.
Among these three countries, Mexico’s attitude toward foreign investment was
probably the most restrictive. Mexico allowed foreign investment only in partnership
with local capital in its national markets in the period from 1976 to 1988. Companies
that could be 100% owned by foreign interests were restricted to special border zones.
In 1989, Mexico opened its markets to 100% ownership while reserving significant
chunks of its industrial sectors for national capital. Yet Mexico has managed to pull in
$7.7 billion (1.77 percent of GDP) yearly in foreign investment equity despite these
restrictions.
At first glance, one could classify these countries and their different situations on
size and region. After all, Niger, Gabon and Swaziland are located in Africa and are
small. Mexico is located next to the United States, China is in the booming Asian
economic zone, and Brazil is the largest country in the economically vibrant Latin
American region. These facts probably play a part in explaining their contrasting
situations, but the main point still stands out. In the game of globalization, Niger,
Gabon, and Swaziland appear to be doing what is expected of them. They have
maintained few restrictions on foreign direct investment equity in their markets, but they
are not rewarded by the international economic community for their efforts. On the
other hand, China, Brazil and Mexico flaunt restrictions on foreign equity, and yet
investment keeps pouring in.
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What is the explanation for these apparent contradictions? Why do developing
countries want foreign investment? Why should some developing countries maintain
open policies toward FDI if they do not get rewarded? Why shouldn’t developing
countries simply restrict FDI as they see fit – after all, if China, Mexico and Brazil can do
it and receive billions of dollars in investment, while other countries go out of their way
to make themselves attractive to potential investors and get very little, what is the point?
Why do countries bother with policies on foreign direct investment? What influences the
attitudes on foreign investment that are reflected in policies? Do these policies make
any difference at all when it comes to FDI inflows?
I will explore these questions by investigating this phenomenon of globalization –
foreign direct investment (FDI). 2 In particular, I examine the creation of foreign direct
investment policies in developing countries and how those policies affect actual foreign
direct investment inflows. I develop a multi-level model of FDI policies and inflows in
which a combination of international and domestic politics intertwine to not only
influence FDI policies in developing countries, but also influence the eventual
agreements between developing states and foreign investors. I test this model using
two time-series cross-sectional quantitative analysis of 55 developing countries over a
period of twenty-nine years, from 1976 to 2004. In the first analysis, I develop a model
of FDI policy based on domestic and international political factors, demand for FDI, and
anticipated FDI inflows. In addition, I evaluate the relationship between policy and FDI
inflows through a second analysis based on policy outcomes and international and
domestic economic factors. Finally, I follow up these two quantitative analyses with a
2

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines foreign direct investment as “a category of
international investment made by a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting
interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct investment enterprise).”
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separate qualitative study of policymaking and FDI outcomes in two Caribbean Basin
states: El Salvador and Nicaragua
Globalization is a concept that sparks fierce debates among politicians,
academics and even the general public. Business leaders and policymakers, the
practitioners of globalization, argue that open markets and free trade will create new
economic opportunities for all. In truth, developed countries in the global North have
benefited for decades from globalization in all its forms and account for the lion’s share
of the world’s economic trade and investment. Their message to the developing
countries in the global South has taken the following form: Open your economies to
market forces, and you will achieve greater development than is possible on your own.
Developing countries, after trying and then rejecting liberalization in the 1960s,
embarked on campaigns of economic self-sufficiency. They were initially slow to
embrace the new message of globalization. However, eager to advance their
economies and afraid of being left out of the promised economic boom, developing
countries have lined up to liberalize their trade and open their markets in the 1990s and
the early 21st century.
Attracting investment from foreign companies has been an important economic
strategy amongst developing countries. They have seen the continued growth of the
developed economies and have come to believe that such interconnecting economic
links can bring greater development. They have watched international firms from the
United States invest in Europe and Japan throughout the last half of the 20th century,
and European and Japanese firms invest in the United States in turn. In particular,
developing countries look to such foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed
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nations because it promises jobs, technology, management skills, infrastructure and a
host of other improvements. Many developing countries also believe that FDI will
increase their foreign exchange holdings, tax receipts and boost their international
economic standing by improving their balance of trade and payments.
To set the stage for FDI in their markets, developing countries create policies
establishing their level of openness to foreign firms and their activities. These policies
are delineated by three types. The first category of policies governs foreign firms’ entry
into the market. These policies generally outline what restrictions, if any, foreign firms
face when they set up business in the country. The second category of policies is
incentives – the types of fiscal and financial inducements offered directly to the firm if it
decides to set up business. The third category is regulation, or what laws foreign firms
will have to obey in order to continue doing legal business in the country. Altogether,
these three types of policies serve an important function for developing economies.
They allow developing countries to control the flow of FDI into their markets, they allow
for developing countries to compete against other developing countries for FDI, and
they allow the state to maintain control over and set boundaries for foreign firm activity
once the firms are establishing themselves in the market. These sets of policies also
serve as signals to foreign firms. They indicate how open a country is to new FDI, what
kinds of agreements they may be willing to make to beat out the competition, and what
kind of freedoms firms will or will not have if they set up business there.
At first glance, these policies seem very important in the process that makes FDI
an integral facet of globalization. As one of the manifestations and engines of
globalization, FDI is an accepted, and popular, means for economic development. FDI
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has seen tremendous growth in the last half century. Since the 1970s, developing
countries have increasingly courted multinational corporations (MNCs) in efforts to
attract more FDI within their borders. On a larger level, FDI is a tangible symbol of
interpenetration that attracts both praise and criticism from politicians and academics
alike. However, the story of FDI policy and its contribution to the FDI process has not
been adequately told, in large part because there have been no adequate and reliable
indicators of FDI policy that can be used in systematic large-scale research. Theories
about FDI policy have thus been inadequately tested except in case studies which give
us a limited picture on how they relate to the overall FDI process. 3 Research has been
able to bridge this gap by focusing on other indicators of FDI – most often FDI flows and
stocks. 4 However, these indicators only indirectly, if at all, illuminate the role of policies,
which in turn illuminate the key role of the state in the FDI process.
Why are developing states’ policies relating to FDI so important? First, in an era
of global integration, where some see an erosion of economic boundaries and the
decline of the nation-state relative to non-governmental entities in the international
marketplace, I argue that nation-states still have means to control their economic
destinies. Perhaps a future world will make the nation-state obsolete, but for the
present, nation-states still make choices that restrict or enhance the flow of investment
into their markets. Second, these choices may be dictated in part by characteristics of
the host polity, and in part by the international system. These choices are inherently
political, actively chosen by nation-states in the process that leads to the creation of
their policies. Third, I argue that these policies may have ramifications on the
3

For example, see Fletcher (2002), Besley (1995) and Laney (1991).
For some recent examples utilizing flows, see Egger and Winner (2006), Jensen (2003), Li and Resnick (2003), Bandelj (2002).
For a recent example utilizing FDI stocks, see Kentor and Boswell (2003).
4
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investment that flows into the host state, and on the gains that accrue to the host state.
Fourth, the inadequate amount of rigorous study on developing states’ FDI policies has
meant that some important research questions have not been answered satisfactorily.
Why do developing states set their policies as they do? Why have some developing
countries chosen to promote FDI with few restrictions, while others regulate and restrict
it to a greater extent? Through research, we have gained a good understanding of the
effects of FDI on states’ political and economic processes, and we have made strides in
understanding some effects of FDI inflows, but there is very little systematic and
quantitative research that explores why developing countries are more or less open
toward FDI and whether this level of openness has any effect on their FDI inflows. This
dissertation fills the gap in research by developing a model of foreign direct investment
that includes FDI policymaking, and tests it through quantitative and case study
analysis. The tests will answer questions about the determinants of FDI policies and
the effectiveness of FDI policies on FDI inflows.
This study focuses on the political and economic factors that lie at the heart of
FDI policy and its role in the FDI process by presenting and testing three main
hypotheses. First, I argue that FDI follows the same framework of two-level games
established by Putnam (1988). In this since, FDI ultimately involves an agreement
between two entities: developing states and international firms. States develop their
policies on FDI in order to control the flow of FDI into their markets, and these policies
are influenced by domestic politics and the realities of the domestic market. However,
international factors introduced by the globalization of trade and investment also
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influence policymaking, and these factors are usually more friendly to international
firms.
Secondly, the creation of FDI policy is only part of the full story of FDI. These
policies become the basis for future agreements between states and firms, with
domestic factors influencing how states can bargain with firms and whether firms will
invest in developing markets, and international political and economic factors providing
further influences on decisions by firms to invest. Once FDI policies have been
completed and the stage is set for FDI, I argue that those policies in turn influence
actual FDI inflows into each developing country’s domestic market because they set a
level of openness to FDI. Combined with characteristics of the investment market in
each country, and the economic characteristics that are unique to each state, FDI
policies should exert a profound influence over the actual flows of FDI.
In general, I argue that FDI policies follow a pattern generally as depicted in
Table 1-1: with policies and outcomes relating from low openness to FDI and low
inflows to high openness to FDI and high inflows. While my model predicts that most
developing countries’ FDI policies and inflows follow a direct and positive relationship,
indicating that policy is important in the FDI bargaining process, there are some
countries that will fall outside these expectations.
Those countries that fall in cells II and III of the table will be interesting to
examine, because they will help determine whether policy really matters or whether
there are other factors that are more important to FDI inflows. Unfortunately, prior to
this research no reliable and direct measure of FDI policy appears to exist, which is an
extreme obstacle to these arguments. To test these hypotheses, this dissertation

9

Table 1-1: Predicted Relationships Between FDI Policies and Flows
Policies: FDI Openness

Outcomes: FDI Flows

Low

High

Low

I

II

High

III

IV

therefore develops an important new measure of FDI policy. This new index will be a
valuable addition and resource to future researchers of FDI and FDI policy.
Why does this dissertation only concentrate on developing state policies, and not
generalize to all states? First, FDI involving firms investing in developed states may be
very different than FDI involving firms in developing states. Enough key factors differ
between the developed nations and the developing nations, as well as the fact that FDI
to developed states is still greater than FDI to developing nations, that addition of
developed nations to the sample may cause a loss of significance in those factors that
truly affect developing states’ FDI processes.
Second, until recently a lack of available data from developing nations has
hampered the study of FDI in the developing world. While some research has been
done with developing nations, more studies have been performed on FDI in the
developed world. 5 However, greater amounts of data coming from developing nations
and compiled by world institutional bodies have made greater
study involving developing nations possible.
Third and foremost, developing countries contain the bulk of the world’s
population, and the bulk of the world’s poverty. The developing world, for the most part,

5

This has been true from Hymer’s (1976) first research on foreign direct investment in the 1960s to today. For more examples, see
Vernon (1966), Kindleberger (1974), Barrell and Pain (1997).
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has, for better or for worse, chosen to utilize FDI as a cornerstone of their development
strategies. Since the struggles of developing states to achieve greater living standards
for their citizens has been a key concern of the developing and developed world alike,
any research that helps shed light on their development processes is extremely
important and may serve not only as an academic exercise, but also as a policymaking
aid.

Recent Trends in Foreign Direct Investment
The amount of FDI capital inflows and outflows around the world rose sharply
starting in the early 1980s, peaked in the year 2000, and since has suffered a
precipitous decline. Table 1-2, reproduced from UNCTAD, illustrates these trends.
Figure 1-1 graphs the trends for FDI inflows and outflows of capital. The reason
for the recent decline was blamed by the World Investment Report on slow economic
growth around the world and a decline in cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(UNCTAD 2003). Despite the declines, the amount of foreign direct investment in 2002
throughout the world, both inflows and outflows, remained over 200 times greater than
in 1970, and around 4.5 times greater than in 1992.
Where does this foreign investment go? By and large one characteristic of
foreign investment is that the bulk flows to and from the developed world. From 1970 to
2002, the developed world has received an average of 72 percent of the inflows of FDI
capital. Developing countries, on the other hand, that have made foreign direct
investment a key part of their development strategies, have averaged far less. Figure
1-2 gives a graphical representation of developing countries’ inflows, and their share of
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Table 1-2:

Selected World Indictors of FDI, 1982-2002

Value at 2000 prices
(billions of US dollars

Item

Annual growth rate (Percent)

1982

1990

2002

1988-90

1990-95

1995-00

1999

2000

2001

2002

Inflows

33

159

677

18.5

15.4

36.7

60.6

33.1

-39.1

-20.2

Outflows

16

184

673

23.1

12.7

31.4

63.9

21.9

-39.0

-8.1

Source: World Investment Report 2003 (http://www.unctad.org)

world inflows (UNCTAD 2003). In 1982, developing countries hit their highest percent
of world FDI inflows, at nearly 46 percent. Developing countries captured over 40
percent of world inflows two other times, in 1994 and 1997. In 2002, they captured only
about 25 percent, over a percentage point less than their share at the beginning of the
1970s. 6
Nor is FDI distributed evenly among the developing nations. A number of
researchers single out Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Singapore as those
developing countries that capture a large percentage of FDI from the developed world
(Moran 1986, Cable and Mukherjee 1986, Cable and Persaud 1987, Page 1987).
Recently, China has grabbed more and more of the FDI available from the developed
world. In 2003, among the top 20 recipients of FDI, China ranked second to
Luxembourg with receipt of $53 billion, Singapore grabbed about $16 billion for 14th
place, Mexico ranked 15th with receipts of about $15 billion, and Brazil ranked 16th with
receipts of about $13 billion. 7 China and India also stand out as desirable locations for
new investment. In 2004, one survey showed that for the first time, global company

6

Data gathered from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Their website, http://www.unctad.org,
contains statistics on FDI available for viewing and downloading.
7
World Development Report, 2004.
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executives ranked China higher than the United States as a destination for investment,
with India as the third most attractive location. The report states that “…China and India
dominate the top two positions for most positive investor outlook, likely first-time
investments, and most preferred offshore investment locations for business processing
functions and IT services.” 8

Brief Outline of the Dissertation
Having introduced a rationale for a new study of FDI, the remainder of this
chapter will discuss the structure of the rest of this dissertation. Chapter Two will draw
specific elements of economic and political science literature together to create a model
of FDI. I first revisit these questions: What accounts for the variation of FDI policies in
developing countries? Do policies have an effect on FDI flows? I argue that individual
developing countries policies are indicative of a blend of wariness and openness toward
FDI, partly due to economic outlooks at various points in time that reflected pessimistic
or optimistic views of industrialization. Modernization theory and dependency theory
are discussed as emblematic of these two viewpoints. I then introduce the main actors
in the FDI story, multinational firms and developing states, and discuss their motivations
for participating in the FDI process by reviewing a number of theories on FDI from both
the firm and state perspective. Following that discussion, I introduce the logic of twolevel games. I argue that it best explains the FDI process because it incorporates both
the international and domestic level influences on policymaking and agreements
between firms and states.

8
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At the end of Chapter Two I develop a model of FDI. FDI policy is theorized to
be influenced by both domestic and international political and economic factors in a
larger multi-level process. FDI policy establishes each country’s openness or
restrictiveness to FDI. These policies are subject to domestic level political factors such
as regime type, nationalism, ideology, and domestic economic realities, such as the
availability of alternatives to FDI. However, international political and economic factors,
such as pressure from international institutions and proximity to developed countries,
also have an effect on domestic FDI policies.
Once the level of openness to FDI is determined through policy, it becomes a
factor in determining FDI inflows. Policies establish a baseline for agreement between
developing states and firms. Developing states with open policies have a larger range
of agreement possibilities, whereas those with restrictive policies have a smaller range
of agreement. These policies combine with other domestic and international economic
and political factors, such as international and domestic political stability, characteristics
of the investment market, wage structure, presence of corruption, and property rights, to
create an environment in which international firms decide whether or not to invest. The
type of investment opportunity (sectoral) will be particular to each state. I further argue
that FDI policies and FDI inflows have mutual dependence on each other, with each
exerting influence over the other.
Chapter Three subjects the theory presented in Chapter Two to empirical
statistical tests. Drawing on publicly available data published by international
institutions, I created a paneled time series dataset encompassing 55 countries and 29
years (1975-2004). In addition, I drew on the Exporter’s Encyclopedia, published by Dun
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and Bradstreet, to create an important new indicator of FDI policy: a 4-point index which
measures the relative openness and restrictiveness of each developing country toward
FDI. This indicator is the first of its kind, and should create opportunities for additional
research on FDI policy per se. I test the influences on FDI policy by using a general
linear, latent, and mixed model process and discuss the results. I find positive
associations between developing countries’ openness to FDI and democracy,
membership in international institutions, proximity to developed countries, external debt,
and past experience with FDI. I find negative associations between FDI policies and
nationalism and savings rates. Chapter Four extends the model to FDI inflows. I
specifically propose that FDI inflows are positively associated with open FDI policies,
and I find that is the case. FDI inflows are also positively associated with degree of
democracy.
Chapter Five presents case studies of two developing countries: El Salvador and
Nicaragua. El Salvador and Nicaragua offer interesting similarities and differences for
comparison. Each country has had a similar history in Spanish colonialization and
independence, and each has had a history of political and economic dominance from a
handful of elites. In El Salvador, a small coterie of influential land-owning families has
virtually controlled the political and economic landscape of that country. In Nicaragua,
most of the 20th century political and economic history of the country was dominated by
the Somoza family. However, many differences remain. El Salvador maintained a
nominal democratic government, dominated by right-wing groups, while Nicaragua was
ruled by the Somoza family dictatorship. Both countries faced violence and repression,
and both suffered from civil conflict. In El Salvador, the conflict ended in stalemate,
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leaving the country ruled by centrist and then rightist forces. In Nicaragua, however,
the conflict turned into a victory for leftist forces, followed by a continued and protracted
civil war.
In addition, both countries have had differing relations with the United States. In
Nicaragua, the Somoza regime largely retained the support of the United States, with
some exceptions when the dictatorship went too far with human rights abuses and
corrupt practices. The later success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua led to increased
U.S. involvement in military efforts to overturn the government, which helped culminate
in the 1990 election that turned out the Sandinistas and ushered in the Chamorro
government. In El Salvador, U.S. military support for the government helped keep the
country from turning left politically, though at the cost of civil unrest. Economically, both
countries have also had differing histories in the 20th century. While El Salvador’s
governments embraced free-market capitalism and experienced some growth in the
industrial sectors in the 1970s, largely due to foreign investment, the 1980s brought an
economic downturn due to the ongoing civil conflict. In contrast, Nicaragua’s small
industrial sector was geared toward domestic consumption and never really competed
with coffee and other agro-industrial exports. The Chamorro government brought in
economic reforms in the 1990s hoping to attract further aid and investment, but these
never really materialized.
To test the theory of FDI offered in this dissertation, I will examine their histories
of domestic and international politics and their economic openness. I will also pay close
attention to FDI and FDI policies. I include interviews with El Salvadoran government
and academic elites who know the policy process relating to FDI and its ultimate effects
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on the FDI bottom line. These interviews will help complete the overall picture that I
establish with my theory and model.
I will follow the case study chapters with a short review in Chapter Six of the
research presented in this dissertation, and some conclusions. I will also provide some
possible directions for future research based upon my findings. I hope that the addition
of a new measure for FDI policy, a quantitative test using that measure, and
comprehensive case studies will significantly add to the previous valuable research on
foreign direct investment.

The Path to a New Model of Foreign Direct Investment
In the following chapter I will begin by focusing on attitudes toward foreign
investment established by modernization and dependency theories and then
concentrate on the relationship between states and firms. While the multinational
corporation pursues strategies toward greater profit, the state or groups within the state
pursue strategies toward greater development. These development strategies are
represented by state policies including those dealing with foreign direct investment. I
argue that developing states create policies that constitute a basis for eventual
agreement with international firms. These policies can be classified as incentives or
restrictions. The more open (restrictive) the policies, the easier (harder) the bargain the
state will drive. In turn these FDI policies influence the level of FDI inflows that enter
developing countries, since along with other factors they provide some level of
inducement for international firms to invest. The entire dance of FDI takes place within
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a complex web of interactions between domestic political and economic activities and
the international political and economic environment, which I will discuss further.
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Chapter Two
Toward a Theory of Foreign Direct Investment Policy
Arriving at a theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) policy is a bit like staging a
play. There are actors, both primary and secondary, encounters among those actors,
and outcomes from those encounters. However, there are also motivations, desires
and strategies that drive the actions of each of the actors. These characteristics are
specified in an overall narrative, which creates the conditions for what happens on the
stage. In this chapter, I will lay out the narrative, identify the actors, especially the main
actor or actors, highlight their characteristics and describe their encounters and the
outcomes of those encounters. The following pages will illuminate the drama that is
being played out in the foreign direct investment story. The goal is to identify why
developing countries pass policies on FDI, and why those policies vary from more
restrictive to more open. A second goal is to determine if developing countries’ FDI
policies have an effect on the amount of FDI that flows into their markets.
The first part of the chapter will set the stage for why developing countries restrict
or demonstrate openness to FDI. I will examine two main theoretical frameworks which
I argue have influenced developing countries’ attitudes toward FDI over the past half
century. I will then introduce our main actors of interests, developing states, and their
motivations. I will also introduce and briefly touch on another primary actor,
multinational corporations, without which the FDI story would not occur. I will explain
the web of domestic and international factors that influence agreements, and tie

20

everything back to the main goal of explaining FDI policies and their effects on FDI
flows. I will conclude the chapter by defining a model of FDI that includes FDI policy.
I assume, throughout this dissertation, that all developing states have a desire to
better their economic development at various points in time. Regardless of whether
they put their development plans on hold for a period of time, they will have pursued or
will pursue development at other points in their history. I believe this is a reasonable
assumption because the history of states is dynamic, not static. Governments,
economic situations, world politics and other aspects of states change, and so do their
goals.
I also assume, for the sake of simplicity, that investment agreements are
between one firm and one state. Of course, developing states most likely engage
multiple firms and also compete against other states. However, I argue that each
agreement process between a developing state and multinational corporation follows
similar dynamics, and therefore simplification to a one-state, one-firm scenario helps
explain all such situations.

Setting the Scene
As explained in Chapter One, FDI has been a growing and important part of the
globalization of the international economy. In the latter half of the twentieth century, FDI
has been a vital component in the development strategies of underdeveloped countries.
FDI has been at the center of a convergence of desires between the developed and the
developing world. By and large, the developing world has desperately wanted to
industrialize to enjoy the benefits experienced by the already industrialized developed
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world. However, industrialization not only provides benefits, but also costs. For this
reason, I will argue that developing countries are of two minds about FDI. On one hand,
they want investment, capital, job opportunities, managerial and technological
advances, and additional revenues. On the other hand, allowing foreign investment
potentially brings about a whole host of problems for host governments, including partial
loss of economic decision-making control, local opposition by interest groups, and
greater international scrutiny of their policies toward business and the economy in
general. Thus, each developing country weighs the benefits against the costs of FDI,
and decides how wide to open its doors to foreign capital. Some countries will be more
wary about this path to development and restrict foreign investment to a greater degree
based on a multitude of factors such as their internal political situation, their position in
the international community, the availability of alternative ways to development, and
their own past history with FDI. Other developing countries, based on the same factors,
will take a more positive view of foreign direct investment, and open the door wider.
For those in the developed world, the benefits of industrializing the
underdeveloped countries have largely outweighed the costs. At the very least,
developing countries hold the potential of new markets, cheap labor and manufacturing,
and can possibly serve as a new source of profits for multinational firms. For the more
utopian-minded, the prospect of a fully modernized and industrialized world creates the
prospect for a high standard of living for all, harmony and peace among nations, and an
opportunity for humanity to engage in higher pursuits. The idea that humanity can rise
above its petty conflicts, harmonize its interests in the pursuit of rational ideas, and live
in prosperity was first proposed during the Enlightenment in Europe. Over the
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centuries, various incarnations of this philosophy have flourished and waned. The hope
of a more rationalized, modernized world influences the narrative I am constructing in
the 1950s, just after the bloodiest war in history and in the middle of the Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Modernization theory emerged from
academia in the United States partly as a way to entice developing and newly liberated
states away from the umbrella of the Soviets (Latham 2003). The message was simple.
The industrialized countries in Europe and the United States were all once developing
states themselves. Through a progression from agriculturally-based societies to
industrialized societies, each of the industrialized nations advanced until they reached
modernity. The developing countries are on the same path, modernization theory
argued, maybe starting at a later point in time or moving at a slower pace but all
advancing inexorably forward. In order to help the process, the acceptance of Western
values such as capitalism and democracy was seen as key to leaping ahead of the
countries (the Soviet Union and its allies) that had turned their back on Western
modernity to pursue a socialist form of industrialization.
One widely accepted version of this theory was proposed by Walt Rostow (1960).
Rostow argued that modernization proceeded in a linear set of stages. Basing his
arguments on observations of European cases, Rostow contended that all countries first
begin in what he labeled the traditional stage. At this stage, the state is rudimentary or
non-existent, and the market consists of low-technology production and subsistence
agriculture. As the nation-state begins to centralize, the preconditions for take-off begin
to appear. The growing nation-state fosters private entrepreneurship, which in turn
leads to advances in technology and the beginnings of industrial production. These
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advances create changes in the economic, political and social environment. The state
pushes greater development by passing laws favoring production over agriculture. The
overcoming of obstacles and groups opposed to economic development puts the
nation-state in the takeoff stage.
Rostow maintains that nation-states that continue a long process of economic
development by extending modern industrial production techniques throughout society
advance through a stage called the drive to maturity. After about 40 years, the stage of
high mass consumption occurs, in which a state’s economy has become sufficiently
diversified and more service-oriented. Industrial production concentrates on durable
goods rather than non-durables.
Another articulation of modernization theory was provided by Lipset (1959), who
proposed that various socioeconomic factors, such as education, industrialization,
urbanization and wealth, along with the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political
systems, were the keys to political and economic modernization, particularly sustaining
democracy.
This linear and somewhat deterministic theory seemed to not only explain how
the European nations developed, but how other nations, particularly the developing
countries in the global South, could develop as well. State actions that promoted
private entrepreneurship and free markets assumed primary importance. However,
many developing nations that followed U.S. prescriptions for development, regardless of
what types of policies they put together, did not seem to develop as predicted through
the 1950s and 1960s. From the modernization viewpoint, this lack of development was
explained by inadequate investment in the local economy and bad government policies.
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Modernization theorists, particularly Rostow, proposed advancing foreign aid from the
industrialized world, most notably the United States, to help finance development in
underdeveloped regions. They argued that such aid would create appreciation for
capitalism, and create aspirations for democracy in recipient countries (Haefele 2003).
Most notably, it was argued that such aid would keep such states from falling into the
Soviet orbit, which was advancing its own form of modernization with its command
economy model. More recently, Boix and Stokes (2003) find, statistically, that economic
development leads to democracy, especially when per capita income exceeds $12,000
per year.
Modernization theory has been under scrutiny since it was articulated. Some
critiques have to do with the factors that push modernization. For example, does
modernization in developing countries arise from endogenous factors or exogenous
factors? Migdal (1974) looks at what he calls “culture contact” or exposure to a wider
cultural environment (perhaps akin to globalization), and finds it insufficient to explain
modernization. He argues that the breakdown of old traditions and institutions within
societies, if they occur, is another explanation for modernization. Similarly, Pye (1979),
in a critique of the development of modernization theory, points to local cultural factors
and its effects on the pace of economic and political development within different
societies.
Other criticisms arise from modernization theorists’ predictions of democracy
given greater economic development. Some theorists, such as Barrington Moore
(1966), though sympathetic to the idea that development of a middle class could allow a
country to politically modernize, disputed that the Western model would lead to one
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outcome. He argued that differences in class development could easily lead to
modernization under non-democratic conditions. More recently, Przeworski and
Limongi (1997) challenged the prediction that countries that economically develop
become democratic, citing data that show that some dictatorships are wealthy and
reach stability under greater development. In their view, democracies thrive due to
political actors, and because they are modern. Similarly, a study of the military-led
modernization efforts in Latin America found that increased military spending thwarts
modernization (DeRouen, Jr. and Heo 2001). Since many Latin American countries
have histories of military rule during modernization attempts, modernization may not
have been the impetus behind their recent political development into democracies. In
that vein, modernization may not have contributed to democracy in Thailand (Englehart
2003).
Other theorists took aim at the argument that modernization was inevitable.
Notably the dependency school, beginning with Andre Gunder Frank and continuing
with Immanuel Wallerstein, argued that the results of industrialization on the Western
model were conditioned by the structure of the world economy, which was based on
colonization and exploitation (Gilman 2003). Developed nations and their former
colonies were locked in a relationship of dependency, where developing countries
gained somewhat, but the core developed countries gained more because the world
economic system limited the economic capacities of the developing world.
Different approaches to dependency theory developed, all concentrating on the
systemic nature of the international economic environment (Fry 1983). One, Marxist in
character, focuses on the effects of socio-economic class and investment on national
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welfare. It argues that the capitalist class in industrial countries uses FDI to dominate
the lesser-developed countries. Investments are made in commodities and raw
materials, which are exported out of the host country and manufactured into industrial
products that are imported back to the developing countries. Thus, developing
countries are victims of a type of economic colonialism, continually dependent on the
industrialized countries for consumer goods, made from developing states’ own
resources, at high prices.
A non-Marxist strain of the theory softens the language of economic colonialism,
but argues that the net effect of the dependent relationship over time is a continued loss
of economic ground to developed countries. In other words, this softer dependency
theory does not necessarily accept the thesis of economic colonialism, but argues that
the inherent bias of the international economic system leads to similar effects.
In both strains of dependency theory, the world is seen in dichotomous terms.
The international arena is divided into areas called the “core” and the “periphery.” The
core is made up of industrial states concentrated mostly in the global north. These
states have set up a system based on economic openness, especially with each other.
Trade and investment pass relatively easily between them. Because they are
industrialized, they have a wide variety of materials that can be used to trade with other
nations for comparative advantage. The periphery is made up of all other nations.
These nations range from some industrialization to little industrialization. They have
relatively few resources or products to trade for comparative advantage.
Some periphery countries, like Mexico, Brazil and the newly industrializing
countries of Asia, managed to make some advances in industrialization that was not
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accounted for in dependency theory. To explain these countries, Peter Evans (1979)
advanced a version of dependency theory that he labeled dependent development. In
his formulation of dependency theory, some countries were able to advance from the
periphery to a semi-peripheral state based on a tripartite alliance of international capital,
local capital and the developing state. These countries are able to industrialize to a
point, and even gain control over some non-critical sectors of the economy. However,
conditions always dictated that local capital would be at a disadvantage. The
developing state plays local capital against foreign capital, and left out of the process is
the mass population of the developing country which is not allowed to participate or
make decisions about economic growth.
Resources that developing countries offer are raw materials and abundant labor.
Because they are under-industrialized, however, they lack the ability to exploit these
resources efficiently and must choose to try to industrialize by themselves, or to invite
help from outside. The first choice is often economically more expensive than they can
handle, but may be popular socially and politically. The second choice may be less
expensive economically and gain developing countries’ world credibility, but
governments opening up to the global system and inviting agents of industrialization
from outside to enter their economies may pay a political and social price. Once there
is a leak in the economic dike, the flow of outside capital, including foreign direct
investment, becomes difficult to stop.
Developing nations are affected by their reliance on the world economic system
to develop through FDI, argues dependency theory. While this is not the main focus of
this dissertation, it is interesting to review because it foreshadows later arguments on
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the agreement process between states and firms. In general, industrialized countries
and their agents, the multinational corporations (MNCs), continue to draw upon
resources primarily from the developing host countries, leaving developing countries in
a permanent state of under-development.
The costs of industrialization are painstakingly tallied by dependency theory.
First, it is argued that MNCs do not bring much new capital into host countries; instead
they borrow locally and spirit capital back to the industrialized countries through transfer
pricing and profit repatriation (Fry 1983, Moran 1986, Billet 1993). Second, FDI allows
MNCs to maintain a monopolistic advantage in developing countries’ markets, stifling
local competition, creating technology dependence, stripping resources from the country
and leading to MNC domination of key sectors (Evans 1979). Third, MNCs bring
inappropriate, capital intensive technology into host developing countries which do not
make the best use of their abundant labor resources. Inequality problems are
exacerbated by the formation of a labor elite and the development of enclave
economies (Evans 1979, Moran 1986, Grieco 1986). Fourth, FDI brings inappropriate
products into host country markets, which can be of little social value and in turn,
exacerbate social inequalities by fostering a consumer culture (Vernon 1977, Fry 1983).
Fifth, the penetration of developing countries by MNCs leads to dependent and
asymmetric relationships with the industrialized countries, increasing the power of
MNCs (Fry 1983) and possibly leading to MNC interference in host state politics and
policy (Apter 1976).
In many ways, classical dependency theory is as deterministic as modernization
theory. It points to world capitalism as the main cause of underdevelopment in
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developing countries (Bratton 1982). For our purposes, the importance of dependency
theory lies not in its arguments about the potential effects of capitalism and FDI on
political and economic development prospects. Instead, the theory is important
because of its view on state roles and state policy. Dependency theory argues strongly
that states should be active participants in the economy, and it had a significant impact
on the way that many nations approached FDI and FDI policy, especially in the 1960s
and 1970s. Many developing nations, following the tenets of dependency theory,
severely restricted the amount of FDI unless it nurtured home-grown industries with an
emphasis on greater exports and replacing expensive imports. Foreign firms were
required to localize production, to varying degrees of success, in many countries
including Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia (Doner 1992). The
primary goal for many developing nations was to become less dependent on foreignmade products by encouraging local manufactures, and to gain greater economic
wealth by exporting these manufactures abroad. Many developing countries took a
direct role in their economies by establishing and strengthening state-owned
corporations and parastatals (Evans 1979).
The 1970s saw a number of developing countries adopt policies based on the
tenets of dependency theories. Export-oriented industrialization policies, combined with
greater regulations on foreign corporations, restriction on the participation of foreign
corporations in developing markets, and import substitution polices to reduce reliance
on foreign products were supposed to allow developing states to drive a harder bargain
with foreign companies. Such policies were not without their critics. Mahler (1981)
made an early argument against dependency theorists’ tendency to blame all
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developing country ills on capitalism in his study of the world sugar agreement. Rather
than quit cultivating sugar because of perceptions that the market is controlled by firms
and advanced countries, he suggested more coordinated strategies among developing
countries. Ahiakpor’s (1985, 546) case study of Ghana showed how policies influenced
by dependency theories could go wrong. He argued that such policies led to “poverty
and misery.” By the 1990s, after disappointing economic results and many economic
crises, many developing countries began to reduce government participation in the
economy, loosen regulations and restrictions, and privatize government-owned
industries. In 2002, one critic declared dependency theory dead (Velasco 2002).
Ideas of modernization began, in one way or another, to gain credence again.
Neoliberal economics argued that developing states had meddled too much in the
economy, and must scale back and allow free market policies in order to modernize.
Western neoconservatives, on the other hand, merely hoped for stability and order
among developing countries, rather than modernity (Gilman 2003, 71). They criticized
previous neoliberal views that modernization could be imposed or encouraged, but
backed invasion of an autocratic, developing Iraq in an attempt to introduce democracy
to the Middle East, arguing that toppling the Iraqi government would bring the Middle
East eventually closer to modern Western values. This cyclical movement of
development prescription is noted by Paul Krugman (1995), who describes the
movement from free-market and state privatization policy recommendations in the
1930s to those of state intervention and activism in the markets in the 1960s and 1970s,
and back to Washington Consensus recommendations of free-markets and privatization
in the 1980s and 1990s.
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I argue that the result, for developing countries, is a mixture of acceptance of the
international economy and its promise, and a wariness of the methods of the
international economy. Many developing countries implemented import-substitutionindustrialization policies in the 1970s, hoping to reduce their reliance on imports from
the developed world and to foster their own industrial capabilities. Many countries
allowed restricted foreign investment, and regulated it. Massive state spending and
establishment of state-owned-industries, fueled by recycled petro-dollars, led to equally
massive debt-crises in the 1980s, and prescriptions of structural readjustment by
international lending institutions as a remedy to put developing countries back on the
right track. FDI policies in many developing countries become less restrictive, though
some countries, such as China, were able to restrict investment more than others.
FDI policies serve as one indication to firms of the investment climate in
developing markets, and their potential of profitability. Therefore, policies directly affect
the amount of FDI that flows into the developing market. Developing countries’
attitudes, reflected in their policies, consist of unique combinations of acceptance and
wariness based on past experiences and future promises.

Foreign Direct Investment Defined
To this point, we have discussed the environment which allows developing
countries to set policies of foreign direct investment. What is FDI and why do
developing countries, on one hand, look to it as a path of development and on the other
hand, treat it cautiously?
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Foreign direct investment occurs when a firm in one country invests directly in
facilities in another country for the purpose of producing a product, buys an enterprise in
a another country, or sets up a direct subsidiary. While this concept is relatively
straightforward, it still creates difficulties for researchers that wish to measure FDI and
use it for study. A comprehensive FDI glossary compiled by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
defines direct investment as “a category of international investment made by a resident
entity in one economy (direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting
interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct
investment enterprise).” 9 In addition, both the IMF and the OECD define a direct
investment enterprise as one “in which a foreign investor owns 10 percent or more of
the ordinary shares or voting power for an incorporated enterprise or an unincorporated
enterprise in which a foreign investor has equivalent ownership.” 10 Direct investment,
according to these definitions, can include subsidiaries, branches, and associate
companies in which non-resident investors own 10 percent or more of the enterprise.
The World Bank follows a similar guideline when categorizing FDI.
The main agents of foreign direct investment are firms investing abroad. Labeled
as transnational corporations (TNCs), multinational corporations (MNCs), or
multinational enterprises (MNEs), such firms share common attributes. MNCs tend to
be large and diverse, both geographically and in the products they offer. They are
controlled from a central point in a home country with subsidiaries in various host
nations (Vernon 1977). Home countries for MNCs are predominantly in industrialized
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countries, though the number of MNCs based in developing countries has been rising.
MNCs treat the entire world as their operational area, and all units of MNCs have the
same objective as communicated from the center operations. The most commonly
assumed objective of MNCs are continued profits.
FDI should be distinguished from other types of foreign capital that flow around
the world. Capital can flow into countries through foreign investment, foreign aid, or by
borrowing from international financial institutions. The utility of the different types of
flows has undergone an evolutionary process. FDI replaced foreign aid as the most
dominant form of capital flow in the 1960s and 1970s. The late 1970s and early 1980s
saw the recycling of petrodollars, in which oil money from the Middle East flooded into
financial institutions in developed countries and then became loans to the developing
world. A ballooning of external debt forced many developing nations to undergo fiscal
belt-tightening, and FDI has come back into prominence in the 1990s as the capitalgeneration mechanism of choice for developing countries (Billet 1993).
FDI must also be distinguished from portfolio investment, which is conducted
through economic transactions in the securities markets.

Hymer (1976), in a seminal

study of FDI, called for a theory of FDI separate from portfolio investment because
examination into the behavior of each revealed more differences than similarities,
sometimes in contradiction to each other. Unlike portfolio investment, FDI is conducted
specifically by firms usually over a longer term. Hymer felt that applying existing
theories of portfolio investment to FDI did not make sense, and argued that the missing
factor separating FDI from portfolio investment is the concept of control. Firms investing
in foreign countries want control of the investment in order to maximize profits, ensure
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investment security, remove competition from other international or local competitors,
and appropriate full returns on skills and capabilities in the host economy. In contrast,
portfolio investment tends to be of shorter duration and concentrates on quick profits.
While portfolio investors in corporations with subsidiaries in foreign countries can often
vote on company direction, voting does not necessarily allow control. Direct investment
is, in other words, controlling investment, where the parent corporation directly controls
what the subsidiary does.
This idea of control emerges from various definitions as “lasting interest” and the
idea that 10 percent or more ownership constitutes an “effective voice” in the operations
of the firm. However, the 10 percent floor has been challenged by some researchers
who question its accuracy despite widespread acceptance (Graham and Krugman
1993). What truly constitutes a controlling interest? Lall and Streeten (1977) argue that
control can be exercised with relatively low equity share, and can be exerted without
direct management. Regardless of the debates about control, this concept separates
FDI from other forms of international investment. However, Moosa (2002) points out
that 10 percent interest does not constitute an actual controlling interest but a potential
controlling interest, and that control is more evident when firms have a substantial
amount of shares, and shift part of their assets, production and/or sales to the host
country.
FDI creates many measurement issues as well. One of the greatest problems is
the lack of available or complete data. Some countries do not publish FDI data on a
frequent basis. Others employ differing standards to delineate FDI. One section of the
World Investment Report 2003 is devoted to individual country reports regarding their
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FDI, and parts of those reports consist of explaining each country’s unique standard of
FDI. Two commonly used forms of measurement for FDI are flows and stocks of
capital. FDI flows are amounts invested over a set period of time, and stocks are the
cumulative amounts invested over time in a country. Furthermore, flows and stocks of
FDI are often divided into inward FDI and outward FDI, each measuring differing
aspects of FDI. Inward FDI is stocks or capital of FDI that enters a host country from
abroad. Negative inflows indicate capital leaving a host country because of government
policy, profit or capital repatriation or export of goods. Outward FDI, on the other hand,
consists of resources that are sent overseas by firms in the home country – outflows
can also be negative for the same reasons as inflows. Researchers investigating FDI
use either inflows or outflows of stock or capital depending on their research questions.

The Developing State
With this understanding of FDI, we must now define the main actors in this
drama. In the world of FDI, the state is one of many actors that influences where the
current of FDI flows. However, the focus of this dissertation is on the eventual action of
developing states as revealed through their policies. In the narrative of this story I am
describing, the developing state has a blend of openness and wariness about FDI.
Therefore, it is incumbent that we appreciate the state and learn why it is important, and
what motivates its actions in the FDI story.
There are a number of perspectives on the state and foreign direct investment,
as well as the development of policy in general. The state can be viewed as an arena in
which various societal and economic groups cooperate and compete and where policy

36

is created that predominantly reflects the interest of the most dominant groups. It is
important to acknowledge that various groups and classes may have some effect on the
creation of policies for foreign direct investment in developing countries. At the same
time, the creation of FDI policy regularly pits the interests of multinational corporations
against the interests of a “state” which may or may not reflect the interests of economic
or social groups within it. When a developing country passes laws that restrict or
enhance investment entry, or establishes regulations on MNC activity within its borders,
it sends a signal to potential investors about its “friendliness” towards direct investment
in general, sometimes in consensus with and sometimes against societal groups.
The “state” has not always been considered to be an important player in the
political arena. Until the late 1970s, many political theories revolved around various
economic and social groups within the state, arguing that such groups use the state as
an arena in which to cooperate and compete in order to further their economic, social
and political interests. Studies in political economy have more or less acknowledged
the existence of the state, with some that give the state a greater role and responsibility
and assigning various roles to it. For example, in classical political economy as
articulated by Smith and Ricardo and their followers, the state plays a minimal role. The
working of the market is presented as a seamless system, where individuals that act as
both buyers and sellers of products and labor pursue the means to meet their
subsistence levels. Public welfare is met if the market is free to operate according to its
own rules; though hardship is inevitable for individuals for periods of time, the laws of
supply and demand serve the public good overall. The state is relegated to protecting
life, property and providing public goods that the market cannot provide.
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Neoclassical political economy similarly downplays the role of the state. The
neoclassical perspective argues that public welfare is maintained if all people are
allowed to maximize their satisfaction. In maximizing satisfaction, people pursue
consumption, thereby entering into exchange with others who are equally trying to
maximize their own utilities. Neoclassical theories argue that a perfect market with
plenty of competition features maximum group welfare if individuals are allowed to
pursue their satisfaction without interference. Unfortunately, markets are not perfect
and there are problems of externalities – the effects that transactions between two
parties have on others who are not part of the transaction. Thus, neoclassical theories
also see a role for the state in the absence of perfect markets, because the state can
intervene to create more competition by breaking up monopolies and preventing
collusion, and use fines, subsidies and regulation to limit externalities.
The Marxian perspective perceives the state in a very different way. Like Smith
and Ricardo, Marx argued that the market system creates a social division of labor,
which separates upon class lines. The most simple and important class division is that
between workers and producers, or in other terms, labor and capital. Marx argued that
labor and capital are diametrically opposed to each other because of conflict over
surpluses created by the market. These surpluses are coveted by capitalists as profit,
and by workers wishing to move beyond subsistence and to gain other social welfare
benefits. Because capitalists always want more profit, they attempt to make production
more efficient at the expense of labor. However, whereas workers may achieve class
consciousness and unite, Marx argues that capitalists are not very cohesive as a class
because they are in competition with each other and weaker capital is constantly
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subsumed by stronger capital. Thus, the Marxian perspective sees the state arising for
two different purposes. The state exists to keep social order because of the conflict
between labor and capital, and to represent the interests of the capitalist class. This
does not mean that the state acts at the behest of the capitalist class, but simply in
capital’s interest.
More academic interest has focused on how the state acts not only as an arena
for political conflict, but also as an autonomous actor in the political process affecting
political outcomes even as it is affected by them. Part of this “upsurge” in interest in the
state, as Skocpol (1985) described it, was the realization that the state often took
actions that either went beyond or went against the wishes of the dominant societal or
economic groups. In addition, the fact that states cooperate and compete with each
other in an international political and economic environment, and the assumptions
already inherent in these relationships that states act in an internally cohesive manner
by serving as an arena for compromise among their constituent units, helps to give the
concept of “state as actor” more credibility.
Researchers, beginning in the 1970s, began to take the state into account in their
studies. As Duvall and Freeman (1981) succinctly write:
“In capitalist societies of the twentieth century, the state is deeply and
directly involved in the processes of economic growth, not only through benign
facilitation, but through active promotion and direction. Partly through Keynesian
demand management, and partly through intervention into the sphere of
production, the capitalist state plays an important role in shaping the course of
the economy. It influences patterns of distribution and consumption, affects
savings and investment rates, devises and executes development programs
(albeit sometimes haphazardly and unwittingly), and contributes to the national
creation and maintenance of industrial sectors by participating in the financing
and even ownership of the means of production. Indeed, capital accumulation is
so directly and thoroughly affected by the state that it becomes increasingly
difficult conceptually to distinguish the “public” from the “private” in analyzing the
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dynamics of accumulation. The capitalist spheres of production and exchange
and the capitalist state are inextricably bound together.” 11
Evans (1979) argued that the rapid industrialization that occurred in Brazil from 1950
through the 1970s would not be possible without an activist state whose interests were
sometimes allied with and sometimes opposed to multinational corporations and local
elites. Caporaso (1982), in addressing the industrialization of Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan,
Singapore and South Korea, found that one common characteristic among them was an
active state that aggressively entered the economy and promoted the industrialization
process, often by mobilizing both domestic and foreign finance. Campbell and Lindberg
(1990) argue that both the state as actor and the state as a collection of institutions
influence their economies by shaping, defining, and redefining property rights. The
research suggests that the state can be perceived as an actor that cannot be dismissed
in political economy, and serious consideration of the state should be taken into account
in any discussion of FDI, especially FDI policy.
What does it mean for a state to be an actor? According to Skocpol (1985),
states are considered actors if they formulate and pursue their own goals. This
independent action may come about because of states’ linkages into the international
economic and political environment, and because of their need to maintain order
domestically. States are made up of collectivities of actors implementing established
policies in an organizationally coherent fashion over a long period of time. The
organizational resources states can bring to bear are very important. In particular, state
autonomy and capacity become crucial if the state is to be successful in reaching its
economic goals. Autonomy refers to the separation the state can maintain from
11

Italics are mine.
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dominant groups, and capacity refers to the resources the state can bring to bear. In
many cases, capacity not only refers to financial resources, but human resources as
well, such as the skill and loyalty of state officials. Autonomy and capacity are not
constant, but may vary across policy areas.
States value autonomy and capacity because of the opportunity it gives them to
maximize various goals. What are these goals? Four possible goals of the state in the
international economic arena have been defined as aggregate national income, political
power, social stability, and economic growth (Krasner 1976). Krasner argued that these
goals apply to all states in the international system, regardless of size and level of
development. Even though Krasner was exploring the question of states’ openness in
the international trading sphere, these goals also apply to foreign direct investment, and
are especially important in developing countries, where distortions of the market make
state autonomy and capacity very important in order to achieve these goals.
Reuschemeyer and Evans (1985) argue that one goal of states is to promote economic
development by stimulating and disciplining entrepreneurship in markets that are less
than competitive. In some cases, the state inserts itself into the economy in the form of
state-owned enterprises, ostensibly to replace the lack of private capital in certain
problematic sectors. In other cases, it may offer incentives for local and/or foreign
capital. Another goal of the state is to try new methods of achieving economic growth.
Amsden (1985) offers a case study of Taiwan in which the state managed to move the
economy from import-substitution to export-led growth, overcoming the influence of the
military and its interest of continued defense spending. Regardless, the state’s ability to
affect the economy seems relatively clear.
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As discussed above, state autonomy is important, but some see state autonomy
as being clearly dependent on a number of important factors. A long-standing
traditional political science framework for influences on the state has been pluralism, or
the degree of strength and competition between interest groups within society.
Traditional pluralism as applied to the United States held that interest groups competed
in a “free market” of politics. It was argued that the existence of many points of access
in the federal U.S. political system allowed ample ways for groups to influence
government. Competition between groups checked the monopolization of one or a few
groups (Truman 1951, Dahl 1967). According to Keehn (1976), pluralism relegates
government to the task of night watchman, acting as a referee and balancing the
competing interests. Policy is created by government after weighing competing
proposals from groups. Corporate pluralism held that interest groups do not compete
freely in American politics, but that individual groups or small collectivities of interest
groups “capture” governmental institutions and literally write governmental policy
because government has given them sovereignty in certain areas (Lowi 1967, 1979).
Subsequent refinements of pluralism include the more complex models of policy
subsystems, such as subgovernments consisting of Congressional committees,
administrative agencies and interest groups, and the more complex model proposed by
Heclo (1978) which proposed the existence of issue networks within which
subgovernments operate. As issues become more complex, the federal government
finds it more difficult to address them comprehensively through public policy. New
networks form from a rapidly increasing pool of new groups, as well as federal, state
and local governmental agencies. The representatives of these groups and agencies
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are more politically and technologically savvy about the issues their groups and
agencies represent, and more tightly focused policymaking occurs as a result.
The concept of pluralism has been argued to more or less describe the federal
U.S. system, though it has been criticized as not capturing the essence of the American
political system. (Keehn 1976).

Pluralism is also a much less compelling argument in

other parts of the world, but the existence of groups in developing countries and their
relationships to the state, in some cases reducing state autonomy and capacity, have
been noted. For example, it has been documented that African states regularly
intervene in agricultural markets at the behest of interest groups with a stake in
agricultural prices (Bates 1988). Migdal (1988) argues that in weak developing states
such as Sierra Leone, central governments have been hampered by local strongmen
and their followers who were empowered by previous colonial governments. The
implication, however, is that pluralism does not necessarily indicate a vibrant state. For
instance, it has been argued that “pluralism by default” has been the process by which
developing states in the former Soviet Union have progressed politically, based not on
strong civil society or democratic institutions but in the breakdown of autocratic control
(Way 2005).
Many modern European democratic systems were built partly through interest
groups operating in close alliance with governments. These groups did not capture
government agencies but were officially sanctioned by governments. This type of
system has been labeled corporatism, and has been defined as a system in which
“strategic actors are given a permanent role in policymaking in those sectors that are
relevant to their interest” in exchange for “politics of moderation characterized by a
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willingness to compromise with each other and with the state” (Magagna 1988, 422). In
Europe, corporatism seems to be associated with consensus democracies, while
pluralism tends to concentrate in majoritarian democracies (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991)
However, this is not necessarily the case in developing countries. In Latin America, for
example, majoritarian systems such as Mexico and Brazil have at times been
corporatist. In such countries we see similar situations in which governments sanction
official interest groups and leave independent groups on the margins. Corporatist
systems allow government elites to define the scope of civil society through
inducements and constraints and maintain more control over the policymaking process.
Groups that are officially sanctioned receive organizational benefits, such as official
recognition and subsidies that give them significant advantages over groups that claim
to represent the same members of the public. In addition, official recognition may allow
the government to penetrate and dominate officially sanctioned groups, which then
respond to the government’s wishes more readily than the needs of their constituents
(Collier and Collier 1979).
So far, the developing state in a corporatist scenario seems to have relative
autonomy from interest groups. However, this is not entirely the case. First, the
support of interest groups does not come for free for governments in developing states;
they must provide some reason to win the initial cooperation of the groups. Often this
may involve acceding to certain demands. The stronger the interest groups in question,
the more inducements the state must offer to win them over. Second, a developing
state under the corporatist model cannot always fully silence non-sanctioned groups
unless it reverts to a more oppressive system. This is not to say that corporatist states
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do not repress non-official groups; they often do, especially when the state is strong
enough to dictate high constraints and offer low inducements (Collier and Collier 1979).
However, there is some latitude for non-official groups to operate. In other words, even
an authoritarian state’s policies will still reflect a certain amount of deference to official
groups, and even to some issues from strong non-official groups.
In the case of FDI and FDI policy, domestic interest groups may line up for or
against FDI, and dominant groups within the society may exert more or less influence,
based on whether these groups are open or wary of this form of economic development.
Yet the state must, whether it is legitimately representing its entire population or even a
small portion thereof, set policy and use that initial stance to bargain with multinationals
in order to attract investment. Therefore, whether policies reflect the interests of strong
interest groups or the interests of an autonomous state, they still indicate a set of
preferences. Regardless of whether these preferences reflect narrow interests or a
majority of the population, they are what developing states bring to the bargaining table
with firms and indicate the initial stance of these developing states toward FDI.

Multinational Corporations
Multinational corporations (MNCs), sometimes referred to in this dissertation as
firms, are the second actor in the FDI story. As I have explained, developing states
form attitudes about FDI, which influence their preferences about how open they will be
toward this avenue of development. Their policies toward FDI, either more restrictive or
more open, are an indication of their initial preferences.

45

The MNC plays a key role in the story of FDI. Understanding their role as entities
that enable FDI is essential, because they serve as agents of development. In doing
so, firms act in their own interest and therefore are independent entities in the process.
Nevertheless, their preferences and motivations must be taken into account, because
the results of developing states’ interactions with them can also affect those states’ FDI
policies.
MNCs are distinguished from strictly national firms by their large size, the
complex character of their organization, the diversity of their business interests, and
their geographical dispersion (Vernon 1977, 1998). Because MNCs operate on a global
scale in the pursuit of profit, they are not as concerned about their effects in local
markets as their hosts are. Since they make direct investments, they also control the
actions of their subsidiaries in developing countries through their hierarchical structures.
These traits, argues Vernon, tend to bring firms into conflict with host nations which
have desires and preferences of their own based on local conditions. Thus, firm and
host country desires will sometimes clash with the global preferences of firms.
Even though this study does not approach FDI from the firm perspective, I argue
that firms play a major role in providing an impetus for foreign direct investment policy.
With their investments, firms provide a shopping list of benefits that developing
countries lack and desire, such as resources, expertise, know-how and efficiency.
MNCs also offer a way for developing countries to exploit valuable resources, whether
those resources are natural or human, which they may not have been able to exploit
before.
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Theories of the firm tell us about firm preferences that lead them to invest in
developing countries. These preferences indirectly influence FDI policies and should be
briefly touched on. Hymer (1976) articulated perhaps the first firm theory devoted to
FDI where he argued that FDI could be differentiated from portfolio investment because
of its long-term nature and the characteristic of MNC control over its nature for its
duration. Firms engaging in FDI want control in order to ensure the safety of the
investment, to remove competition between themselves and other international or local
competitors, and to fully take advantage of any returns on skills and abilities acquired in
the investment.
Firms have a variety of motivations to engage in FDI. MNCs gain advantages,
such as such as acquiring lower-cost factors of production, gaining knowledge or control
of more efficient production functions, obtaining better distribution facilities, increasing
the differentiation of their products and reducing risk by diversifying globally (Hymer
1976). They may also gain monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages by investing in
other countries. They gain such advantages by competing and driving out local
business or exploiting imperfect market conditions. Their sheer size gives them the
ability to exploit economies of scale and diverse resources and affords them many
advantages in lesser-developed countries. They also provide benefits to host countries,
including increased exports and a boost in the host country’s economic capabilities
(Grieco 1986).
Firm theories focus on the reasons MNCs choose to directly invest abroad. One
variant focuses on market imperfections that create opportunities for firms to engage in
oligopolistic behavior. Companies prefer to directly invest in foreign markets in order to
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overcome the disadvantages of distance, communication, culture and imperfect
information. In addition, other draws include low costs of production and generous
individual country policies. Marketing advantages also play a role in firms’ decision to
invest. This theory argues that firms seek opportunities to gain an advantage over their
competitors internationally through their investments and must possess advantages
over local competitors when they enter foreign markets (Caves 1996).
Another widely referenced theory of firm foreign direct investment involves the
product cycle. Firms that create products at home may venture to market in other
similarly industrialized countries. High demand may lead firms to decide to invest in
manufacturing capabilities in those countries, thereby cutting costs by manufacturing
the product in the same market. Eventually, production may shift down the income
scale to less-developed countries where the product can be produced and exported
back to high-income countries more cheaply than the costs of production in high-income
countries allow (Vernon 1966). In Europe’s industrial development, for instance, textile
production in Britain led to saturation of that market. Britain marketed textiles in other
European countries, which not only helped spur a wave of industrialization but also
spilled over into other industrial sectors. Later Latin American development was also
spurred by investment from European countries when economic conditions such as
inflation demanded new action, and industrial capital looked for new, stable and
cheaper markets (Kurth 1979).
MNCs may also engage in FDI as a mechanism to get around state trade
barriers such as high tariffs (Blonigen 2006). Tariffs are meant to shield domestic firms
at the expense of foreign firms, effectively protecting domestic businesses against
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waves of cheap foreign imports, though this simple relationship is not so
straightforward. Goodman, Spar and Yoffie (1996) argue that differences between
import-complementing and import-substituting investment create different coalitions.
For example, import-complementing investment, or investment that competes directly
with local firms, causes locally-producing U.S. domestic firms to line up in favor of
protection and foreign firms that import goods into the United States to join together in
favor of free trade. Import-substituting investment, or investment where the foreign firm
replaces imports with products manufactured by its local affiliate, causes a different
alignment. This type of investment will ally both foreign and domestic firms against
protection. However, Blonigen labels the notion of tariff-jumping, or investing in a
foreign country to bypass tariffs, “folk wisdom” among economists. He argues that tariffjumping occurs, but only among firms that have experience in international markets
(Blonigen 2002).
Finally, firm decisions to invest abroad can be determined by considerations of
the advantages of ownership, location and firm internalization (Dunning 1980). By
taking direct ownership in foreign countries, firms can gain additional advantages such
as international transfer pricing, the ability to shift assets to different currencies in order
to create profits, capabilities to diversify investment portfolios and opportunities to
create parallel production capacity in different countries to protect against slowdowns or
labor unrest. Simmons and Elkins (2004) echo Dunning when they point out that firms
weigh the competition and will see countries that offer similar policies on the free
movement of capital as similar risks for investment. Market structure, natural resources,
labor, proximity to market, legal and commercial environments, and government policy
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provide locational advantages. MNC internalization of capital, technology, and
management through direct control in their subsidiaries, rather than leaving control to
local partners, giving local subsidiaries free rein, or engaging in risky and uncontrolled
portfolio investment may also factor into firms’ decisions to invest abroad.

Firm and State Agreement
In the progression of the FDI story, we have met two actors, each with unique
sets of motivations and preferences in how to reach their goals. These preferences
sometimes harmonize and sometimes clash with each other. Developing countries,
hoping for progress through greater foreign direct investment but also with some degree
of wariness, weigh alternatives and make decisions on how much they will rely on FDI.
These decisions are realized through the political process and become policies. Firms,
looking to earn greater profits, make decisions on whether to invest in developing
countries based on the advantages they see by doing so. Firms and developing
countries must come to agreement over FDI and the conditions that will allow the
investment into the host country market.
The firm-state agreement process is an important part of the story that is told in
this study. Developing countries bring existing explicit or implicit policies on FDI to the
table. These policies are a gate, where the width of the opening serves as a screening
function. Some firms will rule out investment based on the policies they see. Those
firms that can live with host country policies may enter into agreement with a developing
state. Developing countries’ FDI policies, in essence, are their opening gambit in the
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bargain. They set the tone for the conditions of investment, and upon conclusion of the
agreement, these policies influence both future FDI policies and future FDI flows.
The first and foremost goal of firms is profit, and MNCs are not driven by altruistic
motives to help developing countries exploit their resources or develop their economies.
MNCs want to make sure that their investments in developing countries will yield more
benefits than costs. If profit is firms’ primary goal, how can they go about reaching that
goal in the most efficient manner? How can they squeeze the most possible profit they
can out of their foreign investment? Internally, they can take a number of measures,
such as making best use of their organization. The internal workings of the MNC do not
necessarily concern us. However, the external conditions that MNCs must confront
point toward Hymer’s initial identification of control as a key preference. MNCs want to
control as much of the FDI process as they can. MNCs try to establish this control in a
number of ways. First, they find imperfect markets that allow them to corner a sector,
either by themselves or with a small number of other firms, which gives them greater
control over pricing. Second, they seek to make use of peculiarities of domestic and
international markets that allow them to move assets and finances quickly and cheaply
in order to create greater profit. Third, they seek stable markets in countries with low
wage bases and few regulations and restrictions in order to keep costs down as they
exploit resources. In other words, MNCs invest in developing countries as long as they
can keep costs low and profits high, and as long as economic and political realities favor
continued business there.
Developing state preferences are a little more complex. Developing states look
upon incoming FDI as a way that they can meet development goals, maintain state
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legitimacy in the eyes of powerful segments of the population, maintain legitimacy in the
eyes of other nations, and participate in the world economy. These countries also want
to achieve a maximum amount of rents and control over the timing and the amount of
flows of investment for their own particular social and political purposes. In order to
achieve their goals, they must insist on taxes, restrictions and regulations and give
away as little as possible. In addition, the priority they put on their preferences and
goals is tempered by the emphasis they put on the participation of FDI against wariness
over allowing foreign capital and corporations to play a part in their national economies.
FDI agreements occur because both firm and state feel they are better off with
the agreement. Should the firm not feel it benefits from the potential agreement, it will
walk away before the deal is made. Should developing states not be happy with the
proposed terms of the agreement, they will call off the process if the terms cannot be
adjusted. Yet there is some reason to question whether firms and developing states are
equally matched at the start of the agreement process, and whether their position in the
bargain remains unchanged after the agreement is reached.
For example, the basis of the relationship between MNC and state may be
characterized as a bilateral monopoly (see Kindlberger 1969, Kobrin 1987). The host
has resources that it cannot exploit but control over access and conditions for operation,
and the firm has the technology, capital and other means to extract the resources. In
this type of relationship, characterized by one buyer and one seller, the bargaining that
takes place between the state and MNC is over the monopoly rents that accrue from the
investment. Within this framework, the outcome of the agreement depends upon the
relative bargaining strength of the firm and the host country. Both firm and state each
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have specific behavior patterns that they follow in such relationships. The firm often
behaves according to the state of the industry in which it produces. The state, on the
other hand, behaves according to its economic and political bases.
Thomas and Worrall (1994) offer a test of the bilateral monopoly framework in
terms of expropriation, or in other words, a host country taking control over the
operations of a foreign firm within its borders. They argue that a one-shot bargaining
process is not sufficient to account for why firms and host countries enter agreements.
Their rationale is that if bargaining was a one-shot deal, firms would know that countries
would eventually expropriate and therefore not invest. However, if the agreement
process is over infinite repetitions, then contracts become self-enforcing because each
side realizes it has something to lose by breaking the agreement. The firm withholds
maximum investment and payments to forestall expropriation, but must increase
investment and payments over time. The contract thus evolves, “ratchet-like,” toward
greater levels of efficiency. If the contract remains below optimum efficiency, the state
expropriates; otherwise an efficient level of investment is reached.
Also in this infinite bargaining period, the state’s power in the agreement process
may get stronger relative to the firm. This “obsolescing bargain” was first proposed by
Kindlberger (1969) and articulated by Vernon (1971). As host countries become more
knowledgeable and the firm’s costs become more tied to the host country, the host
country can begin to exert pressure and get better terms. For example, the erosion of
the bargaining power of foreign copper firms in Chile, along with domestic political
factors, played a role in the nationalization of the copper industry in that country (Moran
1974).
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Shapiro (1991) studies another case in which the Brazilian government was able
to use its bargaining power to manipulate foreign firms. In the 1950s and 1960s Brazil
put in motion a set of economic policies designed to pressure foreign automakers to
increase the domestic content of their manufactures in Brazil. The goal of the Brazilian
government was to create a domestic Brazilian car industry. The foreign automakers
responded tepidly to initial requests by members of the Brazilian administration. They
did not feel that the Brazilian automobile market was large enough to sustain local
production. The administration of Kubitschek then put into place policies constricting
foreign exchange for firms unless they created new products using at least fifty percent
local content, and rising over five years to 95 percent local content. These constrictive
policies were supplemented by generous financial incentives offered to companies that
agreed to abide by the new regulations. The use of these policies were partly
responsible for the development of the Brazilian car industry, which was the first of its
kind in Latin America and served as the basis for later government policies in Argentina
and Mexico.
Kubitschek’s initial impetus was political; he wanted to create a national policy
that would be successful and would survive beyond his presidential tenure. There was
also intense popular support for home-grown industry, and the policies were meant to
not only prop up Brazilian capital invested in smaller local auto and truck manufacturers,
but also to create spillover effects to suppliers. In addition, local labor would benefit.
However, his policies also gained from the condition of the auto industry at the time.
Volkswagen was at a point in its history where it was willing to try overseas
manufacturing for the first time. This coincided with slowed demand at home for U.S.
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and European carmakers after an initial burst of post-war car sales, and increased
demand in Brazil due to a rising economy. Volkswagen’s willingness to enter the
market under Brazil’s policies led other U.S. and European firms to follow suit to protect
their positions in the market. 12
As companies petitioned to enter the Brazilian market, the administration set up
an agency, GEIA, to oversee the process and to rule on applications. This agency was
criticized by many automotive officials for, in their perception, impeding the process and
ruling arbitrarily. Government officials preferred that GM and Ford lead the Brazilian
automotive industry; landing one or both of them would ensure credibility to the program
and the architects of the Brazilian policies assumed that some of the smaller
participants would eventually be driven out or subsumed. 13 GEIA, which was also
intensely aware of showing favoritism, worked cooperatively with all companies that
submitted proposals. However, GEIA hardened its position, particularly with Ford, when
it perceived through the application process that the companies were trying to get
around regulations. GEIA could only accomplish its job with relative insulation from the
administration and from pressure groups, such as local industrial concerns.
Shapiro insists that neither theories of the firm, nor theories that put the state and
its policies to the front, can completely explain the Brazilian case. There is considerable
overlap; states react not only to their economic and political bases but also to the
conditions of industry, and MNCs react not only to their industries but conditions within
the state. In addition, states and MNCs may find their interests to be convergent if

12

Except for Ford and GM. Ford held out against the regulations in its truck division and only entered the car market after the
military coup. By this time, however, Volkswagen had captured the passenger car market and Ford executives lamented that they
had missed an opportunity. GM never did enter the auto market, but did comply in its truck assembly plants.
13
In fact, this did happen after the initial wave of entrants. However, among the casualties were the car and truck makers that had
majority Brazilian control.

55

those political and economic conditions in the state correlate favorably with conditions in
the industry, which Shapiro argues was clearly happening in the Brazilian case.
However, despite convergent interests, Ford held out for years despite intense pressure
and almost walked away altogether.
What is clear from Shapiro’s account is that the Kubitschek administration used
its restrictive foreign exchange regulations and the financial incentives policies to
encourage foreign automakers to invest new technology and production processes in
Brazil. These policies set up the initial conditions by which Brazil could then, company
by company, reach agreement on its initial goals of increasing local content in
automotive manufacturing, and on the long-term goal of creating a stand-alone Brazilian
automotive industry through new investment.
Stopford and Strange (1991) take the bargaining scenario one step further,
arguing that firm and state bargaining is part of a more complex scenario that pits states
against firms, states against other states, and firms against firms. In their study of firm
and state policy in the face of FDI, they argue that the bargaining that takes place
between firms and states are conditioned by the competitive structure of the market, for
example, if the firm is entering a global market, is trying to enter a local market, or if the
firm is trying to exploit natural resources. It is also conditioned by the national policy
intent of the host state, such as whether the host state is looking toward import
substitution or exporting in a dependent or independent relationship with the rest of the
world. They contend that the problem with existing economic models, except perhaps
for Vernon’s product-cycle model, is that they are static and do not adequately explain
the changing economic and political environment that firms and countries face.
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Governments in particular face excruciatingly difficult decisions. Should they liberalize
or restrict investment? Should they or should they not utilize monetary policy to control
capital? Should they promote trade, and if so, what kinds of restrictions are
appropriate? Should they privatize their state-owned firms and open up to market
forces, and if so, do they put any restrictions at all on private ownership and foreign
firms? What differences across sectors should they take into account? Stopford and
Strange argue that as governments design policy, the dynamic political and economic
environment ensures that governments often have multiple, conflicting and shifting
objectives, and their decisions lead to political consequences.

FDI Policies
In the process of telling the FDI story, I have thus far introduced two different
views, openness and wariness, of FDI which inform developing states’ impressions of
FDI and thus, influence their FDI policies. These views I derived from paradigms
established by modernization theory and its descendents, and dependency theory. I
have established two main actors in the FDI story, developing states and multinational
corporations, and explored their motivations. Generally, firms look for conditions of
investment that will improve their ability to make profits, and developing states look to
investment to increase their economic abilities. Both actors hope to be able to control
aspects of investment that put them at odds on many of their goals, and therefore a
bargaining situation arises. Developing states’ policies provide a starting point for
negotiations, and agreements reached provide one influence on developing states’
future FDI policies.
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In this section, I will look at two possible ways to examine FDI policies. The first
way is by comparing FDI policies to tax incentives policies. Tax incentives policies are
used to encourage or discourage investment in certain regions, sectors or industries in
local economies (Biger and Pepe 1986). As such, tax incentives policies can be
targeted at both local and international capital. Tax incentives policies, their causes and
effects on FDI may have similarities to FDI policies. I will also examine another possible
theoretical perspective on FDI policies which argues that FDI policies are influenced on
two levels, the domestic and the international.
Economists took the lead in examining tax incentives and their effects on FDI.
Taxation, or more precisely effective rates of taxation, are central to the study of
investment incentives (Birla Institute of Scientific Research 1985). The theory of optimal
taxation, one of the core theories of investment incentives, argues that governments
aim for an optimal tax that increases both revenue and welfare. To take the extremes, if
governments do not tax firms, they get nothing. Similarly, if governments tax firms fully,
they will also get nothing because no goods will be produced within their borders.
Governments therefore tax at rates that ensure that they will receive an appropriate
amount of revenue while simultaneously allowing firms to make a profit. In other words,
there is a window of possible tax rates for governments. Governments that set tax rates
higher than this optimal area will get less tax revenue because firms will leave the
country. Governments that set tax rates lower than this optimal area will find it difficult
to maintain revenues because they are not taxing enough. Why wouldn’t firms flock to
states that set inordinately low tax rates? If we take into account that international
markets are not perfectly competitive, then we must accept that many industries are
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oligopolistic on the international stage, therefore limiting the number of firms that will
enter foreign markets. This theory is weighted by standard assumptions; consumers
maximize utilities, all goods can be taxed, and income can be perfectly observed.
However, at its core it still suggests that firms and countries are engaged in a delicate
balancing act, trying to work out a range of possibilities that will be useful and beneficial
to each while also keeping an eye on their competition.
Tax incentives are one of the mechanisms used by states to indicate the level of
their seriousness in drawing FDI (Li 2006). Incentives affect the allocation of scarce
financial resources, influence government revenues, favor particular groups at the
expense of others, reduce market competition, and often cause rent-seeking behaviors
in host countries. Governments pick winners and losers in the market, leading them to
discriminate against small and local firms, and design programs through backchannel
negotiations. Incentives can strengthen MNC competitiveness internationally, but also
enhance their ability to monopolize the local market. Tax incentive policies have
distributive consequences, pitting groups within the society for or against foreign
competition, and against each other.
Research has shown that taxation can have a deleterious effect on investment.
Taxes raise the costs of capital, which disadvantages companies in high taxation
markets and therefore discourages them from investing. High taxes can impede local
research and development if the R&D is complementary to imported technology –
although it can encourage local R&D if it substitutes for imported technology (Hines
1995). Cummins and Hubbard (1995) find that a one percent rise in the cost of capital
leads to a one to two percent decrease in annual rates of investment. Hines (2001)
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finds that tax sparing agreements, which grant credits in order to get rid of
contradictions between home and host country tax policies, can lead to much higher
levels of FDI and lower tax rates on FDI.
Research has also been conducted on the effects of globalization on tax-rate
policies. Some theories speculate that increased participation in world markets and
increased trade integration maximizes the power of the market at the expense of
countries’ policy options and creates a greater need for countries to be economically
efficient in order to effectively compete (Garrett 1995, Owens and Whitehouse 1996).
These conditions lead to policies that favor lower taxes, reduce the welfare state, and
increase labor flexibility.
However, another theoretical strand argues that globalization does not threaten
national sovereignty and is not a new phenomenon. This view argues that corporations
face obstacles that keep them from leaving markets once they invest (Spar and Yoffie
1999), that country characteristics offer enticement to corporations (Garrett 1995, Caves
1996), that political institutions can provide stability that may hold long-term
attractiveness to corporations (Hall 1997) and that countries can use these leverages to
continue to approve taxation policies. Gelleny and McCoy (2001) find that education
levels significantly enhance government abilities to tax, that left-leaning governments
are more likely to tax than centrist or right leaning governments, and that openness to
trade actually increases the likelihood of higher taxes. They speculate that pressures
on societal groups resulting from greater openness lead governments to tax more highly
in order to offset some groups’ losses. Li (2006) echoes this view, arguing that
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democratic governments and governments associated with rule of law tend to be less
generous in their tax incentive policies.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) spells out
some of the elements of this balancing act in its paper advising governments on
taxation in a global economy (OECD 1991). While arguing that countries tax because
1) they use taxes as an instrument of social policy and 2) they want to exercise their
right to tax, the OECD cautions that taxes are often market distorting but should not be.
One reason for the distorting effects of taxes is that there is always the potential for
double taxation, in which a firm is levied taxes both in home and host countries. The
cures for such distortions, such as exemptions, credits and deductions, may be
distorting in themselves in that they may favor international firms over local firms. In
addition to market distorting effects, there are also issues caused by companies
attempting to avoid or evade taxation, fair distribution of taxes, and administrative
problems. Not all nations are inclined to tax in the same way, so nations must decide
whether to tax incomes of resident companies and affiliates or source companies, to tax
international equity, or if domestic rates or some other rates apply.
States use incentives because, as Stopford and Strange argued, states are also
pitted against other states for investment. Chudnowsky and Lopez (2002) point out that
when business leaders are questioned in surveys, incentives don’t appear to be as
important as other factors, such as host market size, a country’s rate of growth, physical
and communications infrastructure, and the quality of human resources. However, they
argue that incentives are important on the margins, when MNCs have a number of
different countries that they can choose from in making investment decisions. They
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point to Ireland as an example, which used incentives to separate itself from the crowd
in Europe. These incentives included grants for research and development facilities,
and were part of Ireland’s set of policies designed to attract higher value-added
industries, create specialized industrial clusters, and promote links with domestic firms.
Ultimately, Ireland’s targeted investment policies were helpful in landing a number of
high-tech companies, which fueled a boom that transformed the country from European
economic backwater to economic engine in just a couple of decades.
Like tax incentives policies, it can be argued that all FDI policies also provide an
indication about the environment for FDI. The effects of FDI policies, including favoring
particular groups and reducing competition, are very similar. Open policies may provide
a basis for competition against other states, but the level of openness must always be
balanced with potential domestic political costs. Globalization demands may influence
more open policies, but openness is tempered by the extent of the need to rely on FDI
versus other avenues of development. Like taxation policies, many factors make it
certain that FDI policies are a balancing act. The balance must be configured between
the degree of openness to FDI and domestic political needs, domestic economic goals,
world pressure, demand for FDI, and past experience with FDI including past bargaining
scenarios and past policies.
Once policies are enacted, they play a major role in firm decision-making, which
directly affects inflows of FDI into developing states. States that are wary of FDI will
enact more restrictive FDI policies. Firms that can still find advantages in states that
restrict investment will invest regardless of the policies, but there will be fewer of them
than in countries that are more open to FDI. Thus, firms examine policies before
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entering agreements with developing states. In this way, developing states set the tone
for any future agreements, and exert some control over the flow of FDI into their
markets.
Another way to look at FDI policies is by examining the environment in which
they are created. The weakness of using existing theory on tax incentives policies is
that while they examine both domestic and international effects on tax incentives, they
do not take into account the dual influences together, nor do these primarily economic
perspectives allow for political influences. Policies may not simply be a case of either
demands of the domestic markets or demands of the international markets. They may
be a function of both together. Add domestic political and international political
influences into the mix, and a much more complex picture emerges.
In this vein, FDI policies can be examined as a function of games occurring on
two levels. The use of games and game theory to shed light on bargaining scenarios
has yielded much academic research. In a seminal game-theoretic paper on
bargaining, Nash (1950) sets up a theory of bargaining in which he outlines a twoperson non-zero sum game. He assumes that each player is rational, able to
communicate desires, has equal bargaining skill, and has full knowledge of the other’s
tastes and preferences. In this idealized environment, Nash creates a utility function for
each player, based on the anticipation each has for what he or she can get in the
bargain. He goes on to prove that if these utility preferences are known, there is a
bargaining solution in which each player can gain a deal which is satisfactory and
leaves both better off.
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Harsanyi (1956) later combines elements of Nash’s game theory on bargaining,
Nash’s theory of optimal threats, and other bargaining approaches to round out
bargaining theory. The theory of optimal threats argues that each bargainer may use a
threat as long as it will hurt the threatened party more than the party making the threat.
However, each party may be prepared to make threats that will cause self-harm if the
agreement fails in the hopes of getting a better agreement. Thus, according to
Harsanyi, bargainers will gain better terms if they are willing to take greater risks than
their opponents. In addition, Harsanyi argues that the bargaining outcome also
depends upon the ease of transfer of goods or money between the two parties, and the
likely effect of present behavior on future bargains between the parties (strategic
thinking).
While game theory on bargaining as envisioned by Nash provides a basis for
explanation, it does not adequately explain all bargaining situations, especially when
there are many possible agreeable contracts and multiple rounds of bargaining.
Rubinstein (1982) proves that with many possible Pareto optimal outcomes (outcomes
which make neither player worse off and make at least one player better off), players
come to an equilibrium agreement among the optimal outcomes. In the presence of
fixed costs, the weaker player is always disadvantaged and does not come out of the
bargain as well off as the stronger player. In the presence of fixed discounting factors
(how the players value the utility of the future), the player that makes the first move will
always be at an advantage.
The need for game theories to reach equilibrium agreements concerns Sebenius
(1992). He notes that game theory, while invaluable in constructing and offering

64

explanations for bargaining situations, makes several troubling assumptions including
full rationality and perfect information, and attempts to relax these assumptions have
been problematic. He observes that game theory views cooperation and conflict as a
binary construct with possible solutions located along the Pareto frontier. However, he
argues that cooperation and conflict are often both present in negotiation, and that the
relaxation of assumptions of full rationality and perfect information allow for a more
useful explanation of bargaining behavior. In essence, the area between no agreement
and Pareto-optimum solutions encompass an area of possible agreement. Bargainers
that assume that their opponents are rational but hampered by imperfect information
may end up with solutions that are not Pareto-optimal but are the best that is possible
given the circumstances. Subsequent negotiations with greater information expand the
zone of possible agreement. Sebenius argues that the existence of epistemic
communities on either side of the issue greatly helps this process, as they bring in new
ideas that also create new possibilities for solutions. In other words, the more
information each side has, the more likely a solution.
Game theory has had tremendous practical applications in international relations
(see Snidal 1985, Maoz and Felsenthal 1987, Powell (1991), Bueno de Mesquita and
Lalman 1992, Niou and Ordeshook 1994, Powell 1996, Allan and Dupont 1999,
Signorino 1999, Bennett and Stam 2000), Putnam (1988) addressed the complexity of
negotiations given international and domestic constraints by introducing the logic of twolevel games. Explicitly, Putnam argued that international negotiations are best
explained by bargaining on two levels. On the international level (Level I), negotiations
between states are more open or constrained by policies and politics on the domestic
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level (Level II). However, negotiations on Level I can also create conditions for policies
on Level II. The two levels operate concurrently over iterations of bargaining, until an
agreement on the international level is reached or lost. Of importance is the size of the
bargainers’ win-sets, or the range of agreements each party is willing to consider
because it feels it has gained. A larger win-set at the international level widens the
range of possible agreements, but leaves the state in weaker bargaining position.
However, a smaller win-set at the international level lowers the range of possible
agreements, but can give negotiators bargaining power by claiming domestic
opposition.
McGinnis and Williams (1993) provide support to Putnam from the social choice
perspective by introducing the concept of the correlated equilibrium to the two-level
game framework. They argue that the idea of a unitary-rational state is not logical,
given that states are collectivities of institutions and actors. However, each state
exhibits regularized behavior. In their models, the individual collectivities that make up
the state reach coordinated equilibrium on their expectations by drawing from the same
pool of information from their environments. Iida (1993) extends the analysis to
conditions of uncertain information, and determines that in these situations domestic
constraints may still impede agreements.
Two-level games, since Putnam’s theory was formulated, have been used to
explain U.S. trade pressure on Japan (Schoppa 1993), United States-Soviet strategic
negotiations (Knopf 1993), trade negotiations between the United States and Taiwan (Li
1994), ethnic conflict (Carment and James 1996), and the peace process in Northern
Ireland (Trumbore 1998) Perhaps tangentially related to this analysis, Goldstein (1996)
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looks at the logic of two level games in determining how domestic politics might
encourage nations to join international trade institutions. Goldstein’s thesis is that
Canada used free-trade agreements as a mechanism to alter what it considered unfair
U.S. trade laws. The U.S. administration had some sympathy toward this view, and saw
agreeing to international arbitration panels under the agreements as a way to thwart
opponents of free-trade. The new institutions created by the agreements effectively
changed the way that the United States administered its own trade laws.
The logic of these games assumes state-to-state negotiations. However, if we
follow the reasoning of Stopford and Strange, we can’t simply assume that states are
the only entities on the world stage, and that states do not make deals with other
entities. States make agreements with multinational firms over foreign investment
constantly, and like in international negotiations, whether a state gets foreign investment
or not depends on the willingness of groups within the state and the credibility of the
state to “seal the deal” on the international stage. The next section will try to extend a
form of two-level games framework to FDI policy.

The Logic of Two-Level Games and FDI
The logic of two-level games proposed by Putnam and reviewed above is a
theory of how domestic policy and international agreement interact and intertwine. As
such, it assumes, on the international level, two or more countries trying to reach
agreement. However, as noted above, some scholars have taken a more expansive
view of the international environment. In this larger milieu, firms also inhabit the
environment and enter into agreements with states on foreign direct investment.
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If firms can be considered part of the international environment, we must fit them
into a framework that will explain not only the nature and character of policies of foreign
direct investment in developing countries, but also how those policies then affect the
amount of capital flowing into each country through direct investment.
Let us look at the stories of FDI we have laid out so far. We have identified two
actors in the FDI process that are important to understanding FDI policies, states and
multinational firms. Focusing for one moment on firms, we have looked at a range of
explanations of firm motivations clustered under the label of firm theories. These
theories, which put their focus on the multinational corporation and its role in the FDI
process, have shown that firms play an indispensible role in bringing FDI to foreign
markets and the reasons for their interest in FDI. Firms have their own set of motives
and desires in engaging in FDI. They look to open up new markets, gain advantages
over competitors, diversify, capitalize on market imperfections, exploit advantages in
local markets and reduce disadvantages of distance. They often follow a cycle of
production where a new manifestation of the cycle leads to foreign production. They
hope to get around trade and other barriers. They also may want to gain other
advantages available to them by expanding abroad. All of these motivations are in the
pursuit of greater profits. Governments that consider allowing foreign firms into their
markets must therefore pass policies in order to control the pace and timing of entry and
to ensure that the state accrues gains. However, firm theories, in their specific focus on
what drives firm investment, treat as extraneous economic and political factors, and do
not account for state behavior. These theories thus lack the ability to account for FDI in
the context of state policies.
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If theories of the firm are not adequate to the explanation of FDI policies, then
perhaps conceptions of the state and its various roles will help us. After all, it is within
the state that policies are formulated and refined. Elsewhere, I argued that the state
presents a united front to foreign corporations in its stance toward investment.
However, this unified stance conceals the fact that even as states present their offerings
to corporations, a lot of political negotiations, along with other political and economic
realities, influence what they bring to the table. State theories, in their examinations of
state power and weakness, have provided us with an opportunity to envision a state
with a unified vision and strategy when facing a bargaining scenario with corporations.
Still unresolved, however, is how states make policies for the specific purpose of
dealing with other entities, as international relations theories do. However, accepting
the state as a unitary-rational actor, as many studies in the international relations
discipline, simply accepts that policies exist, and does not consider the influences of the
internal workings of the political process on those policies. However, pluralism also fails
to provide a complete picture, for it relegates the state to its constituent units and
institutions. The state with any reasonable amount of independence does not exist.
Finally, a theory based on tax policies, discussed above, might be an answer.
However, theories of tax policies simply deal with the economic interaction, bargaining
and agreement between firm and state, but do not account for various domestic factors
that affect policymaking, nor do they account for international influences on the entire
process.
What is needed is a theory or framework that allows for a state-firm interaction
that allows the state to follow a cohesive and stable policy, but also acknowledges the
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importance both domestic and international influences in policies of FDI and in the
practice of FDI. If we accept the proposition that the state, while not precisely a unitary
actor but one made up of constituent groups and institutions that can create consistent
and stable domestic policies and represent them in negotiations with other entities on
an international level, then we can set the stage for using the logic of two-level games in
the creation of policy and in the eventual agreement between state and firm.
Consider Putnam’s argument that international agreements are the result of
political bargaining on two levels. With an expanded environment that allows firms, the
reasoning of two-level games can be modified to include state-firm agreements. In such
a scenario, states face twin dilemmas. On the domestic front, leaders for the state need
to hammer out policies on foreign investment that are acceptable to home
constituencies. Policies are subject to a political process that must take the ideals,
opinions, and values of powerful coalitions into account. FDI policies are influenced by
these political processes as well as the realities of the domestic economy, and are
designed to work to the benefit of the state. With these policies, states can enter into
agreements with foreign corporations.
We can fit this scenario into Putnam’s two-level framework so that we can
categorize the process of agreement between firm and state as Level I, and Level II as
the domestic policymaking process leading to FDI policies. In Putnam’s model, the
process of agreement between firm and state at the international level begins the game,
and domestic policymaking follows. In our model, the process will work in reverse. In
other words, domestic policymaking at Level I starts the process toward agreement on
FDI, and states’ agreements with firms follow at Level II. I argue that this makes logical
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sense, for states’ policies serve as the basis and starting points for agreement. If a
state’s policies are too restrictive for firms, they may not invest. If policies are open,
firms may be more likely to invest.
What determines the restrictiveness or openness of a state’s policies on
investment? Domestic politics and economic characteristics at Level II account for
some of the variation of state policies. Through the policymaking process, groups and
institutions within the political environment work out a cohesive set of policies reflecting
the dominant preferences and economic realities within the state. These policies are
presented at Level I, the international level, during the agreement process. Putnam’s
model focused on the win-sets of various states as determined by domestic politics.
The win-set is defined as the range of agreements a side is willing to accept in making
an agreement. Each side has a win-set, and where the two win-sets overlap agreement
can be reached. The concept works similarly here and demonstrates the importance of
domestic political realities. Restrictive policies are a reflection of the wariness toward
FDI demonstrated by important constituent units within the state, such as interest
groups, parties, and governmental officials and institutions. These smaller win-sets limit
the range of agreements that the state can accept and leave states with less room for
bargaining with firms at the agreement level because going outside the win-set leaves
the government vulnerable to political sanction at home. However, as Putnam
suggests, this may work to state advantage especially if the state is large or otherwise
an attractive market. In such cases firms may be willing to live with a more restrictive
set of choices and invest. Open policies, on the other hand, indicate the openness of
important groups, parties, state institutions and leaders to FDI and indicate that those
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states have larger win-sets. Paradoxically, openness also weakens a state’s bargaining
power since firms can push for the best possible outcomes for themselves and be
reasonably sure that they will reach agreement.
For simplicity’s sake, my models will assume one firm and one developing
country, and one step of the agreement process. State creates policy, policy is
presented during negotiations with firm, agreement with firm is reached (or not). In
reality there may be more iterations, and more countries or firms involved in the process
of agreement. In addition, the negotiations on the international level may influence
future domestic policymaking. Putnam’s theory covered this as he included in his
theory the possibility for multiple iterations in the process of negotiations between
states. In the models presented here, a dynamic element to the process of firm-state
agreement is modeled by the inclusion of international level factors (along with domestic
factors) as potential influences on domestic FDI policies, the inclusion of both domestic
and international factors as influences on the results of firm-state agreements (inward
FDI), and an accounting for the dynamic nature of the process over time.
The model as presented here does not explore in detail the firm side of the
agreement process. While I will assume a rational firm presenting a cohesive face, in
reality firms are more complex and there certainly is disagreement that must be worked
out within each firm’s leadership before an action is agreed upon. I will also assume
that all information is known to both parties, though information uncertainty is more
likely especially given that there may be multiple iterations of the agreement process in
reality, and that in developing countries domestic political situations at Level II could
change quickly.
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The model using a two-level scenario modeling such dynamics is depicted in
Figure 2-1. Domestic politics at Level II starts the process and policies are created
within the state through political negotiation between interest groups, parties, state
institutions and leaders. These policies are also influenced by domestic economic
realities, and international economic and political factors. FDI policies are brought by
states and their leadership to negotiations with firms at Level I during the agreement
process. Restrictive policies at Level II reduce the win-set for states, leading to less
chance of agreement at Level I but allowing greater bargaining leverage to the state.
Open policies lead to a greater chance of agreement at Level I but reduce the
state’s bargaining power. The agreements are reflected by inward FDI, which is
influenced over time by policies and by domestic and international economic and
political factors. Agreements between firm and state ultimately affect future policies,
adding to the complexity and the dynamism of the model.

A Model of FDI
To this point, I have introduced foreign direct investment as a concept, and have
outlined the main actors in the FDI story. MNCs and states, both realizing the benefits
of FDI, must come to terms with conflict over the benefits of FDI. Firms seek to
establish operations overseas for a variety of secondary reasons that support their main
goal, increased profits. Developing states seek to entice firms to invest in order to gain
access to means of development, and to increase revenues. While it seems that each
has reasons to engage in FDI, they differ over the amount of control each will have and
how the benefits will be shared. Firms want control in order to gain more profits and to
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Figure 2-1: Levels and FDI Policies
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Political Factors
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International
Political Factors
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distribute them as they wish. States want control in order to expand industrialization,
keep profits in the local economy, and maintain revenues. Both must balance their
preferences with each other in order to make a working agreement. Firms must be
guaranteed a minimum amount of profit that makes the agreement worthwhile and
profitable for them, while states must be guaranteed that the benefits of FDI outweigh a
host of potential costs in allowing FDI into their markets.
The model created above shows the complexity of the FDI process, particularly
for developing states. States must think locally and must take domestic politics into
account. They must have in mind the interests of the main local groups that support
them. They must weigh other options to development against FDI, and they must take
into account past experience with FDI. These concerns, shaped by their internal and
domestic experiences and realities, do not necessarily coincide with firm self-interests,
which are measured on a global scale. Thus states must also take into account
international factors and of other influences on the international stage that may be
supportive of firm preferences.
Given the supposed benefits of FDI, and the fact that most developing states
appear to desire foreign investment, why do some developing states pass policies
limiting or restricting FDI while others pass policies that encourage FDI? I argue that
policies are shaped by a number of domestic and international factors that affect
developing states, including domestic politics, international pressure, demand for FDI,
and past experience with FDI. These policies provide developing states with a way of
satisfying diverse sources of pressure on them. They also serve as an indication to
potential investors of the initial bargaining position of the developing state. I have also
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argued that two development theories that had a great influence on the development
policies of third-world states, dependency and modernization theories, introduced a
blend of openness and wariness regarding the benefits and costs of FDI. I explored the
motivations of both firms and states in the FDI process. I also introduced the logic of
two-level games and discussed the context of influences on state FDI policies and the
role of those policies in reaching agreement with firms over foreign direct investment.
Finally, I forwarded a theory of FDI that includes the role of FDI policies.
The presentation of a testable model of FDI is the next step in the development
of this story. My model synthesizes the concepts of FDI discussed above, and includes
FDI policies as an integral part of the FDI process. I present the model in two tests. In
the first test I explain the factors that influence FDI policies in developing states. These
factors express the mix of attitudes of openness and wariness that make up FDI
policies, and are divided into the international and domestic influences described
previously. These domestic and international influences take the form of domestic
political factors, international pressures, domestic demand for FDI, and past experience
with FDI. In the second test, I will demonstrate that international and domestic
influences on FDI inflows, such as domestic politics, domestic investment market
characteristics, and the international political environment, affect flows of FDI to those
states. I will highlight in the second test the role of FDI policies in the flow of inward
FDI.
Determinants of FDI Policies
What influences the policies that states make? The logic of two-level games
argues that international and domestic political factors are the major influences on
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policies, and I argue that economic factors also play a role. There are four general
factors that affect developing states’ openness to FDI: political and ideological costs,
international pressure, demand for FDI, and strategic thinking. I will discuss each of
these influences more specifically in the following sections.
Domestic politics and ideologies. Stokes (1997), in a case study of Peruvian president
Alberto Fujimori’s campaign promises versus actual economic policies as president,
explores the concept of responsiveness. Her article makes three points. First,
politicians in democracies do not necessarily keep their campaign promises, especially
in developing countries. They may be motivated to break their promises by new
information upon taking office, a desire to say what voters want even though they know
the voters are misguided, or a desire to mislead voters for personal gain. Second,
politicians may still be considered responsive to the electorate even if they break their
campaign promises. Third, it is difficult to determine whether politicians that break their
promises are being responsive or unresponsive.
Stokes’ arguments are in reference to democratic governments, but she brings
up a germane point. Governments are going to be more or less affected by popular
pressure. FDI is one issue that can feed popular sentiment for better or worse, and
many governments must take the costs and benefits of FDI into account.
Domestic politics and ideology affect FDI policy. Strong interest groups, if
present, may have an interest in the FDI question, and may or may not be in favor of
FDI. There are two levels of politics that we can explore. The first centers on the type
of regime, democratic or authoritarian, present in the developing country. The second
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centers on the ideology of the government, and specifically whether the government is
leftist, centrist or rightist.
There has been quite a bit of theoretical and empirical study on the regime-type
and FDI which is relevant to this study. Lipset (1959) wrote a seminal paper addressing
the relationship between democracy and development concluding that democracy leads
directly to development.

It has been generally noted that democracies tend to have

safer environments for investments, with less chance that the government will
confiscate or expropriate, and even less probability that the government will compete
with private entrepreneurship (Freeman 1982). Theory suggests that democracies
provide more protections for private property rights, and provide institutional means of
resolving disputes between parties which authoritarian governments lack (Olson 1993).
However, many scholars, particularly those from the dependency school, have argued
that autocratic governments also offer advantages to investors, such as relaxing
unfavorable laws, using strong tactics to intimidate labor unions and other potential
opposition to investment, and putting favorable policies in place faster than democracies
(Evans 1979; O’Donnell 1988).
The effects of regime type on FDI have been empirically mixed. O’Neal (1994)
shows that democratic governments create overall better rates of return for
multinationals, but that multinationals investing in developing states with authoritarian
regimes still manage to come out ahead. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) also find this
association. Guillen (2000) in case studies of Argentina, Spain, and South Korea, finds
that authoritarian and democratic governments stimulate different responses from labor
unions toward FDI. He finds that populist labor unions under authoritarian governments
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tend to see multinational corporations as villains, whereas in democracies, populist
labor unions support import-substitution models and adopt a “necessary evil” approach
toward FDI. Modernizing labor unions, on the other hand, collaborate with FDI at arms’
length in authoritarian countries, while adopting a partnership attitude in democracies.
Most theoretical work generalizes the concept of “development,” while
quantitative work tends to focus more specifically on actual flows of FDI, rather than on
the policies of FDI. Democracy has been the subject of many studies about its
relationship to FDI flows, and in a broader sense, democracy has been tested for
relationships to free trade, open markets, and most recently globalization. Reactions by
developing countries to free trade pressures and globalization lead to policy choices
that have substantial effects on FDI.
Teune (2002), for example, writes “it took most of the 1990s to grasp that without
democracy, globalization could not continue in a peaceful, orderly fashion….,” and that
“….Democracy at the national level became the political environment most open and
receptive to processes of globalization.” Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000,
2002a, 2002b) argue that democracies, with free and fair elections, create greater
economic gains for leaders through trade agreements, which encourage them to pursue
greater economic cooperation with other states and signal to the population that their
leaders are open to more transparency in their decisions. They find that democracies
are more likely to conclude trade agreements, are more likely to conclude preferential
trading agreements with one another, and generally set lower tariff barriers with one
another regardless. Milner (1998) suggests that ideas help define states’ policy actions,
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and certainly democracy brings expectations of greater openness and transparency with
it.
An oft-debated concept in international relations, the democratic peace theory,
argues that democratic regimes are less likely to go to war with each other, partly
because of the economic links they forge (Maoz and Russett 1993). One study has
shown that democracy and economic interdependence exist in a relationship that brings
greater peace and stability to the international arena, particularly when states are
contiguous with each other (Oneal, Oneal, Maoz and Russett 1996).
The above theoretical arguments give an indication that the preferences of
democracies and autocracies are different when it comes to economic openness.
Democracies generally are more open economically and likely to establish more open
policies toward FDI, while autocracies want greater control over their economies and
therefore set restrictive FDI policies. Given this theorized and empirically supported
relationship, and the fact that economic policy is an outcome of nations’ political
regimes, it can be expected that democracies should be more open toward FDI and
autocracies being less open.
A second measure of political and ideological costs indicates what people in a
country believe about the role of government in their economic and social lives.
Running along a left to right spectrum, with those on the left advocating a greater role
for government in the economy and society, and those on the right generally advocating
for a smaller government role, these ideologies permeate political structures and
provide a platform upon which the political process creates winners and losers. In other
words, we can predict policies based on the ideologies driving governments.
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When it comes to foreign direct investment, the issue would seem to be pretty
well cut and dried. Past research has noted the presence of differing views on
economic development within the domestic polity. Vandevelde (1998) spells out the
differences between economic nationalism, which is descended from the writings of
Hobbes and Machiavelli and which prescribes wealth redistribution, state intervention in
the economy and economic protection, versus economic liberalism, which has its roots
in Locke, Smith and Ricardo and espouses wealth creation, free markets and limited
government intervention. Economic nationalists, he writes, are more likely to call for
restrictions on trade and FDI, whereas economic liberals call for free trade and free
movement of capital across borders.
There are plenty of scholars who find that traditional relationships hold. Ornstein
and Stevenson (1984), in a study of elite attitudes in Canada, generally described rightoriented elites as those favoring the status quo, cutting back on social welfare, and
opposing government economic intervention (though this last point breaks down
between the big business-small business divide). Those on the left had high
identification with labor unions and favored nationalization of some major enterprises,
redistribution of income, and strengthening labor rights. Similarly, the so-called
“Washington Consensus,” a series of economically liberal prescriptions that were
adopted by many developing countries, particularly in Latin America, held that
developing countries could prosper by curtailing government intervention, lifting barriers
on imports, exports, foreign investment, and financial transactions (Naím 2000).
Empirical work trying to relate these ideologies to economic outcomes has been
mixed. OECD countries with strong leftist governments are associated with more
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corporate taxes, larger interest rates, and increased public spending despite the fact
that globalization would predict a weakening of their ability to implement such policies
(Garrett 1995, 1998). Oatley (1999) finds that partisan macroeconomic policies exist,
despite the hypothesis that globalization has reduced the ability of parties to follow their
own agendas. He observes that leftist governments, under fixed exchange rates,
impose more capital controls. However, Gelleny and McCoy (2001) find that leftist
governments do not necessarily tax more than other types of governments, and
attribute this finding to one of two things: either leftist governments are nervous about
creating an “anti-investment” climate, or they have accepted neo-liberal economic
policies. Nielson (2003) found the presence of leftist governments an unreliable
predictor for the level of collected tariffs, a potential investment-discouraging policy.
Pinto (2005) examines the hypothesis that labor is generally more favorable to FDI than
capital because the entry of foreign capital alters the traditional returns to domestic
labor and capital. His empirical results on 18 developed countries uphold his
hypothesis.
We might generally expect that governments oriented to the right would generally
be in favor of foreign direct investment. For such governments, most of the opposition
to FDI will come from leftist groups concerned about wages, social welfare and worker
representation. Such groups also tend to be distrustful of multinational corporations.
However, right-oriented governments may also face some opposition from elements on
the right, such as owners of smaller local businesses that will be hurt by foreign
competition. Because the right expects opposition from the left, it is prepared to deal
with its opponents through various means (using anything from compromise to
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repression). Right-oriented governments are able to discount costs of their actions,
having expected such opposition, and the other costs are relatively negligible.
For leftist governments that consider opening to FDI, however, the costs may be
greater. Consider a leftist government that has been elected to power on the
expectation that it will carry out a populist agenda. As economic realities convince the
leaders that they must consider opening to FDI, they must also consider the costs of
doing so. Leftist interest groups, particularly workers groups, might be upset at a shift
away from the domestic economic agenda that was promised in the campaigns, and the
costs to these groups of bringing in foreign investment may be grievous in terms of
lower wages, the decreased power of unions and the potential loss of jobs due to
competition.
Some empirical findings indicate that left-oriented governments may not be as
hostile to FDI as it may seem, especially if they are broken down along regime type.
Guillen’s and Pinto’s work suggest left accommodation, and the fact that Pinto’s work
takes place in developed countries suggest that the effect takes place in democracies.
It is expected that leftist governments will be hostile to greater openness to
foreign equity, given that they must answer to groups that stand to be hurt by foreign
investment. Rightist governments, which stand to benefit given their support by groups
that stand to gain through foreign investment, should favor FDI openness. I could find
little information about how centrist governments should behave when it comes to FDI,
and therefore it is difficult to predict a definite relationship.
Most discussion of nationalism in political economy appears to equate it with
protectionism, economic autarky, and closing the state to external economic interests
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(Shulman 2000).

Indeed, the idea of nationalist protection of the economy in writings

of political economy has a long history. For example, Robert Gilpin (1975) described
three models of the future for the international economy. One of them, mercantilism,
described an economic nationalism of nation-states competing for scarce resources and
eventually, organizing into regional economic blocs to protect themselves. Johnston
(1985), arguing that Canadian trade unions represented a more nationalist and
protectionist position economically, found that Canadian trade union elites did not favor
foreign investment as much as corporate elites, and were strongly in favor of
nationalization. He also found that Canadian representatives of local capital favored
more regulation on foreign firms than representatives of international capital. Beinin
(1999) chronicles the turn of Middle Eastern Arab regimes away from economic
nationalist state-led industrialization and import substitution policies to policies of free
trade and global economic integration beginning in the 1970s. Nayar (2000) points out
that the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s economic program, while not greatly
different from the Congress Party that preceded it, took issue with the Congress Party’s
opening of the economy to foreign capital and promoted an India-first model of
development in which foreign direct investment would play a supplementary role to local
capital. Berend (2000) describes the economic nationalism of Central and Eastern
Europe after World War One, which encouraged import substitution policies in an
attempt to separate itself from Western Europe.
Indeed, while nationalism cannot be equated with dependency theory, both
appear to have sprung out of some similar concerns about globalization. Both appear
to focus attention on the potential harms to local economies and workers as foreign
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capital become increasingly present, and both have encouraged affected nations to
institute some closing-off of the economy to world forces in order to counteract these
perceived harms. It is therefore very likely that countries with a more nationalist
orientation would be more wary of foreign investment and more likely to have policies
restricting FDI.
International political pressure. One force that may make a great impact on the
openness of FDI policies is the overt and implied political pressure put onto states by
other international actors. As trends continue to move nations toward greater economic
openness, developing countries under greater international political pressure are more
likely to be pushed in that direction, which includes greater openness toward FDI.
Multinational corporations, as potential beneficiaries of FDI, are at the forefront of
this international political pressure. However, their efforts are supported by other
international actors. Some scholars have argued that under the onslaught of non-state
actors, the sovereign state is becoming one of many international players, rather than
the only international player (Strange 1982, Stopford, Strange and Henley 1991,
Strange 1996). Developed states, whose multinational corporations provide the lion’s
share of FDI, are one additional source of international political pressure. Another
source of pressure is international opinion and mores. A good example of such
consensus of opinion is the promotion and widespread acceptance of the economics of
the “Washington Consensus” by the international community beginning in the 1980s.
Other sources of political pressure are international organizations which often
make their membership and benefits contingent on greater economic openness. While
developing countries do not need to be members of these organizations, most join
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because of the perceived benefits and to gain a greater voice in international matters.
International organizations are important for a variety of reasons. They allow member
states to share information on the actions of other states, share and reduce the costs of
agreement negotiation, and to bring to light and sanction other nations for agreement
violations (Milner 1998). Martin and Simmons (1998) indicate that there is a long history
of research that indicates that international institutions affect state behavior and their
domestic policies. While Matecki (1956) argued early in the post-war period that
institutions could be places where inspiration and ideas could be fostered, later scholars
such as Cox (1969) showed how international institutions, through their executive
leaderships, could influence domestic policy through building support with domestic
interest groups. Various interest groups and entities can even push for some policies to
be removed from national decision-making entities and put into the hands of
international institutions if it meets their needs. Goldstein (1996) explores why the
United States allowed for trade disputes within NAFTA to be removed from its national
courts to an international body when doing so clearly weakened its abilities to rule in
favor of its own citizens and businesses. Goldstein argues that disputes between the
president and Congress over free trade and protectionism led the executive branch to
favor the international body. However, Congress ratified this move, possibly partly due
to political pressure from constituents concerned about the trade imbalance. Other
aspects of international institutions that may affect domestic policy outlined by Martin
and Simmons include promotion of transparency in international policy, forcing
democratic nations to live up to their ideals on the world stage, providing a vehicle for
nations to solve collective action problems and help nations coordinate more efficient
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policy responses (though efficient policies are not always a result!), and establishing
rules and norms for international behavior.
There are a number of international institutions, such as the World Bank, the
World Trade Organization, and others that focus on world economic issues, including
openness to investment and standardization of international regulations on investment.
Given that membership in such institutions increases transparency, standardizes policy
outcomes, sets rules for compliance and provides some punishment for contrary
behaviors, it can be expected that membership in international institutions leads to
greater openness in policies of foreign direct investment.
Developing countries that border on or are within the sphere of influence of
developed countries may be subject to greater pressures toward economic openness.
The case of Mexico is all too apparent, bordering as it does on the giant United States’
economy. Haggard and Maxfield (1996), for example, write that Mexico’s proximity to
the United States limits its ability to put governmental currency controls in place.
Hanson (1997, 114) writes “….For Mexico, the proximity and size of the United States
make trade liberalization tantamount to integration with its northern neighbor.” Middle
Eastern and North African nations, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
have been forced to seek greater economic integration with Europe, leading to
increased pressures to open their economies further. The northern African nations of
Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania formed the Arab Maghrib Union for this
specific purpose. Owen (1993, 5) writes “…hence, the European Community seems to
have had the freedom to demand integration as a prior condition to serious negotiations
if and when it suits its own interest.”
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Given the pressure that can be brought to bear by developed nations on
developing nations all over the world, and considering that some developing nations’
proximity to the developed world gives them an interest in putting policies in place that
will make them attractive to capital from their wealthier neighbors, it can be expected
that this proximity leads to greater openness in FDI policies.
Demand for FDI. The demand for FDI is another combination of factors that affect the
openness of FDI policies in developing countries. The demand for FDI can be summed
up as the relative importance of FDI in development strategies versus other options for
development. States are not simply limited to one avenue of development. They can
have access to alternative sources of capital, and may gain development funding from
international lending institutions, overseas aid, exports (which increase cash flow), and
domestic savings. States can put themselves at a disadvantage by relying too heavily
on one form of development. States that rely primarily on loans, for instance, place a
great amount of control in the hands of their creditors, the international lending
institutions. Often states cannot rely too heavily on overseas aid due to uncertainty
about whether the funding will remain in place or at the same levels year after year. In
the case of FDI, states that rely too heavily on foreign investment capital face the same
problems as outlined in the previous chapter. By relying on FDI, they enter a bargain
with multinational corporations. Access to other options not only strengthens countries’
bargaining strength with MNCs, it also reduces their reliance on FDI.
Domestic savings, the first component of demand for FDI, follows a simple
maxim: savings equals investment. Greater amounts of domestic savings create more
homegrown capital for local entrepreneurs. Sengupta (1968) establishes the
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relationship between domestic savings and investment by showing that the difference
between exports and imports equals the difference between gross domestic savings
and gross domestic investment. Countries can therefore invest more than they save if
the shortfall in savings is met by the same amount in increases in imports. Krause
(1989) links the high development growth of Pacific Rim Asian countries with high
domestic savings rates, leading to a lack of dependence on foreign capital. Graham
(1991) writes of the low gross domestic savings rate in the United States, and how that
has fueled a greater dependence on foreign investment to drive an economy that
continually performs at mediocre levels. This does not just apply to the United States.
Mongolia has relied on foreign investment to make up for a shortfall in gross domestic
savings as well (Goyal 1999). In terms of policies, those countries that establish greater
restrictions on FDI may be relying on higher savings rates to fuel development.
Conversely, those countries that are more open to foreign capital may be trying to make
up for a perceived shortfall in domestic savings. We would expect savings to show an
inverse relationship with countries’ policies on foreign direct investment, because
greater amounts of foreign direct investment is commonly associated with a low
domestic savings rate.
Foreign aid, the next component of demand for FDI, is financial assistance given
by developed countries to developing countries. Research has established a
relationship between foreign aid and foreign direct investment, though the relationship
seems to run in different directions depending on the study. Sometimes, the
relationship seems to enhance, rather than replace, foreign direct investment prospects.
Jodice (1980) finds that greater reliance on foreign aid reduces the number of
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expropriations in developing countries, though the relationship is weaker than expected,
and Bandelj (2002) found that foreign aid had a significant and positive relationship on
logged-FDI flows between dyadic pairs.
However, other studies find that foreign aid supports development as an
alternative to foreign direct investment. For example, Kamath (1990) attributes China’s
post-Maoist “Open Door Policy” for foreign direct investment to three factors: the
impossibility of China raising the resources for development domestically due to its
Mao-era economic troubles; as an alternative to foreign borrowing, which China did not
trust and pursued with a wary eye; and China’s isolation from multilateral aid agencies
and a desire to not become dependent on bilateral aid. In addition, China needed the
foreign technology that comes with FDI. Another study attributes the growth in FDI in
developing countries to the slowdown in U.S. foreign aid (Summary and Summary
1998).
While funding from developed countries is supposed to enhance the
development options of developing countries, we might expect that, despite the
uncertainty of its availability, countries have reasons to want to receive foreign aid as an
alternative to other forms of development, and that a loss of foreign aid would lead
countries to make up the shortfall elsewhere. In developing countries, where over the
past 30 years domestic savings have not lead to significant investment, and where
foreign borrowing has often led to debt crises, foreign aid might be a reasonable
alternative. Therefore, it can be expected that larger levels of foreign aid will lead to
more restrictive FDI policies.
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International loans are another potential variable that may have an effect on the
demand for FDI. There is substantial scholarship to support this idea. Some
researchers indicate that external debt and foreign investment compete with each other.
In developing countries with a large public sector, as in Brazil and Mexico, foreign
borrowing was a direct result of import substitution policies and provided funding for
massive new state investments in the economy. By the mid-1970s, this foreign
borrowing crowded out foreign investment in many sectors (Alarcon and McKinley
1992). Frieden (1983) relates that a net result of such borrowing was that such
countries increased their industrial and exporting capacities. He goes on to argue that
foreign borrowing is simply another form of foreign investment, albeit an indirect form,
and presents statistics demonstrating that throughout the 1960s and 1970s an increase
in the share of foreign capital inflows into developing countries held by private
international financiers was accompanied by a decrease in the share of inflows held by
multinationals.
However, there are some contrary indications that foreign loans affect the
demand for FDI. In particular, China has benefited from both borrowing and foreign
direct investment, using the two simultaneously to fund its development (Lardy 1995).
The issue may be one of causality. If countries have racked up great amounts of
external debt, would they be more inclined to seek capital to pay off their debt? Might
another way to gain capital consist of the promotion of foreign direct investment? A
temporal element may also be in effect, as countries developing over time may reach a
threshold where they cannot, or will not, borrow any more. However, since foreign
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borrowing constitutes a possible alternative to FDI, it is expected that countries that rely
more upon international lending will have more restrictive FDI policies.
The trade balance may be a force that influences FDI policies. Sengupta, as
noted above, set the trade balance equal to the difference between gross domestic
savings and gross domestic investment:

Exports − Imports = Domestic Savings − Domestic Investment
This simple equation suggests that the trade balance is linked with investment, and
particularly that a trade deficit will lead to a savings deficit which opens the door to
foreign capital. Lipsey (1991) argues that direct investment in the United States is part
of a web of interrelationships involving imports, exports, market shares and component
and materials sourcing, though he doubts the relationship leads to much effect on the
U.S. trade balance. The trade balance is also nested with other possible variables,
including exchange rates, which affect whether investment will be domestic or foreign.
In any case, Lipsey and Sengupta serve to show that trade and foreign direct
investments are interrelated. For example, in the United States, larger trade deficits
have helped turn the United States into a debtor nation with a greater reliance on
foreign direct investment, though some argue that this state of affairs is not all bad
(Dornbusch 1990). If trade balance is indeed related to foreign direct investment, then
trade surpluses affect the demand for FDI, and will result in more restrictive FDI
policies, while trade deficits will lead to more open FDI policies.
Because the demand for FDI is inversely related to the availability of other sorts
of development funding, we should see that these four factors – domestic savings,
foreign aid, foreign loans and the trade balance – are negatively related to the openness
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of FDI policies. Alternatively, it is possible that general openness to FDI directly
influences the demand for FDI. For example, developing countries that have greater
openness to FDI may gain a positive reputation that justifies greater trust from
international lending and aid institutions and decreases the amount of domestic savings
as the economy develops and more local resources are tapped.

In other words,

openness to FDI may precede demand for FDI, in which case we would not see these
relationships develop as the theory predicts. Should the theory be correct, then
developing countries that maintain trade surpluses and rely on greater amounts of
foreign loans, overseas aid, domestic savings will rely less on FDI, and therefore may
be expected to be more restrictive in their FDI policies.
Past experience with FDI. Finally, developing countries look to past experience in
developing their policies. By looking at past experience with FDI, states can anticipate
their needs, and therefore past performance becomes part of the agreement process. I
argue that developing countries take advantage of their attributes, which will be
explained more fully in the test of Model Two, to exert control over the FDI process.
Developing countries have no exact idea what they can expect in terms of FDI inflows
from year to year. While they can make a prediction based on past performance,
current negotiations with firms, and other tangible and intangible factors, they will not
know the exact level of FDI inflows until those inflows are accounted for. In addition, in
order to have a modicum of control over the FDI process, developing states may want
to keep their FDI policies as restrictive as they possibly can while maintaining inflow
levels at an acceptable level. For example, assume that the government of a
developing state believes that it is attractive to investors for a variety of reasons, such
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as natural resources, infrastructure, abundant labor, a large market, and a stable
political system. This government believes that investors are more disposed to invest in
the state than not. Should political and economic realities mean the state has restrictive
policies, it enters the agreement phase with firms in a good bargaining position. If firms
agree, the various constituencies within the state might favor restrictive FDI policies in
the future based on the anticipation that the state will still receive an acceptable level of
FDI.
On the other hand, assume that a state has not been attractive to investors, and
has experienced a stagnant flow or decline of FDI in the recent past. If the
constituencies of this state have agreed to open FDI policies in the political process, the
state may find itself in a weaker bargaining position so that the investment it does get
works to a greater benefit for firms and a lesser benefit for states.
If states review past performance, where do they get their information in order to
make reasonable estimates? States will look at past FDI figures as well as their assets,
liabilities and negotiating positions and try to anticipate and predict future FDI. On a
basic level, if states see that past inflows have been declining and economic
performance is down, governments may be compelled to open to FDI. States that have
rising FDI may act in various ways given other economic and political factors.
Determinants of FDI Inflows
All of the factors described in the previous section influence current FDI policies,
which indicates the extent of developing countries’ openness to FDI. In this model, I
argue that FDI policies have a strong influence on inflows of FDI into developing
countries. In addition to FDI policy, other influences on FDI inflows include
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characteristics of the investment market, political characteristics of the state, and state
economic characteristics. All of these factors combine to determine the levels of
developing countries’ overall total of FDI inflows. I discuss the influences on FDI inflows
in greater detail in the next sections.
FDI policies. Now that FDI policies and the factors that influence developing countries’
level of openness to foreign investment have been established, FDI policies become an
important influence on FDI, and their level of openness should have a strong impact on
FDI inflows. FDI policies serve as one basis for agreement between developing
countries and international firms over investment, as well as delineating each
developing country’s win-set, or range of possible agreements that they can make with
firms. Multinational corporations’ responses to developing country policies are therefore
indicated by the amount of investment that flows into developing markets from foreign
sources. Policies that are more open increase the number of possible agreements with
foreign firms that developing countries can accept, and should lead to a greater amount
of FDI inflows, while restrictive policies reduce the range of agreements and should
therefore decrease FDI inflows.
State political characteristics. The political character of the state does not just affect
FDI policy. It also affects the flow of FDI in and out of the domestic economy. This
effect is partly because the political makeup signals to potential investors what types of
policies are in place in the host market, what the initial bargaining position of the host
state will be, whether the state will be more inclined toward regulation, control, and
expropriation or toward market freedom, whether the state will protect property rights,
and so on. In developing countries, where governmental structures may not be as
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advanced or as stable as in the industrialized world, the political characteristic of the
state can make a difference in the importance of foreign direct investment in its
economy. The political characteristics that have the greatest impact on foreign direct
investment are regime type, ideology, and political stability.
Regime type has many theoretical and empirical associations with foreign direct
investment. While most of the discussion on this concept for the first stage of the model
is still pertinent in Model Two, there have been some specific quantitative studies
utilizing regime type as an independent variable where the effects of regime type on FDI
inflows have been generally favored democracy for greater inflows, with a few
exceptions. One exception has been reported by Resnick (2001), who finds a negative
association between FDI and democracy in his study of FDI in nineteen developing
countries, and Li and Resnick (2003) come to a similar finding on foreign direct
investment and democracy in a study of 53 developing countries. Property rights
protections seem to mitigate this effect because they are stronger in democracies and
suggest that developing countries may gain greater foreign investment by making
incremental improvements in the protection of the rights of property owners.
However, Feng (2001) finds that political freedom (usually associated with
democracy) enhances private investment. Jensen (2003) argues that findings that
downplay democracy’s effect on FDI are in error because they do not account for the
fact that most developing countries are more authoritarian than developed countries,
and all developing countries depend on FDI as a greater share of their GDP than
developed countries. In tests on cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional models
he finds that democracies are 70 percent more likely to attract FDI than non-
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democracies. He concludes that democracies are considered low-risk, which makes
them attractive to international investors.
In the face of much theoretical and empirical support, it is likely that countries
that are more democratic will be more likely to receive the benefits of FDI over countries
that are not, although there is a possibility that, given the mixed findings, political
stability matters more than regime type and therefore stable authoritarian and
democratic regimes are considered attractive to investors.
Ideology should also play a role in determining the amount of foreign direct
investment inflows. Ideology matters for numerous reasons, explained in Model One,
and which serve as the basis for hypotheses. If left-leaning governments are more
likely to restrict FDI than right-leaning governments, then there should be less FDI in
left-learning developing countries than in right-leaning ones.
Unfortunately, few existing studies use ideology as a variable to predict FDI. A
very recent study that uses ideology was written by Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006) in
response to an earlier study by Li and Resnick, cited earlier. They take issue with Li
and Resnick’s findings that democracy and FDI inflows have a negative association
when controlling for property rights. By increasing the sample size to 114 countries
from 1984 to 2001, they find that property rights become insignificant. Developing
democracies gain higher inflows of FDI, and governments under the control of leftist
political parties gain more FDI than governments under centrist and rightist control.
They argue that leftist governments prefer FDI because it will help labor. In turn, labor
is less likely to engage in internal struggles over policy change, which offers potential
investors credible guarantees against policy reversals. Leftist democratic governments
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are also more likely to fund public goods and engage in human capital formation which
would be attractive to foreign investors.
In the paucity of quantitative evidence about ideology and FDI it is hard to predict
an outcome. Certainly leftist governments should be more guarded about FDI as
reflected in their policies, but does this translate to inflows? Are MNCs attracted to
supposedly capital-friendly right-oriented countries as opposed to capital-unfriendly leftoriented countries? It is expected that the traditional relationships will hold, but it is also
quite possible that left-leaning developing democracies may be different, as Jakobsen
and de Soysa suggest.
Political stability and its relationship to FDI have been well-researched. While it
is possible that political instability inhibits FDI, the evidence has been decidedly mixed.
Early research tended to equate democracy and political stability, but Bollen and
Jackman (1985) make a good empirical case for not making such an assumption, and
encourage researchers to test stability as a concept separate from democracy. Bollen
and Jones (1982) find a negative and insignificant correlation between political
instability, defined as armed attacks, riots, deaths from political violence and
assassinations, and domestic auto production (which, as they argue, involves significant
foreign investment from the auto-producing corporations) in 84 countries. Crenshaw
(1991) also finds political instability, defined similarly to Bollen and Jones, to be an
insignificant determinant of FDI in 69 developing countries. Feng (2001) finds that usual
indicators of political instability (strikes, revolutions, coups d’etat, and riots) have little
effect on private investment. Perhaps these findings are due to the fact that strikes and
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riots are limited instances of instability and should not be grouped with larger, more
disruptive instances of instability, such as wars, civil insurrection, and revolution.
Political instability can also be measured by the rate of change of government.
The more change that governments undergo, the fewer guarantees investors have in
terms of protections and policy certainty. Root and Ahmed (1979) find that frequent
changes in government deter non-extractive foreign direct investment. Feng, cited
earlier, finds that government changeability and policy uncertainty have negative effects
on FDI. Li and Resnick (2003) find a positive correlation between regime durability and
foreign direct investment, while Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006) discover that the
association disappears when they increase sample size.
Political stability in a country can often depend on whether it is in conflict
externally or internally. Internal conflict, such as civil unrest or civil war, is related to the
concept of political instability as defined by strikes, revolutions, riots and coups d’etat.
Civil war can be an extension of those occurrences, and is perhaps the next, more
violent step of political instability. External warfare, on the other hand, consists of
government sponsored violence against another country. External war can create
political instability in all parties to the war, and most especially in the nation that fares
badly.
As one indicator of the domestic political environment, we can expect that greater
political instability hinders, not enhances, FDI prospects in developing nations. Given
that developing nations are perceived to be less stable than the developed nations, and
that theoretical links have been proposed linking greater FDI to greater stability, all
aspects of political instability should correlate negatively with FDI.
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Characteristics of the investment market. Characteristics of states’ investment markets
may affect foreign direct investment and its location in developing countries. Theories
of firms cited above have identified locational factors as contributing to firm decisionmaking in foreign direct investment. I will list a few factors here that fall under the
locational rubric. They include economic sectors, regional trade agreements, wages,
and unionization.
FDI may be attracted to certain countries based on the strength of certain
sectors. Much early FDI was attracted to extractive industries in raw materials, but
newer investments are to be found in manufacturing and services. It is crucial, when
looking at issues related to development, to account for differences not only between
but even within sectors (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 1986).
Do these differences determine whether FDI enters developing countries?
Research has linked investment in sectors to development in lesser-developed nations.
While most pre-World War II foreign investment in Mexico was in public services and
extractive industries, the latter half of the 20th century saw most investment go into the
industrial sector (Weinert 1981). Export-led growth in manufacturing, aided by foreign
direct investment, helped Sri Lanka rebound from a dismally underperforming economy
to a vibrant outward-oriented economy (Athukorala and Rajapatirana 2000). Public
investment in Malawi, which includes significant investments in the services sector, has
been shown to demonstrate a two-directional causal relationship with private investment
(Mataya and Veeman 1996). However, Root and Ahmed (1979) do not find any
significance in the relationship between the ratios of manufacturing to GDP and raw
material exports to GDP to foreign direct investment in manufacturing, and Crenshaw
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(1991) finds that foreign capital penetration in extractive industries actually reduces total
FDI stock, while foreign capital penetration in manufacturing increases FDI stock.
If sectoral differences are a factor in attracting FDI, there should be a positive
relationship between one or more sectors and FDI performance, assuming that there
are no causality questions. Developing countries with industrial economies or
economies that focus on manufacturing should attract foreign direct investment. More
recently, services have accounted for a greater share of overall foreign direct
investment. Services accounted for the majority of FDI in developing countries in
2005 14 . In 2004, the share of services in FDI accounted for 63 percent of FDI flows,
and 55 percent of FDI stocks in 2001 (Kolstad and Villanger 2004). Most of the share of
services in FDI can be attributed to the financial and business sectors. Kolstad and
Villagner (2004) also report that there is also evidence of a positive interrelationship
among FDI in various sectors, particularly between the manufacturing sector and the
services sector.

Based on such evidence, it is expected that developing countries with

economies focusing on services should also attract more FDI.
International Factors. International factors do not only affect FDI policies, but can have
a large effect on FDI inflows. Membership in international organizations concerned with
trade and investment, for example, may be an attraction for firms that look for a level
playing field when making their investments. Besides Jodice’s (1980) finding of a weak
relationship between FDI and international institutional pressure in terms of
expropriations, McGinnis and Movsesian (2000) explore the impact of the WTO on
world trade and argue that its rules and norms restrict protectionist groups within
14

UNCTAD, 2006 World Investment Report. Highlights of the report can be found online at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=7431&intItemID=2527&lang=1&mode=highlights
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domestic society and increase countries’ abilities to engage in trade, and by extension, I
would argue, foreign investment. Solingen (2001) defines internationalization as the
expansion of global markets, institutions and norms, and maintains that countries in
internationalizing regional coalitions attracted greater trade and foreign investment.
Proximity may also have an effect on FDI inflows. Deichmann et al. (2003) find
that geographic factors helped determine Eastern European countries’ attractiveness to
foreign firms. Eastern European countries clustered in three groups geographically;
those that were making progress in economic and political reforms, those that were
implementing some reforms but struggling with others, and those that lagged behind.
These factors, plus their proximity to Europe, helped determine their attractiveness to
foreign firms. In addition, a recent study on the impacts of the globalization of health
care and its meaning for the Caribbean nations argues that proximity to the United
States, which has an aging population and high costs of health care, could benefit
foreign investment in health care in countries such as Jamaica (Bernal 2007).
Other factors exist that may influence FDI inflows. Regional trade agreements
(RTA) may enhance FDI inflows to individual countries within the RTA, but only if the
country is already a desirable site for FDI and if it has liberal trade and investment
policies (Blomstrom and Kokko 1997). Worth (1998) finds that RTAs enhance trade
liberalization, which affects per capita GDP, GDP growth and market size and which, in
turn, affect FDI flows.
FDI inflows in developing countries may also be affected by their comparative
advantage in labor provision owing to a surplus of labor. Neoclassical economics
argues that a greater supply of labor in a market should mean lower wages. Theories of
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FDI argue that FDI should flow from high labor cost markets to low labor cost markets to
minimize labor costs to firms. (Calvet 1981). Low wages are a basis for price
competitiveness for firms (Ozawa 1992). Cushman (1987) finds that failing productivity
and higher wages reduce the inflows of FDI.

However, Hanson (1995) disputes this

notion, demonstrating that low wages in developing countries have not been associated
with higher investment rates – the reverse is true. He speculates that other factors,
such as low labor productivity, have a greater influence on FDI. Also, years of FDI
investment may have a residual effect. Several authors find that foreign investment
raises wages in host countries (Feenstra and Hanson 1995, Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey
1997, Lipsey and Sjoholm 2001).
Unionization may be another influence on FDI inflows, and firms may assess
unionization as one local factor that affects their decision to invest. Cooke (1997) lists
three reasons why firms would want to avoid unions: restrictions on management ability
to direct their workforce, added transaction costs from bargaining and work disruptions,
and higher wages and benefits associated with unionization. He finds a significant
negative association between percentage of union membership in OECD countries and
U.S. direct investment. Alderson (2004) explores another angle, that union density
causes firm production costs to rise and flexibility in production to drop, and so spurs
foreign direct investment to non-unionized countries. However, he finds no relationship
between union density and outward FDI.
Another characteristic that is associated with foreign direct investment inflows is
corruption. Bardhan (1997) lists two main views of the effects of corruption on FDI
inflows. The first argues that corruption depresses FDI inflows because it places
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barriers against investment within the market and greatly decreases efficiency. The
second argues that corruption aids the flow of the marketplace by allowing those
investors that are willing to pay bribes to government officials to set up for business
more efficiently. An example often given is China, which is considered to have rampant
corruption but also garners much foreign investment (Wei 2000). Wei finds that
increases in tax rates or corruption reduce inward FDI, and that American investors are
as averse to corruption as investors of any other nation. Habib and Zurawicki (2002)
find that not only does corruption have a negative effect on FDI, but also firms in corrupt
countries will not invest in countries where corruption is even worse. Because
corruption is widely seen as an impediment to investment and smoothly operating
business, corruption should be negatively associated with FDI inflows.
Market size has been a long-established predictor associated with foreign direct
investment, because larger markets provide greater potential sales and possibly greater
local support and supply opportunities for businesses. As early as 1969, Scaperlanda
and Mauer found that GDP, proxying as market size, was the only consistent predictor
of U.S. foreign investment in the European Economic Community. Jaumotte (2004)
found that market size, as operationalized by real GDP, was a significant and positive
predictor of overall FDI within regional trade agreements. China is often cited for its
meteoric FDI growth partly because of its large market potential. Even within China,
regions with a larger market size attract more FDI (Wen 2005). However, Miller and
Weigel (1972) did not find a significant correlation between market size and U.S. direct
investment in Brazil. And Crenshaw (1991), operationalizing market size as total
energy consumption in thousand-ton coal equivalents, found market size negatively
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associated with total FDI stocks and stocks per capita, but acknowledged that
elimination of overly-influential outliers in his analysis led to severe problems with
heteroskedasticity. These factors should be controlled for in any test.

The Next Step: Testing the Model
The model outlined above is one possible explanation of FDI in developing
countries. In the first part of the model, FDI policy is determined by domestic political
and ideological costs, international pressure, demand for FDI, and anticipated inflows.
The policies that result from the first stage then become determinants of FDI inflows in
the second part of the model. The influence of policies is supplemented by
characteristics of each developing state’s political environment, investment market, and
economic characteristics. Because there is an anticipatory aspect to the first model,
inflows from previous time periods feed back into the first part. Figure 2-2 provides a
graphical representation of the theory.
In Chapter Three, I will provide a quantitative test of this model. I introduce a
new measure of FDI policy, the FDI Equity Index, which will shed light on how policies
establish each state’s openness toward FDI. I lay out a statistical model which defines
independent and control variables for the concepts I propose above, and conduct a test
to determine whether those variables influence FDI equity openness.
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Figure 2-2: Determinants of FDI Policy and Inflows
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FDI Inflows

Chapter Three
Quantifying and Testing Foreign Direct Investment Policies
In this chapter I lay out the first part of a model of FDI policy and its effects on
FDI. This model follows the narrative and theory of FDI described in Chapter Two. I
argue that FDI policies in developing countries follow the logic of two-level games, and
therefore are influenced by both domestic and international level factors. Domestically,
FDI policies are more open or closed based on attitudes (influenced by prevailing
prescriptions for development in vogue at the time) that exist in the most powerful forces
in the domestic political consciousness at any given point in time, along with realities of
domestic economics. The direct domestic influences on FDI policies are political and
ideological forces, international pressure, the demand for FDI, and state anticipation or
prediction of actual flows of FDI. International influences on FDI policies come from
pressures in the international political and economic environment.
In the second part of the FDI story, inflows of FDI to states are influenced by the
level of openness to FDI as indicated in their FDI equity policy, as well as domestic and
international influences on firms’ decisions to invest. Firms decide to invest based on
existing state policies, characteristics of states’ investment markets, political regime
type and stability, and other state economic characteristics. I test the proposition that
FDI policy is the basis for agreements developing states make with firms, and therefore
any agreements (as indicated by FDI inflows) are influenced by these basic policies.
The levels happen concurrently, and the outcomes from both levels help explain the
outcomes of the other.
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States face a fundamental tension when dealing with FDI. I assume that states
want to receive FDI, and I therefore argue that they are motivated to seek FDI for
development and gain. However, there are costs to states for implementing policies
that are open to FDI, and states that wish to bring in more investment have to take
account of these domestic and international political costs. These costs may include
domestic opposition to FDI by powerful interest groups, and loss of economic and
political power to international actors such as international institutions and multinational
corporations. Consideration of costs and benefits allow states to create and modify FDI
policies, which serve as indicators of their FDI preferences. Such costs and benefits not
only influence states’ openness to FDI, but also predict the inflows of FDI into the state.
States also examine their past inflows, which help them identify the usefulness of their
current FDI policies. Therefore, the explanation and testing of the complete model will
follow this approach.
Determinants of FDI Equity Policy
The first part of my theory explains the openness of countries to FDI. States
considering the extent of their openness weigh the benefits and costs of FDI against a
number of other domestic and international factors. In other words, we cannot assume
that states are simply willing to accept FDI without first considering the factors that lead
to such policies. The factors described below are an integral part of the way states
weigh the benefits and costs of FDI.
States’ openness to FDI is a difficult variable to measure, partly because there
have been few quantitative studies of FDI policy and partly because the theoretical
concept of FDI openness is very complex, consisting of many different components.
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For example, Guisinger (1985) identified over 50 separate incentives and disincentives
that pertain to FDI, and mapped these policies in ten countries. The policies affect
corporate revenues, inputs, value-added, the ability of individuals or corporations to own
land, and corporations’ relations with labor. FDI policies can consist of restrictions on
new investment, regulations on existing investment, respect for and government
protection of property rights, and level of taxation on foreign corporations to name a few.
Which of these is most important? Alternatively, are all of them important in determining
FDI policy openness?
Similar problems exist in measuring trade policy, leading some scholars to
employ creative solutions which have relevance to the study of FDI policy. A gravity
model of optimal level of trade, employed by Hiscox and Kastner (2002) inspired Pinto
(2005) to utilize their procedure to predict openness toward FDI. Basically, a gravity
model of trade utilizes the distance between two units and their respective market sizes
to predict trade flows. Pinto utilized the technique to develop a measure that indirectly
represented FDI policy. However, an indirect measure based on flows of investment
may be problematic because it assumes that flows relate to policy. This is not a sure
assumption. The only way to determine if flows relate to policy is to develop a direct
measure of openness to FDI and test it; otherwise other methods remain approximate
techniques of determining this elusive concept.
One possible solution to the problem is to find a measure that more closely
reflects FDI policy and policy changes which will allow a direct test of the influences on
openness to FDI. To date, few solutions have been forthcoming. Bandelj, stating that
“no other study has tried to quantify host country FDI policy,” wrote perhaps the first
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paper where a direct measure of FDI policy was utilized. She created her variable by
conducting a content analysis of government provisions for incoming FDI in eleven
Eastern and Central European countries (Bandelj 2002, 426). Her policy variable,
which she used as an independent variable, did not significantly affect FDI inflows.
So far, FDI policy measures consist of indirect measures applicable to a large
number of countries, as in Pinto’s gravity model measure, or a direct and encompassing
measure that is limited to a small number of countries, such as Bandelj’s measure. A
large-scale statistical analysis utilizing a direct measure of FDI policy has remained
elusive. The variable created for this study, the FDI Equity Index, is a significant step
toward resolving the gap between indirect and direct measures and offers researchers
the benefits of each.
The FDI Equity Index is an ordinal measure of the equity openness to foreign
investment of 57 developing countries over 29 years (1976-2004). 15 The variable was
created primarily through a content analysis of the Exporters Encyclopedia, a yearly
publication currently published by Dun & Bradstreet which lists practical trading
information for exporters. Much of the information published in the Encyclopedia has to
do with specific trading issues, such as tariffs and other taxes, labeling and packing
regulations, a description of ports and the machinery available in them, etc. However, a
section on marketing in each country often includes a subsection on foreign investment
and various policies that are in effect. From these descriptions, exporters can
determine whether equity restrictions are in place against foreign investment and

15

The full list of countries in the sample may be found in Appendix A. A listing of summary statistics for each untransformed
variable in this chapter is provided in Appendix B. Transformed variables are indicated in the listing.
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whether tax breaks and customs duties exemptions are allowed. Sometimes even the
entire text of a law or regulation is printed. 16
The foreign equity index is thus a one-dimensional variable of equity openness. 17
The countries for which information was obtained are listed in Appendix A. The
variable was coded into four categories, with the lowest category correlating to the
highest restrictiveness on foreign equity, and the highest category allowing the most
foreign equity participation. The categories therefore take on the following values:

Category

Description

0

Less than 100 percent participation allowed, but
majority foreign equity possible.

1

100 percent foreign equity allowed in some sectors,
but many sectors (over 10) restricted or prohibited

2

100 percent foreign equity allowed in most sectors,
but some sectors (6-10) restricted or prohibited

3

100 percent foreign equity allowed in nearly all
sectors; small number of sectors (0-5) may be
reserved for state or domestic equity.

This variable allows testing of an aspect of FDI policy that has not been directly
tested before. It is a direct measure and is also available for a large number of
countries, and therefore presents an improved alternative to existing measures of FDI
policy. Figure 3-1 portrays the histogram of the variable.

16

Please refer to Appendix C for more information regarding the creation of the Foreign Direct Equity Index and problems
encountered.
17
The index does not count free trade area policies or export processing zone policies, which a number of developing countries
have set up. The policies creating these zones set aside a certain area where foreign companies can establish manufacturing
plants, and where they get privileges not available to them in the overall domestic economy. These policies are an attempt by
domestic governments to manage foreign investment. Free trade areas often allow 100% ownership and offer tax breaks and
customs duty exemptions as long as all or a majority of the finished product is exported out of the country. However, these are
exceptions to the general domestic economy, and not the rule. The FDI Equity Index only considers FDI equity policies that apply to
the entire economy.
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Over time, the countries in the sample moved toward greater openness in
aggregate. Figure 3-2 illustrates more of this upward drift in categories. The mean
value in 1976 for all countries is 0.92 and the median is 1. By 2004, the median value
increased to 2, and the mean value to 2.14. A movement of one category in a positive
direction for all countries in the sample does not seem like much movement, but it
conceals some volatile movement within many individual countries. Table 3-1 illustrates
that some countries have moved toward greater openness in their foreign equity policies
over 29 years, while others have remained more or less static.
One fact stands out clearly: once countries passed new foreign equity policies,
they were unlikely to reverse them. Only two countries in the sample ever reversed
direction in their FDI equity policies. Iran began 1976 in category 0, and then moved up
to category 1 in 1995 after passing a law that allowed more than 50% foreign equity in
joint ventures. However, Iran fell back to category 0 in 2002 after a new law put a cap
of 35% on foreign equity in individual companies and 25% cap on foreign equity in
sectors. Nigeria, in category 2 in 1976, passed a 1977 law setting caps on new
investment and calling for the gradual phase-out of foreign equity to domestic investors,
moving it back a category. Nigeria moved up again after liberalizing its codes in 1989,
and then to category 3 in 1995 following its Investment Promotion Commission Decree,
which removed a number of sector-based restrictions on foreign equity.
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Figure 3-1: FDI Equity Index
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Figure 3-2: FDI Equity Index
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Table 3-1:

Movement of Selected Sample Countries Along Equity Index
1976-2004

Countries Moving
Upward Two or More
Categories

Countries Remaining in
Same Category

Countries That
Reversed Course
during time period

Algeria
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guyana
Jordan
Madagascar
Morocco
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey

Brazil
Chile
Cote D’Ivoire
Gambia
Haiti
Kenya
Lesotho
Malaysia
Niger
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Swaziland
Syria
Tunisia

Iran
Nigeria
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What has influenced these countries’ FDI policies at particular points in time? I
have argued throughout this dissertation that factors at both the domestic and
international levels affect FDI policies. This blend is conditioned by prevailing attitudes
toward FDI at any given point in time and even toward globalization in general. The
main domestic factors that influence FDI policies are domestic politics and economic
realities. The main international factors are international political and economic
pressures. I will operationalize these factors in more detail in the following sections.
Domestic Level Politics: Political and Ideological Costs to Government
In the previous chapter, I established that the domestic level political environment
has an effect on FDI policymaking. Domestic level bargaining between interest groups,
political parties, state governments and other players in the political system produce
coherent policies which are then presented to foreign corporations as the basis for
agreement on FDI. The state, once the policies are agreed upon, may enhance its
prospects for agreement if it goes outside the bounds of domestic policy, but will face
political costs at home. The next sections will discuss the domestic political factors that
influence FDI policies
Regime type. The previous chapter established sound theoretical reasons for believing
that regime type influences FDI policy. It has been argued here that democratic
regimes tend to have safer environments for investments because they protect property
rights and provide fair ways to resolve disputes. Despite the fact that autocracies also
can provide protections for investment, democracies have been at the forefront of the
globalization movement and therefore have been open to free trade and investment.
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To test the relationship between regime and FDI policies, I use the Polity IV
dataset, which is one of the most widely used dataset on regime characteristics. Polity
IV consists of an index built on a number of regime indicators identified by Ted Robert
Gurr. 18 The dataset codes many countries from the early 1800s, utilizing a continuous
scale from complete autocracy (-10) to complete democracy (+10).
Figure 3-3 illustrates the distribution of the Polity IV variable over the sample
data. The Center for International Development and Conflict Management, which
administers the Polity IV index, recently released its country codings through 2004,
making them available for use in this study.
In 1976, the median Polity IV aggregate score was -7, indicating that most
developing countries in the sample were highly autocratic. By 2004, the median
aggregate score was 6, which put most countries in the sample in the democratic
designation. In 1976, 39 of the 57 countries in the sample had a score that was -5
(autocratic) or below, and only 10 countries had scores of 5 or above (democratic). The
remaining eight countries (which could be labeled “transition” countries) occupied the
area between -5 and 5. By 2004, the situation had reversed. The number of autocratic
countries had dropped to 10, and the number of democratic countries in the sample had
risen to 36, with the remainder in transition.
There are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that regime type is
positively related to FDI policy. Democracies are more likely to have open economies,
while autocracies prefer to maintain more control over their economies and are
18

The Polity IV dataset can be found at the website of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management,
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/projects/project.asp?id=18. Use of two other variables, the Vanhanen Polyarchy index and the Freedom
House Freedom in the World index, were also considered. All three indexes are highly correlated with each other. The Vanhanen
index only coded countries to the year 2000, and therefore did not cover the time-frame of this study. The Freedom House index
had data for all the years of this study, and its substitution into the regression equation in place of the Polity variable does not alter
the results of the regressions.
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Figure 3-3: Regime type
Median Polity values
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therefore likely to be more restrictive. It can be expected that this relationship will hold
with FDI equity policies.
H1:

Regimes that are more (less) democratic will have more (less) open FDI
equity policies

Left-right spectrum. Theoretical links have been established between ideological
orientation and economic preferences, which encourages a test of this concept. In
general, literature reviewed in Chapter Two showed that the right is associated with
free-market principles, free trade, and economic globalization while the left tends to be
focused more on the national economy and various groups within it that depend on
social welfare.
The measure utilized for ideological orientation is taken from the Database of
Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). The DPI categorizes the ideological orientation
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of each country’s chief executive’s party by labeling it as “left”, “center”, “right” or “other.”
The category “other” consists of those governments that cannot be categorized on a
left-right continuum, such as monarchies, theocracies, some military dictatorships and
periods of non-governance.
The database also lists the ideological orientation of the ruling party in
government, and of the largest opposition party. In few cases were there any
misalignments. The entries for Bangladesh in 2002, 2003 and 2004 were corrected for
this study because the entries for the chief executive’s party and the largest government
party were not aligned even though they were both labeled as the same party in the
database. In nearly all cases, the chief executive aligned with the ruling party in
ideological orientation, and so the orientation of the chief executive’s party was chosen
as the measure to be used.
Out of the 57 countries in the sample, leftist governments averaged just over one
fourth of all governments each year during the time period examined, with the highest
proportion of leftist governments in existence from 1976 – 1990. Rightist governments
averaged just over one-fifth of all governments during this same period, but gained a
higher proportion during the 1990 – 2004 time range. Centrist governments only
existed in about three countries per year in the sample. The governments characterized
as “other” account for almost half the governments in the sample from 1976 – 2004.
The categorical variable from the DPI was reconfigured into separate dummy
variables, labeled “left”, “center”, “right” and “other”. The “right” category was left out of
model estimations and serves as a basis of comparison. The variables were coded 1 if
they possessed the required ideological attribute. For example, “left” is coded 1 if the
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chief executive’s party is oriented to the left and 0 if it is coded any other way. The
same coding rules were utilized for “center” and “right.”
Research suggests that the left tends to be less supportive of and open to FDI
because it is more concerned with boosting and protecting the national economy,
redistributing income and supporting a strong labor movement. Alternatively, the right
tends to be less hostile toward FDI because in the past 30 years it has supported global
interdependence and free trade. This relationship should therefore hold with FDI equity
policy. There is little research on the center’s attitudes toward FDI, and therefore the
relationship could run in either direction or be non-significant.
H2:

Left-oriented governments prefer less open FDI equity policies than rightoriented governments.

Nationalism. Neoclassical theory and researchers studying nationalism suggest that
nationalist governments may be more inclined view the international economy as a
competition for scarce resources. Nationalist governments also may attempt to shield
certain constituencies in their country by protecting their markets from outside forces in
the belief that greater openness to international economic forces may cause harm to
local economies.
To test nationalism’s effect on FDI policies, I employ a variable from the
Database of Political Institutions, which is coded as 1 when the largest party in the
government is a nationalist party and 0 when it is not. In the sample, nationalist
governments made up 19.5 percent of all governments in all countries over the 29 years
of data. The variable is missing 227 observations. I predict that nationalist
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governments will be more inclined to pass FDI policies that have more restrictions than
non-nationalist governments.
H3: Nationalist governments will prefer less open FDI equity policies.
Domestic Level Economics
Domestic level politics work in conjunction with domestic economic realities. These
realities include the ways that the state funds development. If a state can rely on
alternative sources of development, or it has had past success with FDI, these factors
will influence state policies. The next few sections discuss the domestic economic
environment.
Domestic savings. The previous chapter discussed the links between domestic
savings and foreign direct investment, particularly that low domestic savings is
associated with high rates of foreign direct investment. Countries that have low
domestic savings are less able to develop using domestic capital, and must make up for
the lack of capital by importing it from foreign sources.
Gross domestic savings is used as the measure of domestic savings in this
model estimation. Figures 3-4 and 3-5 graphically depict the descriptive statistics for
gross domestic savings in the country sample. From 1976 through 2004, average gross
domestic savings increased over three times. In 1976, the average gross domestic
savings in the country sample was $13.81 billion (constant 2000 dollars).

By 2004, the

average gross domestic savings was $31.46 billion. Overall, between 1976 and 2004,
gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP increased only slightly, from 18.24
percent to 19.43 percent. Between those years, the percentage dipped as low as 13.88
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Figure 3-4: Gross Domestic Savings

Figure 3-5: Gross Domestic Savings
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percent in 1983 but mostly fluctuated back and forth. Gross domestic savings as a
proportion of GDP is the measurement used in order to control for market size and to
solve autocorrelation problems resulting from a rising trend in the non-proportioned
statistic. I expect that gross domestic savings will show a negative relationship with
countries’ policies on foreign equity.
H4:

As developing states’ proportion of gross domestic savings to GDP rises
(falls), they are more likely to have less (more) openness to foreign equity

Foreign aid. Foreign aid, the next component of demand for FDI, is financial assistance
given by developed countries to developing countries. The previous chapter discussed
the research on the links between foreign direct investment and foreign aid, and its
often contradictory findings. While foreign aid in some cases enhances foreign direct
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investment, developing countries with capital shortages can turn to foreign aid to
supplement or replace FDI.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines
official development assistance (ODA) as “flows to countries…and multilateral
institutions…to aid recipients which are 1) provided by official agencies, including state
and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and 2) each transaction of
which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare
of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and
conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10
per cent).” 19 This study uses ODA to each developing country as a percentage of
overall assistance to all developing countries from OECD members. Because of a rightskew and kurtosis, the variable has been right-shifted and logged to mitigate these
difficulties and in order to cut down on any loss of observations.
Figure 3-6 graphs the yearly mean of ODA to countries in the sample as a
percentage of total ODA given to all developing countries by members of the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The amounts, as shown, are a
very small percentage of overall ODA, either one percent or less. Overall, the amount
of ODA given to countries in the sample has undergone reductions over time, and
generally mirrors the situation among most developing countries. Net disbursements of
ODA from the DAC countries to developing countries increased from about $40 billion in
1976 to just over $74.1 billion in 1992, then fell to $57.6 billion in 1997. By 2004, net

19

From the paper Is it ODA? by the Working Party on Statistics of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Unclassified paper available online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf
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Figure 3-6: Official Development Assistance
Mean values
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ODA disbursements had again risen to $79.4 billion. 20 Figures for ODA per capita
mirror the overall decline in ODA as a percentage of net DAC disbursements, peaking
at a high of $86.14 per person in 1979 but declining to $30.89 by 2004. 21 However, the
World Bank reports that ODA has been rising recently, though most of the increase in
development assistance has gone mainly to a small number of countries, particularly
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 22
Developing countries experiencing a dearth of foreign assistance may use policy
to draw in greater amounts of foreign direct investment. Alternatively, greater amounts
of foreign assistance may reduce a country’s need for foreign investment. It is

20

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Data in constant (2004) U.S. dollars. Statistical
data for OECD development assistance can be found online at
http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,2340,en_2649_34447_36661793_1_1_1_1,00.html.
21
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006.
22
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006 World View: Goals. Report with analysis of Official Development
Assistance can be found online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Section1_1_8.htm.
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hypothesized here that a negative relationship will exist between official development
assistance and FDI policy.
H5:

As the percentage of ODA to overall ODA falls (rises), there will be more
(less) openness to foreign equity.

Foreign borrowing. The theory presented in the last chapter includes foreign borrowing
by developing countries as another alternative to FDI. Foreign borrowing has served to
fund development in many developing countries, and is often seen as another form of
investment. Rather than being mutually exclusive in all cases, FDI and borrowing may
work together, as in the case of China.
I use gross external debt as the variable to represent foreign borrowing in this
model. Gross external debt consists of the amount that is still owed on loans to
creditors outside the country. According to the IMF, “Gross external debt is the amount,
at any given time, of disbursed and outstanding contractual liabilities of residents of a
country to nonresidents to repay principal, with or without interest, or to pay interest,
with or without principal.” 23 Therefore it gives a direct indication of the amount of loans
that developing countries are responsible for in any given year.
A potential problem with this variable is related to the range of time in the
sample. The measure not only takes into account recent borrowing, but also older
loans that have not been repaid. Therefore, the measure is fluid, and the statistics from
1976 – 2004 most certainly include external debt incurred before 1976. As with
savings, debt as a percentage of GDP is used here. The variable has been logged to
protect against biased outcomes due to right-skewness and kurtosis. Figure 3-7
23

From the International Monetary Fund’s External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users, ©2003. On the World Wide
Web at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/eds/Eng/Guide/
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Figure 3-7: Gross External Debt
Mean values
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illustrates that the percentage of GDP of gross external debt among sample countries
has been rising. A negative relationship is expected because external debt represents
an alternative path to development.
H6:

As percentage of external debt relative to GDP rises (falls), developing
countries will have less (more) openness to foreign equity.

Trade Balance. As argued in the last chapter, with investment linked to trade balance,
trade becomes another alternative to foreign investment. Countries that focus on
export-led development can hope to reduce their eventual reliance on foreign direct
investment by building up a surplus in savings.
The variable used in this study will be the trade balance as a percent of GDP.
While the variable exhibits much kurtosis, logging the variable does little to mitigate this
problem so the variable is used in its natural form. Figure 3-8 demonstrates that the
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Figure 3-8: Trade Balance
Mean values
-0.14
1976
1977 -0.17
-0.13
1978
-0.14
1979
-0.16
1980
1981 -0.17
-0.11
1982
-0.10
1983
-0.08
1984
-0.10
1985
-0.08
1986
-0.07
1987
-0.05
1988
-0.03
1989
-0.04
1990
-0.01
1991
-0.04
1992
-0.06
1993
-0.03
1994
-0.05
1995
-0.04
1996
-0.07
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

-.2

-.1

0.01
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.08
0.13

0

.1

.2

Percent of GDP
Source: World Development Indicators

average trade balance for the countries across the sample for the years 1976-2004 was
mostly negative, only turning positive around 1998. With trade and investment so
linked, I expect that trade balance varies negatively with foreign equity openness.
H7:

As the percentage of GDP of the trade balance in developing countries
rises (falls), countries have less (more) openness to foreign equity.

Because the demand for FDI is inversely related to the availability of other sorts
of development funding, we should see that the alternatives to FDI, such as gross
domestic savings, foreign aid, external debt and the trade balance, are inversely related
to the level of openness recorded in the FDI equity index. Alternatively, it is possible
that general openness to FDI directly influences the demand for FDI. For example,
developing countries that have greater openness to FDI may gain a positive reputation
that justifies greater trust from international lending and aid institutions and decreases
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the amount of domestic savings as the economy develops and more local resources are
tapped.
In other words, openness to FDI may precede demand for FDI, in which case we
would not see these relationships develop as the theory predicts. Should the theory be
supported in the model, then developing countries that rely on greater amounts of
international loans, overseas aid, domestic savings and a positive trade balance will rely
less on FDI, and therefore may be expected to be more restrictive in their FDI policies.
Past FDI Performance
Developing states that set policies on FDI and review these policies periodically
will look at past FDI performance to determine present policies, specifically how much
FDI they have received in previous years. How far in the past will they look? I argue
that states look farther than just one year in the past in order to judge their FDI
performance. Choosing a past time-frame may be somewhat arbitrary, yet many
developing countries, especially those that were formerly socialist or under the Soviet
sphere of influence, map out their economies in five year plans.
This variable of anticipated FDI inflows will be measured using the average of the
previous five years of FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP. The variable is right-shifted
and logged to reduce the effects of skewness and kurtosis. As operationalized, FDI as
a percent of GDP measures the proportion of FDI to its overall economy, or in other
words, the importance of FDI to each developing country. Figure 3-9 describes
graphically the previous five year average for FDI inflows as a percent of GDP across
the sample. Figure 3-10 shows the previous five year average for constant dollars. The
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Figure 3-9: FDI Inflows

Figure 3-10: FDI inflows

Mean values, previous 5 year average
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1980 312.36
1981 309.23
1982 352.81
1983 366.34
1984 356.10
1985 333.74
1986 332.89
1987 298.07
1988 281.95
1989 312.62
1990 364.44
1991 396.05
466.00
1992
582.00
1993
729.42
1994
947.61
1995
1187.65
1996
1476.97
1997
1817.79
1998
2098.89
1999
2302.76
2000
2430.49
2001
2468.07
2002
2356.15
2003
2218.33
2004

0.87
0.87
0.87
0.91
0.99
0.94
1.04
1.07
1.01
0.88
0.82
0.75
0.73
0.77
0.93
1.02
1.12
1.35
1.56
1.75
1.98
2.24
2.44
2.83
3.09
3.25
3.41
3.46
3.43

0

1

2

3

4

0

Percent of GDP

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

Constant (2000) US dollars

Source: World Development Indicators

Source: World Development Indicators

percent of GDP rose from an average of about 0.87 percent in 1976 to about 3.43
percent in 2004, and a similar pattern can be seen in the constant dollar amounts.
States may look at their past performances with FDI inflows and pass policies
allowing for some opening if they are not meeting development goals and if FDI is too
low. States that are meeting their development goals, or have grown wary of the
amount of FDI flowing into their markets, may feel a need to restrict FDI through policy.
Regardless, states policies are a result of their proactive attempts to control their FDI
destinies. Therefore, a negative relationship between FDI policies and previous FDI
inflow averages will result.
H8:

A rise (fall) in the previous five-year average of FDI inflows will lead to less
(more) openness in FDI equity policies.

128

International Environment: International Political Pressures
Theoretically, international pressures influence FDI policies. A developing state
occupies part of a large international political and economic playing field where it
competes and interacts with other states, multinational firms, and international
institutions. All of these interactions have influence on policy creation in developing
states. Pressure may thus come from international institutions that develop and
represent norms and ideas about FDI, and pressure may also come from closer
proximity to more developed states which push for greater access for their home-grown
multinationals in other developing markets through free trade and movement of capital.
The next two subsections will introduce the variables that represent international
political pressure.
International institutions. International institutions allow member countries to uphold
norms by allowing for effective communication. They also provide an arena for
generating ideas and solving problems and allow for punishments and rewards. As
discussed in the previous chapter, there are theoretical reasons to hypothesize a
relationship between international institutional membership and government policies.
International institutions are generators of norms and values which in themselves exert
pressure on the domestic policies of their members both directly and indirectly through
alliances with domestic groups. Membership in international institutions, especially
those that are organized around the international economy, should be a direct and
indirect source of pressure on developing states because of their promotion of free
trade, open movement of capital and other tenets of globalization.
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The measure employed for international institutions combines developing
countries’ memberships in international institutions and conventions into an international
institutions index. I selected five international organizations were selected: the World
Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) which provides loans and other
types of financing in order to spur private investment in projects in developing countries;
The World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which
provides investment insurance for investors and lenders in the cases of currency
transfer restrictions, expropriation, war, civil disturbance and breach of contract; the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which offers
arbitration services for dispute resolution and reconciliation between governments and
foreign investors; the United Nations’ World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
which standardizes international intellectual protection laws, policies and standards; and
the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose members agree to curtail trade-related
investment measures (TRIMs) that are inconsistent with WTO trade agreements and
also agree to standardization of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPs). These five organizations represent important international norms on foreign
direct investment. They also came into effect at different times, some before the time
frame of the study and others between 1976 and 2004. The index thus represents a
percentage of the available international institutions to which developing countries could
belong as members at every time point in the dataset.
Figure 3-11 graphs the mean values of the index over the time range of the
sample. Overall, from 1976 to 2004, the mean index values of the sample countries
rose from 0.56 in 1976 to 0.94 in 2004, indicating that the sample countries became
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Figure 3-11: International Pressure
Mean values
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more aligned with world standards on investment over time. The model should show
that the relationship between developing country membership in international
institutions and foreign policy is positive, with membership in more institutions focused
on investment issues leading to greater equity openness.
H9:

As developing countries belong to more (fewer) international organizations
promoting investment norms, foreign equity openness will rise (fall).

Proximity to Developed Countries. Recent scholarship, as explored in the previous
chapter, has addressed the effects of proximity to developed countries on the policies of
neighboring developing countries. In this analysis, proximity means contiguity, either
along borders or along economic zones. While there may be much variation in how
developing states respond to overt or implicit pressure from contiguous industrialized
states, there may be effects of this pressure regardless. States that are closed and
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unfriendly to the developed world still face pressure. Cuba has faced isolation from the
United States, but also friendlier relations and some encouragement from other
industrialized states. Mexico has moved over the years from some restrictions on
foreign investment to opening to U.S. and Canadian business through NAFTA. Even
the presence of open, industrialized states near closed economies can generate its own
pressure for reform. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not leave Eastern European
states economically closed – they almost immediately opened their economies.
The variable used to measure proximity is taken from the Correlates of War
(COW) contiguity dataset. The COW data codes contiguity for dyad pairs on a scale
from 1 - 5, with 1 meaning that countries are only separated by a land or river border,
and 5 meaning that countries are separated by 400 miles of water or less. The
remaining categories reflect distances of 12, 24 and 150 miles between countries.
COW considers 400 miles to be the maximum distance in which two 200 mile economic
zones can intersect. The proximity variable used here codes each country as 1 if it falls
between 1 and 5 in a dyad pair with the United States, a European Union country,
Japan, or Australia and 0 if it does not.
Given the pressure that can be brought to bear by developed nations on
developing nations all over the world, and considering that some developing nations’
proximity to the developed world gives them some interest in putting policies in place
that will make them attractive to capital from the wealthier countries, we would expect
that proximity leads to greater equity openness.
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H10: Developing countries that are in proximity to developed countries,
separated either by a land border or by 400 miles of water, will have
policies that demonstrate greater FDI equity openness.
Control Variables
Literature suggests controls are needed to account for other possible
explanations of FDI policy. A common variable used in FDI studies is market size
(Miller and Weigel 1972; Root and Ahmed 1979; Davidson 1980), though there are
mixed findings on whether market size affects foreign direct investment. However,
since the countries in the study sample are spread across a large range of countries
and years, there may be differences between larger and smaller markets. There are
two ways that market size is controlled for in this study. First, most variables measuring
demand for FDI are proportioned as percents of GDP. This helps keep market size in
perspective in the study as well as providing a smoothing technique on data that
otherwise clearly trend. A second control for market size is added with the logged
population variable, which lists the population of each country in each year. The
previous mixed findings of the effect of this variable on FDI make it difficult to predict
whether FDI policy is affected by market size.
A second control is labeled “region.” The theory presented in this study is one
that argues that countries and multinational corporations come to agreement over FDI.
This relationship is therefore assumed to involve one country and one MNC. However,
there is a universe of developing countries that have made FDI a development strategy,
and each country sets its policies given its domestic needs and the actions of other
countries. Each country is therefore part of a larger set of countries, each individually
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coming to agreement with firms and hoping to bring FDI into its economy, sometimes at
the expense of other countries. This competition has been commented upon and
studied in academic literature. For example, Haaland and Wooton (1999) extend a twostage game model demonstrating how it is optimal for a country to subsidize FDI in
order to attract it, illustrating that many countries that extend subsidies are drawn into
competition which ultimately transfers income to MNCs at the expense of those
countries if subsidies become too high. Governments compete by extending tariff
protections, tax holidays, loan guarantees and tax grants. These incentives are used to
offset other regulations and limits (Encarnation and Wells 1985). While countries’
policies cannot be easily changed, individual negotiations provide countries with a
chance to bargain on particulars in order to present a favorable environment relative to
other countries competing for the same FDI.
Given that each country resides in a region with other actual and potential
competitors, a set of six dummy variables representing geographical regions was
created. These dummy variables represent Central Asia, North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America. Five of the dummy variables were
introduced to the model, with the sixth, Central Asia, serving as the comparison group.
Proposed Relationships
The hypothesized relationships proposed are listed in Table 3-2. In the first
column are the domestic, international and control variables. The second column
indicates by a + or – sign the hypothesized direction of the relationships. In the next
section, I will estimate these relationships statistically to see if the hypotheses hold up,
and explain the outcomes.
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Table 3-2:

Predicted Directions of Independent Variables

Independent Variables

Hypothesized Direction

Domestic Political and Ideological Costs
Degree of Democracy

+

Govt. Ideological Orientation
Left

-

Right

+

Nationalism

-

International Pressure
International Pressure Index

+

Proximity to Developed Country

+

Demand for FDI
Domestic Savings

-

Official Development Assistance

-

External Debt

-

Trade Balance

-

Past Experience with FDI
FDI Inflows-Previous 5 yr average

+
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Model Specification
Because the dependent variable, the FDI Equity Index, is categorical and
therefore has discrete values, maximum likelihood estimation is the most appropriate
method to employ in estimating the model. Maximum likelihood estimation assumes a
curvilinear relationship and obtains a probability function, rather than expected or
predicted values as in ordinary least squares, for categories of the dependent variable.
The multiple categories of the dependent variable offer a range of options for
maximum likelihood estimation. Because of the ordinal nature of the categories, an
ordered probit model is appropriate for estimation of the data. In addition, because the
data is in the form of a pooled time-series, additional elements must be added to the
model to account for time effects and the possibility for additional error inherent in timeseries data, such as autocorrelation.
I estimate three variations on the policy model. Estimation 1a estimates the
model using regime type and nationalism as domestic political variables, and 1b adds
ideological variables. Estimation 1c consists of all variables together. The models were
estimated using the statistical program Stata running the routine “gllamm.” Gllamm
stands for “generalized linear latent and mixed models,” and this type of estimation is
becoming more commonly used in the social sciences. “Mixed model” estimation does
not just assume fixed effects, or in other words, that the observations are all completely
independent of each other, but that random effects are also present. The clustering of
observations under country units makes the presence of random effects likely. Gllamm
designates these clusters as level-2 effects. We will consider the effects of the second
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level country clustering which are nested in the level-1 cluster of individual observations.
The random effects are the effects of latent or unobserved variables on the dependent
variable in question. Using random effects will also allow for generalization from a
sample to a larger population (Balestra 1992). In this study, it is assumed that the
developing countries used in the estimations reflect the characteristics of all developing
countries within a confidence interval defined by a standard error. 24
In this model, the dependent variable’s responses are coded from greater equity
restrictions to greater equity freedom. Therefore, it stands that interpretation of
estimations of the primary parameters will be as follows: Positive signs will indicate the
probability of greater equity openness as the value of the associated independent
variables increases, and negative signs will indicate the probability of greater equity
openness (restrictiveness) as the value of the independent variables decreases
(increases).
The addition of a time component adds a host of factors to additionally consider
when estimating this model. To control for autocorrelation, I created dummy variables
representing a time lag for each category, and all but one of these dummies were added
to the estimation equation (Long and Freese 2003). The addition of the dummies to
control for autocorrelation was supported by a likelihood ratio test between the full
model and the model without the dummies. Dummies for two-year time lags of the
categories were also estimated, but they were insignificant and unnecessary to the final
estimations. To correct for the effects of time, I introduced a count variable ranging
from one to 29 for each year in each cluster, but it tested statistically insignificant and a
likelihood ratio test indicated that the variable was unnecessary.
24

For a mathematical specification of the ordered probit technique within gllamm, please refer to Appendix E.
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Tables 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 list the results of estimations of the FDI policy model.
The estimations were run specifying the family as binomial, the link as oprobit and using
robust standard errors. The estimations include 54 countries and 1329 observations in
Estimations 1a and 1c, and 1511 observations in Estimation 1b. 25
In all estimations, time-lagged categorical dummies are all highly significant. The
negative signs of the coefficients could mean that there is considerable inertia in the
movement of policy, perhaps contradicting the significant movement of many countries
from more restrictive policies to more liberal policies, as shown in Table 3-1. This is not
surprising. First, 38 out of 57 countries in the dataset moved one category or remained
the same over the time period.
Second, policies do not change very quickly. Jordan is an example. From 1976
until 1994 it remained in the lowest category. All of a sudden, in 1995 it implemented
FDI policies that opened to foreign investment, and jumped immediately to the highest
category. When policies do change, they tend to change quickly, and then remain
where they are for a long period after the change. In other words, this could be an
indication of state dependence – that governments are more inclined to maintain the
same policies over longer periods of time than to change them incrementally.
In order to interpret ordered probit estimations, I used the cumulative distribution
function and the probability density function to determine predicted probabilities. Table
3-6 demonstrates how the predictions of all estimations compare to actual values of the
dependent variable. The proportional reduction of error, which compares the predicted
results with the dependent variable, is very high for all model variations. Model 1a

25

Two countries, Niger and Papua New Guinea, dropped out of the models due to missing observations in all 29 years in the trade
balance variable. Swaziland also dropped out of the model due to missing observations in the nationalism variable
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scored the highest gamma, 0.952, but all models were well over 0.90. Table 3-7 shows
the effect each significant independent variable in Estimation 1c, the full estimation, has
on the probability that FDI policies will fall under any of the categories when the
independent variable falls along its range of values. The minimum and maximum
values of the variable were used if it was dichotomous, and the minimum, mean and
maximum values for continuous variables, plus a one standard deviation shift away from
the mean in each direction.
For example, foreign equity policy has a 71.1 percent probability that it will be at
its most restrictive category (less than 100 percent foreign equity allowed) when the
variable regime is at its minimum, autocracy, and a 28.9 percent probability to be in the
next category (100 percent foreign equity allowed with many restrictions). As the value
for regime type is moved across its range through its mean and toward its maximum
(full democracy), the probability that FDI equity policies will be more open increases.
One can see the effects on predicted probabilities of all the significant variables in this
way.
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Table 3-3:

Determinants of Foreign Equity Policy in Developing Countries
Estimation 1a

Variables

Coefficient

Robust S.E.

P-value

Category 0 time lag dummy

-5.3566

0.3905

0.000

Category 1 time lag dummy

-2.4259

0.3245

0.000

Category 2 time lag dummy

-0.8095

0.2699

0.003

Regime type

0.0574

0.0123

0.000

Nationalism

-0.6687

0.1793

0.000

Institutional membership

2.0303

0.4072

0.000

Proximity

0.5610

0.4430

0.205

Savings/GDP

-0.0186

0.0044

0.000

Logged ODA/Total DAC aid

-0.9904

0.3927

0.012

Trade Balance/GDP

-0.1353

0.1706

0.428

Logged Debt/GDP

0.1740

0.0678

0.010

Logged Average FDI inflows/GDP –
previous

0.6041

0.4130

0.144

Logged Population

0.0658

0.0621

0.289

Sub-Saharan Africa

1.5131

0.5750

0.009

East Asia

-0.1924

0.3134

0.539

Latin America

1.0607

0.4757

0.026

North Africa

1.1491

0.2885

0.000

South Asia

0.3916

0.4854

0.420

Cut 1

-1.7858

1.6110

0.268

Cut 2

1.3322

1.6690

0.425

Cut 3

3.7180

1.6850

0.027

N=1329

Log Likelihood=-678.5378

Variance and Covariance of Random Effects=1.3740
(0.3590)
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Table 3-4:

Determinants of Foreign Equity Policy in Developing Countries
Estimation 1b

Variables

Coefficient

Robust S.E.

P-value

Category 0 time lag dummy

-4.7786

0.3068

0.000

Category 1 time lag dummy

-2.0936

0.2383

0.000

Category 2 time lag dummy

-0.8846

0.2476

0.000

Regime type

0.0765

0.0123

0.000

Leftist government

-0.2008

0.1711

0.240

Centrist government

-0.5486

0.1779

0.002

Other government

0.5095

0.1918

0.008

Institutional membership

2.2461

0.6099

0.000

Proximity

2.1543

0.6561

0.001

Savings/GDP

-0.0215

0.0037

0.000

Logged ODA/Total DAC aid

-0.7360

0.4672

0.115

Trade Balance/GDP

-0.1509

0.1987

0.446

Logged Debt/GDP

0.2798

0.0887

0.002

Logged Average FDI inflows/GDP –
previous

0.6604

0.4383

0.132

Logged Population

-0.0786

0.0494

0.111

Sub-Saharan Africa

2.6513

0.6804

0.000

East Asia

1.2557

0.4368

0.004

Latin America

2.2248

0.7562

0.003

North Africa

1.8135

0.3668

0.000

South Asia

1.8778

0.7498

0.012

Cut 1

-1.8032

1.1043

0.102

Cut 2

1.1683

1.1237

0.299

Cut 3

3.4246

1.1058

0.002

N=1511

Log Likelihood=-819.1927

Variance and Covariance of Random Effects=1.6756
(0.4330)
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Table 3-5:

Determinants of Foreign Equity Policy in Developing Countries
Estimation 1c

Variables

Coefficient

Robust S.E.

P-value

Category 0 time lag dummy

-5.3902

0.4242

0.000

Category 1 time lag dummy

-2.5093

0.3039

0.000

Category 2 time lag dummy

-0.8743

0.2545

0.000

Regime type

0.0775

0.0156

0.000

Leftist government

-0.3843

0.1779

0.036

Centrist government

-0.7441

0.2132

0.001

Other government

0.5297

0.1846

0.001

Nationalism

-0.5438

0.1246

0.000

Institutional membership

1.8494

0.4874

0.000

Proximity

1.5255

0.3116

0.000

Savings/GDP

-0.0176

0.0033

0.001

Logged ODA/Total DAC aid

-0.9055

0.3866

0.032

Trade Balance/GDP

-0.1369

0.1685

0.434

Logged Debt/GDP

0.1965

0.0674

0.004

Logged Average FDI inflows/GDP –
previous

0.6814

0.4499

0.104

Logged Population

-0.1293

0.0552

0.056

Sub-Saharan Africa

1.7153

0.3495

0.000

East Asia

0.8783

0.3824

0.084

Latin America

1.3543

0.3601

0.000

North Africa

0.6566

0.2596

0.022

South Asia

1.5926

0.4607

0.002

Cut 1

-4.1012

1.1569

0.003

Cut 2

-0.9402

1.1138

0.817

Cut 3

1.5103

1.0627

0.039

N=1329

Log Likelihood=-670.0941

Variance and Covariance of Random Effects=1.0358
(0.2432)
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Table 3-6: Predicted versus Actual Categories of Dependent Variable
Estimation 1a
Actual
Equity
Categories
<100%
100%-m.r.
100%-s.r.
100%-f.r.
Total

Predicted Equity Categories
<100%

100%-m.r.

100%-s.r.

100%-f.r.

Total

183
20
1
1

36
381
30
4

10
70
304
72

0
0
27
190

229
471
362
267

205

451

456

217
Gamma = 0.957

1329

Estimation 1b
Actual
Equity
Categories
<100%
100%-m.r.
100%-s.r.
100%-f.r.
Total

Predicted Equity Categories
<100%

100%-m.r.

100%-s.r.

100%-f.r.

Total

154
19
0
1

94
341
45
3

18
169
291
102

1
0
61
212

267
529
397
318

174

483

580

274
Gamma = 0.92

1511

Estimation 1c
Actual
Equity
Categories
<100%
100%-m.r.
100%-s.r.
100%-f.r.
Total

Predicted Equity Categories
<100%

100%-m.r.

100%-s.r.

100%-f.r.

Total

207
21
1
1

11
403
59
6

11
47
282
141

0
0
20
119

229
471
362
267

230

479

481

139

1329

Gamma = 0.946
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Table 3-7:

Predicted Probabilities of Foreign Equity Openness Varying
Significant Variables
Probability

Min

-1 s.d.

Mean/
Median

+1 s.d.

Max

Regime type

Y=0
Y=1
Y=2
Y=3

0.711
0.289
0.000
0.000

0.627
0.372
0.001
0.000

0.414
0.582
0.004
0.000

0.224
0.759
0.017
0.000

0.161
0.810
0.030
0.000

Nationalism

Y=0
Y=1
Y=2
Y=3

0.414
0.582
0.004
0.000

Savings

Y=0
Y=1
Y=2
Y=3

0.016
0.754
0.228
0.002

0.315
0.677
0.008
0.000

0.414
0.582
0.004
0.000

0.518
0.480
0.002
0.000

0.782
0.218
0.000
0.000

Debt

Y=0
Y=1
Y=2
Y=3

0.634
0.365
0.001
0.000

0.481
0.516
0.002
0.000

0.414
0.582
0.004
0.000

0.349
0.645
0.007
0.000

0.223
0.760
0.017
0.000

Intl. Pressure

Y=0
Y=1
Y=2
Y=3

0.883
0.117
0.000
0.000

0.605
0.394
0.001
0.000

0.414
0.582
0.004
0.000

Variable
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0.628
0.372
0.001
0.000

0.255
0.731
0.013
0.000

Results of Estimations
In this chapter, the goal has been to test both international and domestic
economic and political factors to determine if both have an effect on FDI equity
openness, an element of policy that developing countries use to control foreign direct
investment access to their markets. In this next section, I will examine the results of
domestic factors, Hypotheses H1 through H8, on FDI equity policy.
Effects of Domestic Political and Economic Factors
Hypothesis 1, the democracy hypothesis, is supported in all model variations.
The variable measuring regime type is highly significant. The positive coefficient is an
indication that democracies are more likely to pass policies that have fewer restrictions
on FDI equity, which supports theories that argue that democracies generally have
more open economic policies and are by and large open to international economic
integration. Coefficients estimated with maximum likelihood techniques are difficult to
interpret directly, so with ordered probit I use the cumulative distribution function and the
probability density function are used to determine predicted probabilities. Predicted
probabilities of FDI equity policy equaling the various categories are depicted in Table
3-7, which shows small probabilities that countries in the sample will have extremely
open policies, and that a shift toward democracy across the range of values from
minimum to maximum increases the probability of more open policies.
Hypothesis 2, the hypothesis that leftist governments restrict FDI, is only weakly
supported at best by Estimations 1a and 1c. Its coefficient sign is negative when
compared to rightist governments in both cases, as predicted, but significance does not
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reach the 0.05 level. In essence, the conclusion of this test is that there is very little
difference between governments on the left and right regarding foreign direct
investment. This stands in contrast with governments in the center and the
governments that could not be classified, both of which show distinct differences with
rightist governments.
The failure of the variable to reach significance may have something to do with
the problematic nature of the measure. Part of the problem is the unknown quality of
“other” governments, which consist of over half the observations. Given the structure of
the variable, “other” governments had to be integrated into this study to use ideology as
a variable. The inclusion of ideology adds something to the model, as indicated by the
degree of agreement between predicted and actual outcomes, but it is difficult to
determine just what is being added without a more reliable ideological measure.
The nationalism variable performed as predicted in Hypothesis 3 in all models.
As in the result for regime type, we see that most governments start out with a high
probability of allowing 100 percent foreign equity with many restrictions, but with the
presence of nationalist governments the probability rises that governments will allow
less than 100 percent foreign equity, severely restricting foreign investment.
The hypotheses on demand for FDI, Hypotheses 4-7, met with mixed success in
all models. Savings was significant and negative as predicted across all estimations,
making it a robust predictor. In the presence of greater savings rates, the probability of
more restricted policies in developing countries rises. Debt was also significant across
all models, but its sign was positive, contrary to the prediction. Developing countries
that have greater external debt appear to have more open policies toward foreign
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investment. While the results for savings are not surprising, the performance of debt
may indicate that it does not serve as an alternative to FDI. Instead, debt may enhance
or supplement foreign investment. Alternatively, debt may create conditions where high
country debt loads lead to international doubt about the economic environment in
developing countries, or the perception of this doubt domestically, causing them to pass
more open FDI policies in order to attract more investment. As we will see in the case
studies of El Salvador and Nicaragua, this last scenario is very likely.
Official development assistance reaches significance in Estimations 1a and 1c
but not in 1b, though the direction of its sign is negative as predicted in all models. The
trade balance variable has a sign in the predicted direction, but does not approach
significance in any model.
Hypothesis 8, which proposed that past performance of FDI factors into the
creation of state policies toward foreign investment, had a positive sign as predicted but
it was insignificant in all estimations. The performance of this variable across the
models indicates that the variable is weak at best in predicting FDI policies.
Effects of International Factors
The international pressure hypotheses (Hypotheses 9-10) are mostly supported.
International institutional membership was supported across all estimations, whereas
Estimation 1b did not support the proximity variable. All signs of the coefficients are
positive and significant as predicted, indicating that international pressure accounts
partly for foreign equity openness. Rising institutional pressure increases the probability
that developing countries will be less restrictive in their equity policies, whereas
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proximity to developed countries appears to have some relationship with foreign equity
openness in developing countries
Effects of Control Variables
The control variables had mixed performance in all the estimations. The
population variable, which controls for market size, was significant in one out of the
three estimations, and therefore not a very reliable predictor of foreign investment
policies. All the regional variables except for the East Asia and South Asia regions were
significant across all models, and the insignificance came in Estimation 1a when the
ideology variables were absent. The results indicate that region may have a role in
determining the openness or restrictiveness of FDI policies when compared to the base
group, Central Asia. However, given that all are relatively consistently significant, only
Central Asia (in this sample this region only consists of Turkey) may stand out as being
different.

Discussion of Results
In the opening paragraphs of this dissertation, I argued that developing countries
may have some means of controlling their economic destinies, even as some scholars
argue that the nation-state is becoming obsolete in the face of globalization. Despite
the fact that pressure to open their markets to financial flows and free trade besets
developing countries from all sides, the tests conducted in this chapter show that
developing countries do have some means at their disposal, and can set their policies to
allow themselves to remain more or less restrictive to globalization, depending on their
preferences. These checks against globalization exist because developing countries
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are beset by pressures that offset international pressures toward globalization.
Domestic political pressures and domestic economic realities still mandate that many
developing countries can be cautious about foreign investment because their
governments may face political sanction if they are too generous with foreign firms.
This cautiousness can be enhanced if there are alternatives to FDI for development,
most critically domestic investment through higher savings rates.
What do these models say about the determinants of FDI equity policies in
developing countries? First, it seems that governments take into account domestic
political and ideological costs when forming their policies on foreign equity restrictions.
Democratic governments demonstrate greater FDI equity openness than autocracies.
Democracies tend to be more open to economic interdependence in general, perhaps
because of a longstanding belief in economic liberalism and institutions that encourage
transparency and openness. Autocracies tend to be centered more on control of the
political, social and economic environment, and openness erodes their ability to
maintain a tight rein.
Though political ideology of the left and right appears to be indeterminate from
this data, it appears that nationalism is a force that leads to more restrictive policies on
FDI. Nationalist governments tend to worry more about the implications of foreign
investment on the national market and the possible harms it may inflict on the country
as a whole and particularly on certain groups within the population. Nationalist
governments on the right fear the impact foreign investment will have on local business,
while nationalist governments on the left may be concerned about the social welfare of
the population.
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However, nowhere does globalization exert more pressure than on the
international front, and in those forces firms have powerful allies that push for open
trade and investment policies. Perhaps the variables that most clearly represent
globalization are the international pressure variables, and this study has found that
some elements of international pressure matter. In particular, membership in
international institutions, especially those that have a focus on FDI, leads to more open
FDI equity policies. Governments find it more difficult to remain closed as members of
these institutions because they are subjected to an additional level of transparency,
openness, and accountability. In international institutions, there are penalties for not
conforming to rules and norms that are agreed upon, and for now developing countries
tend to abide by the rules and not risk the costs associated with flaunting them.
There is a possibility that causation on the international institution variable runs in
the opposite direction to that hypothesized. It is easy to see why. I hypothesized that
membership in international institutions creates pressure for developing countries to
maintain greater openness in their FDI equity policies. Perhaps the correlation may
simply be a confirmation that developing countries that are more inclined toward
economic openness are those that join international institutions. While this outcome is
not tested here, it has to be considered. However, even if the causation runs the
opposite way on international institutions, the pressure of globalization and of major
international economic and political players is still present. Maybe countries that are
inclined toward openness are more likely to join institutions, but those institutions also
encourage even greater openness in their turn. Countries not inclined toward as much
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openness, but who join institutions to have a voice, will still feel some pressures from
the institutional environment.
From examining the predicted probabilities, it appears that the models predict
mostly a greater degree of openness. As has been demonstrated, there are some
powerful pressures to create and maintain open policies. It is true that most countries
maintain policies that allow 100 percent foreign equity. Yet, the results also indicate
that most countries have means to restrict foreign investment should they so choose.
They can move in an autocratic direction, elect a nationalist government, and build their
domestic savings at the very least to move in a more restrictive direction.
Of course, this study concentrates on policies that are on paper, and not on
individual agreements between firms and states which may allow countries to waive this
or that restriction. However, FDI policies are the initial starting point for most countries
in their negotiations, and any restrictions that are attached must be negotiated away;
which may entail a possibility of the loss of FDI. If countries did not put restrictions into
place, there would be no need to bargain and no risk of either party pulling out of
negotiations.
What allows developing countries to maintain some control? First, developing
countries’ suspicion of globalization and its costs fuel wariness about FDI. Nationalist
governments tend to want to put the brakes on FDI. Autocratic governments only
enhance this effect. It appears that for developing countries, the fear that the developed
world will interfere in domestic political and economic affairs, and that unfettered free
trade and investment will cause more harm than good in local economies, unites some
in a desire to open their developing economies only as much as they deem necessary.
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Second, the existence of alternatives to FDI allows developing countries more
leeway in controlling the pace and quantity of FDI. Greater domestic savings, for one,
allow developing countries to tap local resources and entrepreneurship and thus rely
less on foreign capital. The difficulty for developing countries is, of course, locating
adequate domestic savings to fund development. Official development aid, another
pathway to development, may have a small effect in alleviating developing country’s
dependence on FDI. Foreign borrowing appears to either supplement FDI, or make
developing countries more eager to attract FDI if their debt loads create adverse
international opinion. Other potential alternatives, such as positive trade balances, may
also serve to alleviate dependence on FDI, although their effect appears to be minimal.
A look at the dependent variable from 1976 through 2004 might give one an
impression that regardless of their preferences, developing countries have moved
inevitably toward greater openness. Only one country in the sample, Iran, became
more restrictive in its foreign equity policy and remained so. Does this data in itself not
indicate that globalization is winning and that developing countries should all simply
become more open? I believe that despite the trend toward increasing openness, these
models show that developing countries are not completely powerless in the face of
globalization and open markets and have some control over their economic destinies.
Specifically, governments of nationalist and autocratic developing countries appear to
be at least somewhat hesitant toward foreign equity, despite the pressures, scrutiny and
risk of sanction by other governments and multinational firms. The gradual drift toward
less restrictive policies is an indication of that pressure. However, there are still
developing countries that resist the pressure to open and others that open only
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gradually. These results may stand in contradiction to theories like modernization
theory, which proposes that all countries are marching toward greater industrialization,
and therefore more openness on a Western model. It may uphold some tenets of
dependency theory, which argues that the developing world is at best in an everincreasing dependent relationship with the developed world, and at worst is being
economically colonized. Certainly developing countries have not fared as well as their
industrialized neighbors. Or, these results may simply reflect what developing countries
say on paper, but not what they actually do when dealing with multinational firms.
However, I suspect that for some developing countries, reducing the opening in the gate
in the face of a horde of MNC suitors reduces the crowd down to the insistent few so
that those countries may bargain more effectively with the remaining firms.
I have argued that the FDI process as a whole follows the logic of two-level
games. Domestic political and economic forces play a powerful role in determining FDI
policy, but one cannot dispute that international forces, brought to the table by firms and
their allies on the global level, play a part in convincing some developing countries to
open their markets to foreign investment. The next question to be studied, then, is
whether the gateway to investment, represented by policies, affects the flow of
investment into developing countries. If policies are the basis for eventual agreements
between developing countries and firms, then those countries that set more restrictive
policies limit the win-sets, or the range of possible agreements, between developing
countries and firms and should have a diminishing effect on foreign direct investment
inflows. Even if such restrictive countries enhance their bargaining position by claiming
that they cannot get agreements past recalcitrant domestic political powers, they will
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end up reaching no agreement with a greater number of firms than those they can come
to agreement with. On the other hand, those countries that set open policies come into
negotiations with firms with a wider range of agreement possibilities, and therefore
should see more investment, even though their bargaining power is reduced. The next
chapter will therefore test FDI policies’ effects on FDI inflows in order to shed light on
how this confluence of international and domestic forces enhances or lessens the
chances of agreement, and therefore the flow of foreign investment.
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Chapter Four
FDI Policy and its Effect on FDI Inflows
In previous chapters, I have laid out a narrative of foreign direct investment. To
briefly recap, I discussed the role of foreign direct investment policies in the FDI
process. In Chapter Two, I described how developing countries absorb prevailing
attitudes toward FDI, which shapes their attitudes. Their attitudes consist of a blend of
wariness and openness toward FDI, and therefore they fall somewhere along the
spectrum of being more open or more restrictive toward FDI. The policies that
developing countries pass on FDI are reflections of this blend of attitudes that plays out
through domestic and international politics and the realities of domestic and
international economics. Their policies serve as the basis for eventual agreements on
FDI with multinational firms. I also argued that FDI follows the logic of two-level games,
One level consist of the political agreement that leads to policy on the domestic level,
and a second level is the agreement between firm and state that leads to FDI inflows.
The activities on each level are influenced by international and domestic factors that
affect both FDI policies and eventual FDI inflows. In Chapter Three, I tested
hypotheses based on these conceptual factors, and discovered that policies are
influenced by domestic political and economic factors such as regime type, nationalism,
domestic savings, and external debt. They are also affected by international factors
such as membership in international institutions related to trade and investment and
proximity to developed countries. Policies were also influenced by geographic regions.

155

This chapter takes up the issue of FDI inflows. Tests performed in this chapter
will determine whether policies work, or more specifically, whether inflows are affected
by policies. If developing countries tighten control and flows slow, or if they open and
the flow increases, then policies function and developing countries have some control
over their economic destinies. If developing countries that desire greater FDI flows
pass policies of openness and instead get a little trickle or nothing at all or conversely, if
developing countries tighten restrictions and the flows continue unabated, then policies
are meaningless and developing countries are at the mercy of globalization, that
international concerns predominate, and development is largely out of their hands.
This dissertation has posed two questions. What accounts for variation in FDI
policies? Do FDI policies affect FDI inflows? My model reveals some answers. The
Chapter Three provided strong support for a model of FDI policymaking in developing
nations. This chapter tests whether the policies that developing countries have
promulgated have any effect on the FDI that flows into their markets. This may seem
self-evident but it is very important. First, FDI flows are an indicator of how firms
respond to the policies of developing states. If FDI follows the logic of two-level games,
policies serve as the basis for agreement between firms and states over FDI. Policies
establish the baseline range of agreements states are willing to consider. If that
baseline is restricted, then the range of possibility for agreement is small. If the
baseline policy is more open, then agreement can be made over a wider range of
potential outcomes.
Do policies allow states some control over the investment process? Do states
still have power to regulate their own development? On one hand, those that celebrate
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international open markets and free trade argue that loss of national sovereignty over
the economy is not something to bemoan, but simply to accept. The world is better off if
nation-states have less control over trade and commerce and the markets are simply
left alone as much as possible. Needless to say, many of these supporters of
globalization represent developed countries that need not worry about their own power.
For others, such as dependency theorists, nationalist leaders and populist
organizations in developing countries, loss of national sovereignty is a much more
serious matter. It means that developing states are always at a disadvantage to the
developed world, without any ability to control aspects of their own political and
economic agendas. These countries will see further disruptions in social cohesion and
participate in the proverbial race to the bottom. Any attempt to assert their
independence through policy will lead to punishment in the international economic
arena.
In sum, this model will demonstrate whether FDI inflows, and by extension firms,
respond to policies, and whether developing states have some control over the
development process. If developing countries’ policies do not have any effect on FDI,
or an opposite effect from that intended, then the forces of globalization are more
powerful than individual developing states and international preferences trump domestic
wishes and realities. On the other hand, if policies perform as intended, limiting FDI
when developing countries want it limited or encouraging FDI when they want an
increase, then the factors identified in the policy stage will be shown to have an impact
on development outcomes. The next sections further define the inflows model,
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explaining the dependent and independent variables, their hypothesized relationships,
and the estimation results.

Determinants of FDI Inflows
The inflows estimations are an important part of the presented theoretical model.
While the policy estimations in Chapter Two test FDI policies, in particular how open
developing states are to FDI, the inflows estimations measure the effect of developing
states’ contribution to FDI agreements. They also capture firms’ reactions to FDI
policies. Developing countries commit to FDI policies and, along with other factors, see
these policies affect their FDI inflows. In identifying this process in two separate
estimations, we can represent the role of firm and state agreement through this second
test.
I argue that inflows constitute a second form of the two-level games theory of FDI
identified in Chapter Two. Whereas the policies are outcomes on the domestic level,
influenced by factors on both the domestic and international level, the firm-state
agreement process takes place on a different level, a transnational level. The outcomes
of this level are indicated by agreement and, following agreement, inflows of FDI. FDI
inflows are in turn influenced by domestic and international level factors also, such as
FDI policies, domestic political and economic factors, and international political and
economic factors. I will explain these concepts further in subsequent sections.
The dependent variable in these estimations, foreign direct investment inflows, is
commonly used to measure foreign direct investment in national economies. Inflows
are defined as “net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10
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percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than
that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other longterm capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments.” 26
I use foreign direct investment inflows as a percentage of GDP as the dependent
variable. FDI as a percent of GDP accounts for the importance of FDI in each individual
economy. The greater the percentage of GDP, the more that economy relies upon FDI.
This allows a basis of comparison among developing countries and blunts the undue
influence of large economies. The dependent variable was logged to normalize its
distribution.
Figure 4-1 graphically describes the mean values of FDI as a percent of GDP for
each year in the sample. Though characterized by peaks and troughs, the trend has
been decidedly upward. In 1976, the mean percent of FDI to GDP was 0.648 percent.
This percentage fell to its lowest point in 1984 at 0.546 percent, and then began an
upward climb, peaking at 3.84 percent of GDP by 1998. Since then, the average
percentage of FDI to GDP has fallen again to around 2.85 percent in 2004. Figure 4-2
shows mean values of FDI inflows in dollars, which averaged $223.08 million dollars
(constant 2000 U.S. dollars) in 1976, peaked at $2.6 billion in 1999, and fell back to
about $2.3 billion in 2004.
These figures show that over time, FDI has become more important in aggregate
economies in the developing world. These mean values conceal much variation among
countries. Values for some countries over the range of years in the sample are
negative. Negative inflows indicate a loss of capital at a rate greater than incoming
capital. Other countries are very reliant on FDI. For example, since 2000, FDI inflows
26

Definition provided by World Development Indicators: http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/wdi/wdivar/wdivar6.html.
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Figure 4-2: FDI Inflows

Figure 4-1: FDI inflows

Mean Values

Mean values
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

223.08
1976
1977279.48
1978 343.23
1979 365.87
1980 334.47
1981 440.98
1982 347.13
1983 292.08
1984254.06
1985 330.22
1986266.86
1987266.54
1988 445.39
513.17
1989
488.32
1990
616.59
1991
846.53
1992
1182.49
1993
1604.11
1994
1688.51
1995
2063.21
1996
2550.64
1997
2588.00
1998
2623.42
1999
2327.17
2000
2251.11
2001
1991.06
2002
1898.89
2003
2259.07
2004

0.65
0.77
1.00
1.18
0.97
1.06
0.82
0.64
0.55
0.78
0.73
0.78
0.91
1.28
1.17
1.03
1.84
1.82
2.20
2.33
2.33
3.10
3.84
3.57
3.13
3.21
3.41
2.98
2.85

0

1

2

3

4

0

Percent of GDP

500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
Millions of constant (2000) US dollars

Source: World Development Indicators

Source: World Development Indicators

into The Gambia, Chad and Lesotho have accounted for 10 percent or more of those
countries’ GDPs. Some countries in the sample receive a great amount of FDI in dollar
amounts. For example, China’s mean inflows from 1976 – 2004 is over $19 billion per
year. Others receive little – Gabon, Gambia, Guyana, Haiti, Madagascar, and Niger
average under $30 million in FDI per year.
FDI Equity Openness
In the policy model in Chapter Three, I argued that developing countries’ policies
reflect their preferences toward FDI openness. Their degree of openness is based on
restrictions and incentives on FDI that have been passed and implemented by the state.
Once these policies are passed, the theory predicts that states’ policies will be an
indication to investors of their initial openness to foreign investment. In other words, the
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policies are like a sign on a door. If states are less open to FDI, they will have less
room for agreement with firms and they will know that attempts to invest there may be
filled with roadblocks such as restrictions and regulations and take their capital
elsewhere. Likewise, if states are more open to FDI, the range of possible agreements
opens wider and states may offer incentives such as tax breaks and exemptions to
attract investment by multinational firms. There should be a positive relationship
between the openness of FDI policies and the inflows of FDI to developing state.
The variables used to measure FDI policy are categories of the FDI Equity Index.
The variable’s characteristics have been described already in Chapter Three. Dummy
variables of categories one, two and three are used, following Long and Freese’s (2003)
advice to separate the categories of a discrete variable into separate binomial variables
on the right hand side. The lowest category, labeled as Category 0 and representing
policies allowing less than 100 percent foreign equity, will be left out of the estimation
and used as the comparison group. I expect a positive coefficient on this variable.
H4-1: Countries that are more (less) open to foreign equity will have greater
(smaller) amounts of FDI inflows.
Domestic Political Characteristics
Certain characteristics of each developing country can exert much influence on
their amount of FDI inflows. There are two aspects of this concept that will be tested.
First, the political environment must be considered because so much of the character of
the investment market depends on the type of government in power, and the prevailing
ideology of that government. Second, consideration should be given to economic
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aspects of the market attractive to firms. The next sections will explain the
measurements used for the political and investment market variables in the study.
Regime Type. As discussed in Chapter Two, degree of democracy should be
associated with FDI inflows. Democracy has generally been associated theoretically
and empirically with FDI inflows. Democracy is generally considered to foster greater
economic openness, greater respect for market forces and greater adherence to
property rights. A small number of recent studies have argued and demonstrated
associations between non-democracy and greater FDI, however, these studies have
been questioned on the grounds of methodology. It is expected that in this stage,
democracy will retain its positive association with FDI inflows. The same Polity variable
used in the policy stage will be used in the inflows stage estimations.
H4-2: FDI inflows will be greater (less) as developing countries become more
(less) democratic.
Ideology. Theory has linked ideology to FDI. In particular, countries with rightist
governments are thought to be more open to globalization in general, free trade and
open markets in particular. Rightist governments are also thought to be friendly to
business, with less regulation and taxation. Leftist governments, so the arguments go,
are more concerned with the social welfare of affected groups within the population.
Many believe they regulate and tax more often. Thus, countries with leftist governments
should receive less FDI and those with rightist governments more FDI.
Will the predicted relationships appear when predicting FDI inflows? Using the
same ideological variables from the Database of Political Institutions that were used in
the estimations of the policy stage estimations, I expect that the traditional relationships
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between ideology and FDI inflows will hold because inflows widen the scope of players
in the model. In other words, firms, not states, decide which states will receive their
investment. Firms may still perceive the left-right divide in the usual manner; the left is
unreceptive to FDI while the right is welcoming to FDI. Given these perceptions, the
relationships should conform to the customary expectations.
H4-3:

Leftist governments receive less FDI inflows than rightist
governments.

Nationalism. Nationalist governments are thought to be less friendly to FDI because
they tend to view the international economic sphere as one of competition for scarce
resources. They are perceived to subscribe to protectionism, and therefore are also
thought to favor local businesses over foreign competition and to generally distrust
“globalization.” In the last chapter, nationalism was a significant influence on foreign
direct investment policies, pushing their countries toward greater restrictions. It is
expected that nationalist governments will also receive less FDI.
H4-4:

Nationalist governments will receive less FDI inflows than nonnationalist governments.

Political Stability. Chapter Two explored the potential relationship between political
stability and FDI. Political stability is theorized to enhance FDI because it creates a
secure environment for investment without the potential for costly disruptions or
changes in the political and economic environment. Disruptions can occur because of
changes in the rules due to government variability or economic disruptions due to
violent upheavals. In this study domestic political stability is represented by two
variables. The first measure of political stability is regime durability, and is taken from
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the measure of durability defined by the Polity IV project as the number of years since
the most recent change in regime. A regime change is defined as a three point change
in the Polity score over a three year period or less, or the period immediately following a
disruption or suspension of stable institutional structures.
Figure 4-3 graphically depicts the distribution of the durability variable over time.
In 1976, the mean regime durability was about 12.5 years in the sample countries. By
2004, the mean durability had risen to almost 19 years, indicating longer-lasting regimes
in developing countries.
Another measure of domestic political stability to be considered in this study is
internal war. This variable is taken from the Peace Research Institute of Oslo’s (PRIO)
Armed Conflicts dataset (version 4 – 2006b). 27 This dataset lists intrastate, interstate
and extra-state conflicts and includes starting and ending information, intensity, and
type and issue of conflict. The dataset defines four kinds of conflict, and for the internal
war variable we will consider two of these categories: internal armed conflicts are
those between a state and an opposition group inside its borders without interference
from another state; and internationalized internal armed conflicts are those between a
state and an opposition group inside its borders and involving intervention from another
state or states. In addition, the dataset identifies two types of conflict intensity levels.
Conflicts can either be minor, reaching 25 – 99 battle related deaths, or major, reaching
1000 or higher battle related deaths. The dataset also contains a cumulative intensity
variable, coded 1 when battle-related deaths reach 1000, and 0 otherwise. The major

27

The Armed Conflicts dataset can be found at PRIO’s Center for the Study of Civil War website, http://new.prio.no/CSCWDatasets/.
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Figure 4-3: Regime durability
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conflict intensity level, meaning conflicts with 1000 battle-related deaths, will be used for
the internal war variable in these estimations
Figure 4-4 indicates the number of internal and external conflicts each year for
the aggregate countries in the sample. External wars will be discussed more fully under
the international factors section. Internal wars were more common than external wars
during this time. The highest number of internal wars, sixteen, occurred in 1987 and
1988; the lowest number, seven, occurred in 2004. The most external wasrs in the
sample, six, also occurred in 1987. Seven out of the 29 years recorded no external
wars at all.
For this study, the internal war dummy variable is coded as 1 if the conflict type is
internal or an internationalized internal armed conflict, and if the conflict has reached
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Figure 4-4: Internal and External Conflict
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1000 cumulative battle deaths. Otherwise the variable is coded 0. I expect that
domestic political stability has a positive relationship with FDI inflows.
H4-5a:

As governments in developing countries show greater (lesser)
durability, FDI inflows rise (fall).

H4-5b:

The amount of FDI inflows fall (rise) when developing countries are
in a state of internal conflict (peace).

Characteristics of the Domestic Investment Market
The investment market, and its distinctiveness in different developing countries,
is another important link to understanding FDI. In particular, the last chapter identified
sectoral investment as a possible influence on FDI inflows. Firms, depending on their
type of business and products in which they are involved, typically want to invest in
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economic sectors that will meet their needs and be profitable, and some developing
countries have attractive sectors that are better developed than others.
sectors refer to certain distinct areas of the economy.

Economic

Those developing countries

whose economies are primarily agricultural-based may not be attractive to multinational
firms, because many developing countries tend to protect their agricultural sector
through high tariffs, depressing the market and dampening prices for developing
countries’ products. 28
Some developing countries may be rich in natural resources, and would then
attract investment in extractive industries. Still other developing countries may be poor
in natural resources, but rich in actual or potential labor, and therefore FDI inflows into
such economies would be associated with manufacturing investment. Finally, some
developing countries may possess a superior financial infrastructure or a developed
tourism industry. Others may have started a process of privatizing state-owned
operations, including public service utilities. Countries such as these may already
possess a reasonably trained workforce, and thus create an attractive service sector for
foreign investment.
This study includes variables that capture four of the main economic sectors in
developing countries; agriculture, manufacturing, extractives and services. The data
was obtained from the World Development Indicators, and consists of each sector’s
value-added (or importance) as a percent of GDP in each developing country. Using
the ratio to GDP allows observation of the importance of each sector in each developing
country’s economy at any particular time.

28

From the online paper “Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries,” by the staff of the International Monetary Fund,
November 2001. Found online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm.
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The agricultural sector is comprised of the UN’s International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC -revision 3.1) codes 1 – 5, and consists of crop cultivation, livestock
production, hunting, fishing and forestry. 29 The manufacturing sector includes ISIC
codes 15 – 37, and consists of all manufactures, publishing and printing, tanning and
dressing of leather, and recycling. The service sector comprises ISIC codes 50 – 99
and covers a wide range of economic activities, including wholesale trade, hotels and
restaurants, transportation and storage, finances and insurance, real estate and
business, public administration and defense, education, health and social work,
community and social services, private households and extraterritorial organizations.
The extractives figures were not provided by the World Development Indicators, but the
WDI did provide an industrial figure that consisted of manufactures plus extractives. A
reasonable representation of extractives was therefore created by subtracting
manufactures value-added from industrial value-added. The extractives variable was
logged to minimize problems associated with its distribution.
Figure 4-5 graphs the mean value-added as a percent of GDP of the agricultural,
manufacturing and services sectors over the time-range of the sample. Agriculture
declined from around 23.5 percent to just over 16.5 percent between 1976 and 2004.
The decline was accompanied by an increase services, from about 45 percent to about
52 percent, over the same time period. Manufacturing stays relatively steady,
measuring only a slight decline from 16.15 percent to 15.8 percent. I expect countries
that depend upon agriculture to receive less FDI inflows as a percent of GDP, while
those that depend more upon services and manufacturing to receive more FDI inflows.

29

For a complete listing of ISIC classification codes, refer to the United Nations Statistics Division website on ISIC codes at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=17.
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Figure 4-5: Economic Sectors
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H4-6a:

As the percentage of agricultural value-added rises (falls) in relation
to GDP in each developing country’s economy, the amount of FDI
inflows falls (rises).

H4-6b:

As the percentage of manufacturing’s value-added rises (falls) in
relation to GDP in each developing country’s economy, the amount
of FDI inflows rises (falls).

H4-6c:

As the percentage of extractives value-added rises (falls) in relation
to GDP in each developing country’s economy, the amount of FDI
inflows rises (falls).

H4-6d:

As the percentage of services’ value-added rises (falls) in relation
to GDP in each developing country’s economy, the amount of FDI
inflows rises (falls).
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International Factors
International factors play an important role on the agreement level, and can
inhibit or enhance the possibilities for firm agreement with developing states. FDI
inflows indicate the extent to which agreement has been reached between firms and
states. These agreements are aided by some international and domestic factors that
we explored on the policy level, and some new factors from each that are have stronger
association to firms and their preferences.
International stability. As discussed in Chapter Two, stability is theorized to improve the
prospects of FDI in developing countries. On the international stage, stability is
considered to be a peaceful international environment, or one that is free of war and
conflict. For this reason, external war is used as a variable that provides a measure of
international stability. The external war variable, like the internal war variable, was
obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) project. For this variable, we will consider
the final two COW categories of war: extrasystemic armed conflicts are those conflicts
between a state and a non-state group outside its borders and interstate armed conflicts
are those between two or more states. A dummy variable, coded as 1 if the conflict is
an extrasystemic or an interstate armed conflict and has reached 1000 cumulative battle
deaths, and 0 otherwise is used in these estimations.
H4-7:

The amount of FDI inflows fall (rise) when developing countries are
in a state of external war (peace).

Institutional membership. Just as membership in international institutions may play a
role in determining domestic policies, membership may also play a role in influencing
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FDI inflows. Firms that see that developing countries are members of international
institutions concerned with creating rules and norms of foreign direct investment may be
more likely to invest in those countries because these norms and rules level the playing
field and encourage transparency. Employed in this capacity is a variable used in the
domestic policy model, the institutional pressure index, described in Chapter Three.
H4-8: Developing countries that have higher (lower) rates of membership in
international institutions will have greater (less) FDI inflows as a percent of
GDP.
Proximity. Proximity to developed countries also plays a part in FDI inflows. Firms that
can invest in countries that are nearer to their home bases can save on expenses that
would be incurred over greater distances, especially if the investments consist of
factories that produce or assemble and then ship the goods back to the home country or
abroad to other countries. Thus, more investment may be likely in countries that are
nearer to home.
H4-9: Developing countries that are closer (farther) from developed countries
should see more (less) FDI inflows as a percent of GDP.
Control Factors
Other characteristics may also present influences upon FDI inflows along with
the political environment, the investment market and policies. There are many possible
influences, but of these, there are some that stand out. These influences include the
level of industrialization of each state, the size of the market, wages, corruption and
region. The following sections list those that that are included in the estimations.
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Corruption. A domestic characteristic that may be associated with foreign direct
investment inflows is corruption. There are two main views of the effects of corruption
on FDI inflows. The most common argument among researchers has been that
corruption depresses FDI inflows because it places barriers against investment within
the market and greatly decreases efficiency. A smaller contingent of researchers
argues that corruption aids the flow of the marketplace by allowing those investors that
are willing to pay bribes to government officials to set up for business more efficiently.
However, because corruption is widely seen as an impediment to investment and
smoothly operating business, corruption should be negatively associated with FDI
inflows.
Corruption data is available for all countries in the dataset through the World
Bank’s Governance Matters dataset. The Governance Matters dataset measures
governmental effectiveness, using a methodology called the unobserved components
model to create six aggregate indicators from individual measures. One of its six
indicators is governmental control of corruption. The corruption indicator is based on
surveys of individuals and firms, and assessments of think-tanks, multi-lateral aid
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and commercial risk-rating agencies. The
corruption measure in this dataset is modeled as a fixed effect in each panel based on
the average of the Governance Matters Control of Corruption index from 1996-2005.
The range of the variable runs from -1.55 to 1.35, with higher values corresponding to
greater government effectiveness. I assume that government corruption is entrenched
and does not change much over time. The values bear this out – the mean standard
deviation across all countries in the sample over the time range of the sample is only
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0.21. It is expected that greater effectiveness in controlling corruption leads to greater
FDI inflows.
Wages. A common argument about the globalization of business is that firms relocate
manufacturing and services from developed countries where wage rates are higher to
less developed countries with lower wages. Their motivation for doing this is greater
profits. Developing countries are prime candidates for firm interest because they tend
to possess a wealth of surplus labor, and we would expect that firm interest would
correspondingly result in a higher rate of FDI inflows.
Unfortunately, no reliable direct indicator of wages exists. The International
Labor Organization keeps wage rate data going back several years, but the wages are
listed depending on how each individual country tracks them, and it appears there is no
uniform way that countries report this data. Some countries report hourly wages, some
daily, some weekly and some monthly. The dataset is full of missing observations. In
addition, each wage is listed in each country’s national currency, and with changes in
exchange rates over time, converting wages to a meaningful uniform measure becomes
very difficult.
Proxies for wage data used in previous research have included education and
per capita income, with per capita income generally serving as the most popular proxy
for wages (Hejazi and Zefarian 2002, Zak and Knack 2001, Agarwal and Winkler 1984).
Given the discussion in Chapter Two, relating to FDI policy, about the importance of
direct measures of concepts, it is important to include some measure for wages in this
study. Educational data for developing countries is not generally available for all the
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years covered in this research, but I am able to employ logged values of Gross National
Income (GNI) per capita due to its availability for all countries in the sample.
Property rights. The extent to which countries protect and preserve property rights has
been identified as a possible influence on FDI. Greater property rights protections have
been identified most commonly with democracies, but as discussed previously, those
states that make changes toward greater property rights protections have been
identified with a greater probability of receiving FDI than those states that do not.
For that reason, property rights protections need to be included in any study of
FDI. However, getting property rights data for a sample going back into the 1970s is
difficult since data collection on economic variables was conducted to the greatest
extent in developed countries than in non-developed countries. The Heritage
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom rates countries on 10 dimensions going back
to 1995. I used the property rights dimension, which runs a range from 0 to 100, and is
defined as “an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property,
secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state” (Beach and Kane 2008).
Countries with scores approaching 100 are those countries that rate higher on property
rights freedoms, and those closer to 0 have less property rights freedoms. The
countries in the sample range from the score of 10 for Haiti and Iran on the low end of
the range to a score of 90 for Chile. I model the average of the property rights scores
for each country from 1995 – 2004 as a fixed effect.
Market size. Another economic characteristic that may be associated with FDI inflows
is market size, which can work to a state’s advantage in attracting FDI. Firms may seek
overseas markets partly so that they can sell their goods with greater advantages than
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at home. Generally, larger markets have been associated with greater inflows of FDI.
The variable used for market size is, like in the previous chapter, population. The
variable has been logged because of its right skew.
Region. As in the estimations in the previous chapter on the policy stage, regional
dummies will be included to control for possible differences related to developing
countries’ placement in geographical areas. This not only controls for potential
competition for FDI, but also should further disperse any overwhelming effects that any
large developing country’s economy may have on the results. The regions included are
Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, North Africa, Latin America, South Asia and Central
Asia. Central Asia serves as the excluded and therefore the comparison category since
it has the least number of observations.

Model Specification
The model estimations were run using the statistical program Stata, employing
OLS assumptions and using panel-corrected standard errors. The sample consisted of
57 countries over 29 years (1976-2004). Panel-corrected standard errors yield better
estimates than generalized least squares estimations, which have been known to bias
standard errors downward and lead to erroneous conclusions of significance (Beck and
Katz 1995). As discussed previously, some variables were transformed where
necessary to reduce problems caused by the state of their distribution. The dependent
variable, extractives variable and CO2 variables were transformed by right-shifting and
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logging to minimize skew. The population variable was left-shifted and logged for
similar reasons. 30
To model serial dynamics a lagged dependent variable is included on the righthand side. Lagrange multiplier tests indicate the addition of this variable prevents serial
correlation of errors. In addition, to account for questions of causality, one-year lags of
most of the independent variables, except for variables with constant values and
regional dummies, were used on the right-hand side, allowing for the interpretation that
previous year’s observation predicts the present year’s result.
There were three estimations. Estimation 2a tests determinants of FDI inflows as
the percent of GDP including nationalism and omitting ideology. Estimation 2b
eliminates nationalism and includes ideology. Estimation 2c includes all variables. The
general estimation equation for the models is as follows:
ln( FDI ) it = β 0 + β 1 ln( FDI ) it −1 + β 2 Regimeit −1 + [ β 3 Left it −1 + β 4 Centerit −1 + β 5 Right it −1 ]
+ β 6 Nationalismit −1 + β 7 Agricultureit −1 + β 8 Manufacturing it −1 + β 9 ln( Extractives ) it −1
+ β 10 Servicesit −1 + β11 Durability it −1 + β .12 Internal Warit −1 + β 13 External Warit −1
+ β 14 International Institutions + β15 Proximity + β 16 Equity Category 1it −1
+ β 17 Equity Category 2it −1 + β18 Equity Category 3it −1 + β 19 ln(GNI / capita ) it −1
+ β 20 Corruption + β 21 Property Rights + β 20 ln( Population) it −1 + β 21 Region

Results of Estimations
The results of the estimations are recorded in Table 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3. Three
estimations were performed. Estimation 2a omitted government ideology variables and
included government nationalism, while Estimation 2b included the ideological variables
and omitted the nationalism variable. Estimation 2c included both nationalism and
30

For complete summary statistics of the variables discussed in this chapter, please refer to Appendix E. Variables transformed for
the estimations are indicated.
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ideology in the test. Overall the estimations performed well. The R2 for the estimations,
which measures how close the independent variables fit the proportion of FDI inflows as
part of the overall economy, are 0.5399, 0.5288 and 0.5405 respectively, meaning
roughly 52-54 percent of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by the
independent variables within the estimations. The lagged dependent variable in these
three estimations is significant and its coefficient is positive.
Hypothesis 4-1, the FDI equity hypothesis, received strong support in the in all of
the estimations. All of the categories of FDI equity had positive coefficients as predicted
and in all estimations the highest category variable reached 0.05 significance or better.
This significance in Category 3 indicates an interesting result. Category 3, the least
restrictive category, is positively significant when compared to the most restrictive
group, Category 0. Categories 1 and 2, representing gradations of restrictions on FDI
equity, show no difference with the comparison group. Apparently, developing countries
that take the extra step to open their economies to foreign equity without restrictions,
represented by Category 3, receive a boost in FDI inflows as a percent of GDP. Those
countries that place some to many restrictions on foreign equity, represented by
Categories 0 to 2, do not see this boost.
Hypothesis 4-2, the democracy hypothesis, proposed that democracies receive
greater amounts of FDI inflows than non-democracies. In all estimations, the regime
variable was positive and significant as predicted, indicating that as one moves across
the range of countries in the sample from less democratic to more democratic, and
countries themselves move from less to more democratic, they see greater inflows of
FDI as a percentage of GDP. While this result does not support some recent
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scholarship suggesting that FDI responds to autocratic regimes, it does support the
more common finding that democracy is more conducive to greater amounts of FDI.
Hypothesis 4-3, the leftist government hypothesis, was tested in Estimations 2b
and 2c. Neither of those estimations supported the premise that ideology of
government has any effect on FDI inflows whatsoever. In terms of leftist governments,
the variable did not approach significance, and the sign of the coefficient was positive,
which was opposite of what was predicted. None of the other ideological variables were
significant either, indicating that all ideological groupings had no appreciable differences
with the comparison group, rightist governments.
Nationalism (Hypothesis 4-4) was included in Estimation 2a and 2c and
registered significant results when alone and when included with the ideological
variables. However, the results of nationalism were not as predicted. The variable was
positive and significant in both estimations in which it was included. The result indicates
that nationalist governments get greater amounts of FDI as a percent of GDP than nonnationalist governments. This appears to contradict conventional wisdom of nationalism
as well as the results of other studies.
The variables representing domestic political stability yielded no significant
coefficients in all the estimations, therefore giving little support to Hypotheses 4-5a and
4-5b in these models to the domestic political stability hypotheses. This suggests that
FDI does not respond to issues of stability in developing countries, or that other
conceptual measures of stability will better capture this relationship.

178

Table 4-1:

Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Developing
Countries
Estimation 2a

Variables

Coefficient

Robust S.E.

P-value

Logged FDI/GDPt-1

0.6485

0.0632

0.000

Regime type t-1

0.0021

0.0009

0.016

Nationalismt-1

0.0260

0.0106

0.014

Regime durability t-1

-0.0001

0.0002

0.724

Internal war t-1

0.0040

0.0086

0.640

External war t-1

0.0169

0.0089

0.058

International Institutional
Membershipt-1

0.0491

0.0235

0.036

Proximity to Developed Countries

0.0007

0.0076

0.918

Agriculture value-added/GDP t-1

-0.0003

0.0009

0.696

Manufacturing value-added/GDP t-1

0.0003

0.0010

0.809

Logged Extractives valueadded/GDP t-1

0.0413

0.0205

0.044

Services value-added/GDP t-1

-0.0001

0.0008

0.930

Foreign equity category 1 t-1

0.0076

0.0087

0.384

Foreign equity category 2 t-1

0.0116

0.0123

0.346

Foreign equity category 3 t-1

0.0337

0.0159

0.035

Logged GNI per capita t-1

-0.0180

0.0072

0.013

Corruption

0.0239

0.0091

0.008

Property Rights

-0.0002

0.0003

0.495

Logged population t-1

-0.0035

0.0034

0.305

Sub Saharan Africa

0.0087

0.0197

0.659

Latin America

0.0326

0.0122

0.007

North Africa

0.0129

0.0195

0.510

East Asia

0.0166

0.0162

0.307

South Asia

-0.0199

0.0137

0.146

Constant

0.9464

0.2054

0.000

N=1255
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R2=0.5393

Table 4-2:

Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Developing
Countries
Estimation 2b

Variables

Coefficient

Robust S.E.

P-value

Logged FDI/GDPt-1

0.6407

0.0555

0.000

Regime type t-1

0.0017

0.0007

0.011

Left governmentt-1

0.0115

0.0111

0.299

Center governmentt-1

0.0064

0.0117

0.581

Other governmentt-1

-0.0028

0.0126

0.826

Regime durability t-1

-0.0001

0.0002

0.826

Internal war t-1

0.0005

0.0076

0.950

External war t-1

0.0098

0.0105

0.351

International Institutional
Membershipt-1

0.0480

0.0219

0.028

Proximity to Developed Countries

-0.0019

0.0095

0.845

Agriculture value-added/GDP t-1

-0.0006

0.0007

0.426

Manufacturing value-added/GDP t-1

0.0004

0.0010

0.703

Logged Extractives valueadded/GDP t-1

0.0201

0.0169

0.235

Services value-added/GDP t-1

-0.0008

0.0007

0.271

Foreign equity category 1 t-1

0.0083

0.0086

0.334

Foreign equity category 2 t-1

0.0121

0.0110

0.272

Foreign equity category 3 t-1

0.0342

0.0140

0.015

Logged GNI per capita t-1

-0.0134

0.0065

0.039

Corruption

0.0092

0.0088

0.296

Property Rights

0.0001

0.0003

0.872

Logged population t-1

-0.0064

0.0033

0.050

Sub Saharan Africa

0.0087

0.0194

0.655

Latin America

0.0263

0.0109

0.016

North Africa

0.0210

0.0160

0.189

East Asia

0.0146

0.0147

0.320

South Asia

-0.0136

0.0151

0.370

Constant

1.0821

0.1930

0.000

N=1488
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2

R =0.5222

Table 4-3:

Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Developing
Countries
Estimation 2c

Variables

Coefficient

Robust S.E.

P-value

Logged FDI/GDPt-1

0.6468

0.0634

0.000

Regime type t-1

0.0019

0.0009

0.026

Nationalismt-1

0.0240

0.0102

0.018

Left governmentt-1

0.0092

0.0114

0.420

Center governmentt-1

0.0050

0.0123

0.687

Other governmentt-1

-0.0032

0.0151

0.834

Regime durability t-1

-0.0001

0.0002

0.669

Internal war t-1

0.0043

0.0087

0.624

External war t-1

0.0142

0.0090

0.114

International Institutional
Membershipt-1

0.0528

0.0246

0.032

Proximity to Developed Countries

-0.0048

0.0091

0.598

Agriculture value-added/GDP t-1

-0.0002

0.0009

0.779

Manufacturing value-added/GDP t-1

0.0001

0.0010

0.906

Logged Extractives valueadded/GDP t-1

0.0397

0.0197

0.044

Services value-added/GDP t-1

-0.0001

0.0008

0.930

Foreign equity category 1 t-1

0.0090

0.0088

0.309

Foreign equity category 2 t-1

0.0129

0.0123

0.296

Foreign equity category 3 t-1

0.0351

0.0162

0.030

Logged GNI per capita t-1

-0.0156

0.0074

0.035

Corruption

0.0214

0.0091

0.018

Property Rights

-0.0002

0.0003

0.497

Logged population t-1

-0.0031

0.0033

0.355

Sub Saharan Africa

0.0042

0.0216

0.847

Latin America

0.0291

0.0122

0.017

North Africa

0.0132

0.0205

0.521

East Asia

0.0192

0.0172

0.263

South Asia

-0.0243

0.0157

0.121

Constant

0.9327

0.2002

0.000

N=1255
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2

R =0.5398

Of the variables representing the value-added in various economic sectors, the
only variable to reach significance was the variable representing the extractives sector.
The sign of the coefficient matched the prediction in Hypothesis 4-6c. However, a
possible mystery about this variable surfaces; the significance of this variable only
appeared when the nationalism variable was included in the estimations, despite the
fact that these two variables have a low correlation (-0.038). The inclusion of the
nationalism variable reduces the estimated sample by 193 observations, so missing
observations may account for the significance of this variable.
Some of the variables measuring international level factors were found to be of
significance. External war nearly reaches significance in Estimation 2a, but does not in
the other estimations, and its sign is opposite to the prediction in hypothesis 4-7. The
variable measuring international institutional membership was significant across all
estimations in the predicted direction of Hypothesis 4-8, indicating that membership in
international institutions, especially those that promote norms and rules related to FDI,
is associated with higher level of FDI in countries across the sample. Proximity to
developed countries appears to have little if any relationship to FDI inflows, providing
little support for hypothesis 4-9.
Some of the controls reached significance in the estimations as well. Wages, as
represented by GNI per capita, appears to be a robust predictor of FDI inflows, with
greater inflows moving toward countries with higher GNI per capital. Corruption
reaches significance in the predicted direction in Estimations 2a and 2c, which may
provide some indication that governments that are effective in fighting corruption receive
more FDI as a proportion of their economies. Surprisingly, property rights protections
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did not reach significance in any of the estimations, despite the fact that it has been
identified as an important variable in studies discussed previously. Market size, as
represented by population, gained significance in a negative direction only in Estimation
2b, and therefore does not appear to be a reliable predictor of FDI inflows.
Latin America was the only one of the regional variables to gain any significance
at all, indicating that developing countries in that region may benefit from their location.
When compared to Central Asia, the comparison group, Latin America’s coefficient was
positive and significant across all estimations. This may indicate that Latin America
receives more FDI inflows than countries from other regions.
Table 4-4 shows the predicted outcomes of FDI as a percent of GDP from
Estimations 2c after varying each significant independent variable through its range.
The dependent variable outcomes have been transformed back to the dependent
variable’s original scale.

Discussion
The goal set for this chapter has been twofold. The dissertation’s main focus has
been to shed some light on the contribution of FDI policies to the FDI process. In order
to bring that illumination, the entire FDI process has been framed in the logic of twolevel games. The previous chapter focused on the determinants of FDI policy, created
on the domestic level, which sets the basis for eventual state agreement with firms over
FDI. This chapter takes the next step. How does policy interact with political and
economic factors to contribute to state-firm agreement and therefore inflows of FDI into
developing countries?
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Table 4-4: Expected Outcomes of FDI Inflows Varying Significant Factors
From Estimation 2c
Variable

Min

-1 s.d

Mean

+1 s.d

Max

Regime

0.77

0.86

1.05

1.24

1.33

Nationalism

1.05

Intl. Institutional
Membership

0.48

FDI Equity Category 3

1.05

GNI/capita

1.75

Latin America

1.05

1.10
0.85

1.05

1.24
1.57

1.29

1.05

0.82

0.53
1.48
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Since this firm-state agreement takes place outside the domestic political sphere,
this environment constitutes the next level of agreement, and this chapter undertook to
demonstrate that policy, formulated at the domestic level, affects agreement at the level
of firm-state negotiation. The outcome of agreements between firms and developing
states, flows of FDI into developing countries, served as the object of investigation in
this chapter.
The estimations of FDI inflows and their determinants reveal two main findings.
First, policy matters in developing countries when it comes to FDI. How does policy
matter? While those countries that are less than completely open to foreign equity will
receive FDI, those countries that have the most open policies will receive a boost in
foreign investment inflows. This finding underscores something that has been missing
from many empirical studies of FDI – policies are an important part of the FDI story.
Lack of data has precluded a large-scale study of FDI that includes policy prior to this
dissertation, but development of the FDI Equity Index, introduced in this dissertation,
has brought an important new tool to the study of foreign direct investment.
The findings presented in this chapter further support the idea that FDI is not
simply determined by domestic and international political and economic factors in
isolation from each other, but follows a logic that resembles Putnam’s two-level games.
International and domestic forces influence FDI policies. These policies in turn
influence flows of FDI along with some of the same and other different international and
domestic forces. Should one be interested in only domestic or international factors and
their effects on FDI, by all means they can study them in isolation. However, the full
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story of FDI can only be told by considering FDI as a product of factors combining from
both levels.
FDI can only be fully understood if one relaxes the assumption that states only
interact with other states outside of the domestic level. Whether one considers firms as
a player in the international community or one considers state and firm negotiation to
belong in a realm separate from international relations but also outside the domestic
purview of the state, the understanding that firm-state agreement is separate from the
domestic sphere is essential. Even though the environment of firm-state agreement
occupies a separate sphere, it is influenced by domestic and international forces and in
turn, has its own effects on the international and domestic environment.
In the FDI story, states come to some agreements with other states over some
aspects of FDI, but developing states are more likely to be in competition with each
other over FDI and the foreign firms that invest. On the other hand, the relationship
between firm and state is much more complex. Some competition is involved, centering
on both firm and state’s desire to maximize their gains and minimize their costs. Both
firm and state in many cases have more incentives to come to agreement than to
disagree, especially if they have any overlap in what they are willing to consider as
acceptable agreements. Instead of true competition, states and firms come to
agreements on how to work together. These agreements result in flows of FDI.
Some of the findings in the estimations uphold what has been found in other
studies. Domestic political level factors that influence firm-state agreement include level
of democracy in developing countries. Democracies simply gain more FDI inflows as a
percentage of GDP than non-democracies. Democracies are friendly to and protective
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of business, demonstrate transparency, have well-defined rules and laws, and
constitute less risk for foreign firms than non-democracies.
Other findings on the domestic level surprised. Nationalism was shown to be
positively associated with foreign direct investment. This finding goes against much of
the literature that addresses the role of nationalism in the world economy. If nationalist
governments are less enamored of the idea of an interdependent world economy, how
do we explain this? Shulman (2000) provides a possible answer for this puzzle. He
argues that nationalist governments face more complex choices and decisions about
the international economy than they are generally given credit for. Nationalist goals of
autonomy, unity and identity can in some instances be achieved by strong foreign
economic policies. In addition, nationalist governments tend to rule smaller countries
where FDI has a greater impact on the economy than in larger, more diversified
countries. Indeed, examining the dataset shows that developing countries with
nationalist governments in the sample have a mean FDI as a percent of GDP of 2.17
percent, while non-nationalist governments have a mean of 1.70 percent. Finally,
based on Putnam’s logic, nationalist governments may leverage some bargaining power
with foreign corporations because the range of possible agreements they can consider
is smaller, and therefore firms that want to invest must decide to take or leave what’s
offered rather than negotiating better deals.
Similarly, the lack of a role for government ideology is also a surprising finding.
Indeed, all ideological forms of government appear to have very little difference from
each other when it comes to receiving foreign investment. Some of the reasons for this
finding may be attributed to methodological problems in the data that categorizes
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government ideological forms. In particular, the contingent of a large set of
governments that cannot be classified as left, center, or right but simply occupies a
category called “other” is a problem that cannot be overcome. Either a greater effort to
classify these “other” governments must be undertaken, or a new way of looking at
government ideology must be created.
Another surprise is the feeble performance of political stability variables in all
models. While political stability has had weak empirical success in other models of FDI,
there has generally been agreement that a stable political environment enhances FDI
flows. However, internal war, external war and regime durability do not have any
consistent significant effects on FDI in these estimations. Does this mean that stability
has no bearing on FDI? The answer may lie in the problem of defining what is meant by
political stability. After all, democratic forms of government are also equated with
stability, but what kinds of stability? Democracies may be more likely to have certain
forms of instability, such as strikes, riots, demonstrations and the like, which would not
be tolerated in less democratic governments. However, democracies are more likely to
exhibit regime stability, as measured by the durability variable above.
The findings on political stability may indicate that, despite Bollen and Jackman’s
(1989) warning of conflating stability and democracy, the particular stability brought
about by democracy is more important to firms than stability for its own sake. After all, if
foreign firms are more willing to send capital investment to democracies in developing
countries, they get two benefits: more political stability and more open governmental
decision-making. Transparency in democracies allows firms to anticipate possible
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changes in advance and adjust, rather than having to adjust immediately to the whims
of an autocratic government.
While this finding certainly merits more study, some possible answers may be in
previous theories relating autocracy and democracy to development. Long lasting
autocracies might be considered more stable in ways attractive to firms. Democratic
political stability may come with policy instability. As countries change governments
peacefully, the policies that they propose, the new sets of regulations and restrictions
they pass, and the demands they make on firms may prove to be unattractive over the
long term. Firms may invest in a developing democratic country under conditions at one
time, and find that after elections the political landscape has changed. FDI policies may
change, as might all policies that affect the business environment in developing
countries. That being said, FDI equity policy in the dataset is remarkably stable, with
changes in FDI equity restrictions occurring in only just over eight percent of the cases.
However, if a wider range of policies that factor into firm decision-making were
considered, a relationship such as proposed above may be found.
The variables measuring the characteristics of the investment market performed
weakly, except for perhaps the variable characterizing extractives. It matters not
whether developing countries are stronger in agriculture, manufactures, or services;
these factors appear to be insignificant in both models. Even though extractives were
somewhat significant, the finding was not as robust as some of the other variables.
Why might sectoral strengths have weak effects? Despite the fact that more FDI
worldwide is flowing into services, developing countries may not have the resources or
the infrastructure to attract FDI into this sector like developed countries. A lack of
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resources to promote other sectors may compound this effect. Countries that are
strong in manufacturing appear to have no advantage when it comes to FDI inflows,
which is surprising considering the amount of FDI that is invested in manufacturing
around the world. Perhaps this result indicates that manufacturing investment is truly
diverse and not concentrated in one area. The extractives sector, one of the oldest
foreign direct investment sectors, is based in natural resources and investment in that
area tends to be more fixed than other forms of investment because unlike
manufactures, where a potential source of cheaper labor might be in the neighboring
country or in another region, natural resources tend to be native to certain areas. Once
firms find a source of a natural resource, they are not likely to give up on it until it has
been worked through, and they will be less inclined to let competition join them in
extracting that resource. Investment will likely be less than in other sectors, and
relatively stable.
Domestic level variables do not tell the entire story of FDI, however. International
level factors not only contribute to FDI policy, but with FDI policy they influence eventual
agreements between firms and states, leading to FDI inflows into developing countries.
In these estimations, international institutional membership is associated with greater
amounts of FDI inflows. International firms are more likely to come to agreements with
those developing countries that belong to international institutions concerned with trade
and investment because they institutionalize rules and norms of international business,
leveling the playing field for firms among various countries.
Controls included in the estimations show an extra level of factors that affect FDI
inflows in conjunction with policies. In general, the standard of living, particularly the
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wage level, appears to matter in attracting foreign investment. The results presented
here suggest that FDI is attracted to low wage countries, much as has been reported in
other research and reviewed previously. I would suggest that developing countries with
lower average incomes have a wider range of possible agreements with foreign firms,
because the need for jobs outweighs the wariness of costs to FDI. Some alternative
explanations attribute somewhat darker designs for developing countries in attracting
FDI. It has been argued that some developing countries can artificially hold down
wages in order to attract investment and compete with other low-wage countries and
areas. For example, there is evidence that in newly industrializing countries (NICs) in
Asia, governments created incentives to lure foreign investment by artificially setting
wage rates lower than the average real world wage determined by markets. They then
let wage rates slowly rise over time so that both firms and governments received
benefits – firms in the beginning and governments over time (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau
and Garber 2004). The countries that want FDI have an incentive to keep wages low,
while countries that do not place as high a priority on FDI can allow higher wages.
The control of corruption also plays a part in the FDI story. Countries are more
efficient in dealing with corruption gain more FDI both as a percentage of GDP.
Investment appears to seek out countries where business dealings are open and
transparent, and where companies do not have to trouble themselves with unforeseen
costs like paying bribes to get things done.
Interestingly, the results do not support propositions that market size or property
rights are important when it comes to flows of FDI. Given that market size may allow for
foreign investment to achieve greater local returns, this is a surprising result. However,
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this may also be a function of investment being placed in countries not to compete
locally, but to manufacture and ship the finished products back to the home country or
other developed countries. In terms of property rights protections, which were also
surprisingly insignificant, democracies have often been associated with greater property
rights protections, and indeed there is a modest correlation (0.2341) between property
rights protections and greater democracy in the sample. This overlap between
democracy and property rights protections may preclude the latter from gaining any real
significance. In addition, since the variable only accounts for an average of the years
1995-2004, the lack of information on the preceding years may have some effect on
how this variable performed as well.
Of the regions, Central Asia, which consists of the country of Turkey, was
excluded from the analysis as a basis of comparison given its limited observations.
While regional differences are not overly present, an exception appears to be Latin
America. The results indicate that Latin American countries collectively receive more
FDI as a percent of GDP than Central Asia, and indeed any of the other regions. This is
not a surprise. Latin American countries were among the first to emerge from
colonization, and therefore they have a long history of relations with both Europe and
the United States. In addition, the United States considers Latin America its back yard
and has cultivated economic ties with most of its countries since the early 1800s. Given
this head start, firms from the developed world are familiar with Latin America, and have
done business in its countries and with its leaders for a long time. Even though Latin
America and Sub-Saharan countries have the most open policies of any of the regions,
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Latin America’s history, relative stability, and its stronger democratic tradition most likely
makes it a more attractive investment opportunity.

The Theory under Scrutiny: The Need for Case Studies
Does policy matter to foreign investors? In the face of the results of this chapter,
it appears that policy, in combination with a variety of factors from both the domestic
and international levels, has a great deal of influence on foreign direct investment
inflows. Statistics aside, the true test of any theory is not only predicated on what the
general numbers say, but also what happens in individual countries. Chapter Five will
examine the theory of foreign direct investment that has been proposed in more detail
by looking at the experiences of two countries, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and
exploring the effects of policies on their FDI experiences. I will consider the following
questions: What affects FDI policies in these two countries? Does policy matter when it
comes to the extent of FDI in their economies? How do international and domestic
influences interplay to produce not only FDI policy in these countries, but also FDI
inflows? The answers will help shed light on these questions in specific, local
conditions.
The case studies will take into account the countries’ similarities and differences
in drawing a more complete picture of FDI policy and its effects on FDI performance.
By delving more deeply into the phenomena of FDI policies in specific countries, I hope
to find more specific answers to some of the outstanding questions about their creation,
character, and influences.
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Chapter Five
FDI Policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua
The findings of the previous chapters reflect a general approach toward finding
influences on FDI policies in developing countries, and how those policies may
influence FDI inflows. This study relies on quantitative studies to test relevant
hypotheses. While quantitative studies can provide fine evidence for possible causal
relations between variables of interest, they cannot capture all variables of interest. In
particular, there may be variables and subsequent hypotheses that are missed in pure
quantitative studies, no matter how exhaustive the list that the researcher prepares.
Other variables of interest may not be quantifiable. In the context of a more detailed
examination of FDI policy, a complement to quantitative analysis may be appropriate.
The utilization of case studies has long been a staple of social science research, and
according to many scholars, qualitative case studies serve as an important complement
to quantitative statistical studies. According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994),
quantification encourages precision, but does not necessarily produce accuracy
because quantitative indexes produced for large scale statistical studies may not relate
closely to the concepts that the researcher desires to measure. Case studies can
complement statistical studies because they can provide additional description and can
lead to valid causal inferences.
The overall purpose of this dissertation has been to discover what role policy
plays in the FDI process. I have looked for answers to the following general questions
in order to discover how policy interacts with foreign direct investment. What accounts
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for the variation in FDI policies among developing countries? How do policies influence
FDI inflows?
In Chapter Two I reviewed literature to argue that developing countries are of two
minds about FDI. These attitudes have been cultivated through exposure to prevailing
thought during different time periods in their histories. In the 1950s and early 1960s,
developing nations were encouraged by an optimistic view of modernization driven by a
Western desire to win the allegiance of developing countries from the Soviet Union.
Modernization theory argued that all countries are on the path to modernity and
embracing capitalism and free markets will bring industrialization. By the end of the
1960s, many developing nations had turned away from these prescriptions.
Dependency theory argued that the developing world’s connections with the
industrialized north were retarding its development and leading to greater inequality.
Prescriptions included de-linking connections to the developed world, giving a greater
role to the state in industrialization, and developing national industries to replace
expensive and costly imports from the developed world with home-manufactured goods.
But in the 1980s, after the rise of bloated state companies and debt crises partly
predicated on massive borrowing made to finance those industries, a new
modernization preaching free-trade and capitalism began to take hold. Often enforced
by international institutions that set conditions for debt restructuring, developing
countries began to privatize their state-owned industries, reduce their social welfare
programs and scale back state involvement in the economy in favor of free-markets and
free trade.
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As a result, states exhibited a blend of attitudes toward globalization, and on
foreign direct investment, over the past thirty years. This blend means that developing
states’ attitudes occupy a spectrum between completely closed and completely open to
FDI. These attitudes are translated into their policies and at any point in time,
depending on a coalition of factors, developing states’ policies will be more or less open
to FDI.
I argued that the factors that influence FDI policies follow the framework of twolevel games. Developing countries create policies to control FDI on the domestic level,
and bring these policies to the agreement process on the transnational level with
international firms. International and domestic factors affect both domestic level
policymaking and the agreement process. In particular, domestic factors include
domestic politics, such as regime type, ideology and nationalism, and the domestic
economic environment, such as potential alternatives to FDI for development and past
experience with FDI. International factors include international pressures and the world
political environment. I hypothesized that countries that are more democratic, nonnationalist, and right leaning would have more open policies. I proposed that
international pressure, operationalized in the form of membership in international
institutions with an interest in FDI and proximity to developed countries, would lead to
more open policies. I projected that alternatives to FDI, such as gross domestic
savings, foreign aid, foreign borrowing, and maintaining a positive trade balance, would
allow developing countries to pass more restrictive policies on FDI. I also anticipated
that past experience with FDI would affect countries’ future attitudes on FDI. Countries
that had strong past performances would continue to open to FDI based on their
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experiences, and countries that had weak past performance would not see it as a viable
option and remain closed.
I also asked if these policies influenced FDI inflows. I hypothesized that
domestic factors such as current FDI policies, political factors, and international and
domestic market characteristics act to create a push-pull influence on inflows. I
specifically hypothesized that open policies would influence greater FDI inflows, while
more restricted policies would inhibit those inflows.
The next sections will examine these hypotheses in light of the specific
experiences of El Salvador and Nicaragua. I will highlight the cases of these two
developing countries. Why El Salvador and Nicaragua? Both countries have had
similar histories, yet many times both countries have had divergent experiences with
FDI. Both fought crippling and exhausting civil wars in the 1980s. Both have had a
long, complicated and often troubled relationship with the United States. Both face the
same political and economic difficulties, including the transition to democracy from civil
war, the incorporation of a reactionary and guerrilla movements into the political
process, and potential political pitfalls due to severe economic and political inequalities.
Yet El Salvador’s government has wholeheartedly embraced economic development,
but controlled it in favor of its national elite. Nicaragua, on the other hand exemplifies a
mix of wariness and openness to FDI, tempered by realities forced upon it. These
differences in two otherwise seemingly similar countries make them interesting case
studies for FDI policy.
Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show the values of the FDI Equity Index and FDI inflows for
El Salvador. It can be seen that El Salvador shows a progression from more restrictive
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Figure 5-1: FDI Equity Index

Figure 5-2: FDI inflows
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FDI equity policies to more open from 1976-2004. While the overall amount of FDI as a
percent of GDP has grown during that time, it has been characterized by mostly
stagnant figures from 1976 to 1997, then a spike in 1998 due to a massive government
privatization effort. From 1999 to 2004, FDI inflows have increased at an uneven rate.
The increase in FDI inflows has matched the increase in FDI equity openness, but other
factors have also contributed to the increase.
Figures 5-3 and 5-4 show the same data for Nicaragua. Like El Salvador,
Nicaragua has shown an increase in FDI Equity openness. In fact, its policy change
has been slightly more dramatic. FDI inflows as a percent of GDP fell dramatically from
1976 through 1980, when it reached zero. It stayed at zero or close to it up through
1991, and then began to rise rather dramatically from 1992 until 1999, when it began to
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Figure 5-3: FDI Equity Index

Figure 5-4: FDI inflows

Values for Nicaragua

Values for Nicaragua

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
0

1

2

3

0

FDI Equity Index Categories

2

4

6

8

10

FDI as a percent of GDP

Source: Dun & Bradstreet's Exporters Encyclopedia

Source: World Development Indicators

fluctuate through 2004. Some of the increase can possibly be attributed to policy
change, but other factors will be considered and examined.

The Context for Comparison
El Salvador and Nicaragua for much of their histories followed similar political
and economic paths. Both are rooted in the greater framework of the history of Latin
America and particularly within the Central American region which gave them very
similar early histories. Most of what is considered Latin America, save Brazil, was
colonized by the Spanish in the 16th century, who carved out their colonies in areas
originally belonging to indigenous peoples. These countries were rich in natural
resources, which made them attractive for colonization, exploitation of those resources
and abundant labor, and foreign investment. The arrival of Spanish conquistadors
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brought Europeans and a political and economic system based on a hierarchical model.
Later revolts for freedom from this system which tied the colonies to the mother country
brought independence for most of Latin America, including the Central American region.
Constant turmoil between different factions in Latin America contributed to the rise of
military intervention in politics in many of these countries, Central America included.
Today, Latin America continues to be an area of contrasts where abundant wealth
exists next to extreme poverty, and where potential always seems to be around the
corner.
In this vein, both El Salvador and Nicaragua began life as Spanish colonies with
the purpose of providing wealth for the growing Spanish empire. Both countries gained
independence after elite creoles began to chafe under the top-down, autocratic
demands of the distant Spanish government, and both put into place republican forms
of government, albeit representing only the elites, tied into an ideal vision of a unified
Central American federation. As I will explore in more depth, both countries gave up
their republican representative governments in the 1930s and for the next few decades
were ruled by governments dominated by the military. The rise of a great number of
civil groups in the 1960s led to greater political conflict throughout the 1970s, which led
to devastating civil wars in both countries during the 1980s. Following the civil wars,
both El Salvador and Nicaragua opened their political systems, implementing
democratic forms of government and involving a wider spectrum of their populations in
the political process.
Much of their economic histories have also been similar. Both countries have a
long history of dependence on agriculture as the primary commodity for export,
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particularly after coffee was introduced in each country in the 1840s. This cash crop
helped define the power structures through land ownership in each country, setting the
basis for future political conflict. It also made each country attractive to foreign trade
and investment. Trade and investment in coffee led to the integration of each country
into the world economy in the early 20th century, and each country set out on a course
of industrialization. However, the inequities in land ownership in each country caused
similar problems of poverty and underdevelopment and set the seeds for future political
conflict.
Despite all these similarities, many questions can be asked. Why do El
Salvador’s and Nicaragua’s policy changes look remarkably similar? Why do both
countries have stagnant or moribund growth in FDI as a percent of GDP from 1976
through 1990? Why does Nicaragua’s growth in FDI as a percent of GDP rise much
more rapidly than El Salvador’s? The graphs do not reveal the differences in how El
Salvador and Nicaragua came to view and establish policies toward foreign direct
investment, particularly during the 1980s. These differences were political, and involved
both domestic level and international level factors, which influenced not only how each
country viewed development but also how they put into place development strategies,
including FDI.
The first difference that influenced the trajectory of FDI policies in each country,
especially throughout the 1980s, was the domestic political environment leading up to
the civil wars in each country and the subsequent way the civil wars played out. In the
case of El Salvador, economic conditions combined with an awakening of civil society
on the left, leading to military repression and an eventual rise of radical left-wing guerilla
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groups bent on overturning the political and social order. However, the government
continued to be run by the military in league with the right wing, and economic goals
remained the same. These economic goals ensured that El Salvador’s FDI policies
remained relatively open in comparison with other countries in the region, thus allowing
El Salvador to rebound in investment after the end of the civil war.
In Nicaragua, however, similar conditions led to radical left-wing groups taking
political power away from the personalistic rule of one man, Anastasio Somoza, who
operated independently from societal groups but whose actions often benefitted the
elite. Upon taking power, the leftist Sandinistas passed policies to implement their own
agenda and erase most vestiges of the Somoza past. Their agenda was at first one of
restriction of FDI, but changed toward openness as economic realities became more
apparent. These policies of openness, however, did little to enhance Nicaragua’s
attractiveness to international firms during Sandinista rule. Foreign investment, while
recently exceeding the level of El Salvador’s as a share of the economy, was
completely moribund during the civil war and has traditionally lagged behind that of its
neighbor.
The second difference, which predates policy decisions from the 1970s onward
(but has a great deal of influence on how each country viewed its potential place in the
economic arena, on the international level and how firms viewed each country’s
attitudes toward foreign investment) is the relationship that they have with world trading
nd investment powers, particularly the United States. Whereas El Salvador has tied
itself to the world economy and has had close economic and political ties with the
United States, Nicaragua has had a difficult relationship with world powers, except
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perhaps the Soviet Union during Sandinista rule, and its relationship with the United
States has a long and troubled history.
Finally, the third difference between the two countries is the disparity in the
relative strengths of each country’s domestic economy. El Salvador, despite its
devastating poverty and severe inequality, has managed to maintain the impression of a
relatively high-performing economy friendly to foreign business. Nicaragua, suffering
the same problems with poverty and inequality, has had a consistently underperforming
economy which has tended to depress investment. Though both countries have low
savings rates, high foreign debt, and have relied on foreign aid, Nicaragua suffers by
comparison in these areas. These differences in economic performance and strength
have also affected FDI policies in each country. I will examine each of these areas in
detail below.

Political Environment, Civil War and FDI
How have domestic level political factors influenced the FDI policies in El
Salvador and Nicaragua? In previous chapters, I demonstrated that domestic level
political factors play a role in shaping FDI policies and in determining FDI inflows. This
has been true for El Salvador and Nicaragua. In fact, both countries’ similar political
histories have led them on similar paths, but at times their political histories have
diverged. This section will examine the two countries and the political structures that
led to their civil wars, and contrast the FDI policies that emerged from these two paths.
Despite the similar histories in the early 20th century until the late 1970s and early
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1980s, the political structures begat very different civil wars, which in turn led back to
similar policies for FDI in the present time.
El Salvador’s political history after independence helped it craft a political
structure that centered around two elite parties with opposing views on the economy.
The conservative party, representing the traditional landed families, favored economic
nationalism that kept economic and political power largely under their control. The
liberal party was made up of merchants and business owners, favored free trade and
openness to the world economy. In 1871, the liberal position won out, and El Salvador
traded on the worldwide market, utilizing its comparative advantage in agriculture. The
government intervened little in the economy, effectively ceding control of the market to
the owners of capital.
El Salvador kept tariffs low to ensure a market for British- and, after 1900, U.S.manufactured goods which, unfortunately, displaced locally made goods. El Salvador
also took a large amount of foreign loans toward projects such as an unrealized canal
and railroads which established the first of its foreign debts. However, an abundant
supply of labor exceeded demand, and land consolidation by coffee barons and
ranchers left many people landless or with too little land to allow them to subsist. Any
form of organization was not permitted, and often brutally suppressed.
A turn of events occurred in the 1920s, when class-based organization led to the
lower classes demanding a greater economic share in the wealth of the country. In
1931, a democratically elected president, Arturo Araujo, was overthrown in a coup on
the grounds that he was unable to check the forces of popular uprising and his
government was unable to deal with the effects of the depression. The army installed
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Hernando Martinez as president and began formal rule of the country, which it did not
relinquish for another five decades. In early 1932, aware of a pending popular uprising,
the army arrested several leaders including Farabundo Marti (from which the rebel
group turned present-day political party Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or
FMLN, gets its name). The uprising fizzled except in the western provinces, where the
army brought its full force to bear upon the peasantry. By many accounts the army
killed upwards of 30,000 peasants (Taylor and Vanden 1982). 31 The brutality of the
“matanza,” or massacre, practically wiped out the country’s remaining indigenous
population and effectively ended any more popular uprisings until the 1970s. It also
cemented the army’s pre-eminent power in the country, and served notice that the
country’s ruling institution had little desire to implement any reformist measures.
In the 1940s, El Salvador’s military government embarked on a program of
industrialization, and by the 1960s, industrialization was in full swing, with foreign
investment used to fund industrial goods produced for the Central American market.
However, El Salvador’s old problem of severe economic disparity and a large rural
landless population came back with a vengeance in the 1970s. New groups began to
organize for greater economic and political rights, and were greeted with much
repression. In 1980, El Salvador exploded into civil war. Over the next 10 years, the
FMLN and successive military governments, followed by centrist and rightist civilian
governments (under Napoleon Duarte and then Alfredo Cristiani) waged a battle to a
virtual stalemate, with the FMLN controlling large tracts of the northern countryside and
wreaking havoc on the U.S.-funded Salvadoran army (Thomas 1987). The inability of
31
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the government to fully defeat the rebels, despite large amounts of aid from the United
States, which was alarmed about a second possible leftist takeover (after Nicaragua) in
Central America, was punctuated by severe brutality committed by the armed forces.
Events such as multiple disappearances of leftist leaders at the hands of government
paramilitaries, the army massacre at the village of El Mozote, the murder of Archbishop
Oscar Romero, and the slayings of six Jesuit priests at the University of Central
America shocked the world and had repercussions for El Salvador’s ability to attract
trade and investment. Eventually, with both sides exhausted and with the end of the
Cold War reducing the importance of El Salvador in the eyes of the United States,
peace accords were ratified in 1992 allowing the FMLN to become a full-fledged political
party. The FMLN took its place in the country’s legislature as the second largest
political party and the Constitution of 1983, originally drafted to serve as the basis of
democratic rule in El Salvador, appeared to finally live up to its promise.
However, some say little has changed. Despite some arguments that U.S. policy
to build up the right-wing ARENA party and install it in power resulted in the removal of
the army from political relevance and cemented democratic institutions. But after two
decades of democracy, the control of politics still largely rests with those allied with the
most economically well-off in the country, though the FMLN holds enough power in the
legislature to serve as a major impediment to ARENA legislative initiatives (Stanley
2006). In addition, leftist and alternative parties hold many local offices, leading to
some tensions between federal and local branches of government. However, the FMLN
has also faced crises within its own party, as reformers fight for more transparent and
party rules based on a democratic process, while orthodox members try to defend their
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power base (Manning 2007). Civil organizations are not as powerful as they once were,
but can still muster enough mass protest to be heard and influence government policy,
and are greatly aided by the FMLN’s support of progressive social movements
(Stansbury 2006). Crime, however, is a persistent threat to internal stability. Gangs run
rampant in San Salvador and other larger cities, and the U.S. State Department reports
that El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. 32 Crime may have
future implications for El Salvador’s stability, as a study shows that Salvadorans are
more likely to support a coup in response to higher crime rates, or at least strong
government measures inimical to democracy.
Nicaragua, in turn, followed a similar path in its early political development except
for one important difference: the involvement of foreign countries in its political and
economic affairs. Nicaragua’s agriculturally based economy led to the rise of coffee as
the largest agricultural export. This in turn also strengthened the Conservative party,
which was backed by the traditional land-owning families, favored economic nationalism
and the role of the Catholic Church in the political sphere, and the Liberal party which
was in favor of greater international commerce. However, Nicaragua’s status as the
largest of the Central American states, its position straddling the isthmus from both the
Caribbean to the Pacific, and geographical features favoring easy transit between the
two bodies of water made it very important to foreign business interests who were
interested in building a canal.
Seeking to take control of Nicaragua from the Conservatives, the Liberals invited
a mercenary force under the leadership of American William Walker in 1855 to help
them drive the Conservatives from power. Walker instead set himself up as monarch of
32
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the country, which discredited the Liberals and, after a force invaded from Costa Rica
with backing from both the United States and Britain, led to Walker’s execution by firing
squad in Honduras in 1960 and Conservative rule of Nicaragua until the 1890s.
The United States’ concern over the Nicaraguan Liberal government’s courting of
Germany and Japan to build a canal in its territory, in direct competition to U.S. interests
in Panama, led to U.S. Marines landing on Nicaragua’s coast in 1912 and installing the
Conservatives in power. For the next 21 years, the United States would continue to
have troops on the ground to both guard its interests and keep the Liberals and
Conservatives from fighting a civil war. A withdrawal was attempted once, but led to a
larger intervention and U.S. oversight of the next two elections. Nicaraguan
governments at this time tended to toe the U.S. line, even if the policies favored were
against the interests of the Nicaraguan people. For example, Nicaragua gave the
United States exclusive rights to build a canal in Nicaragua, even though the United
States planned to do nothing of the sort. They simply were protecting their interests in
Panama. The U.S. presence also led to civil strife, with a former general of the armed
forces and member of the Liberal Party, Augusto Sandino, leading a home-grown
resistance against U.S. occupation.
U.S. intervention also led to the establishment of the Nicaraguan National Guard,
which was trained and at first commanded by the U.S. military. Upon leaving in 1933,
the United States handed control of the National Guard to Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza.
At the departure of the U.S. troops, Sandino ended his guerilla actions, but was
assassinated not long after. It was rumored that Somoza was an architect of the plan to
have Sandino killed because Sandino wished to maintain his own military force in the
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area of Nicaragua that he controlled. Not long after Sandino’s death, Somoza forced
the president of Nicaragua out of power, and took the presidency for himself. The
Somoza family would rule Nicaragua for almost 50 years. Anastasio Somoza was
assassinated in 1956, but his sons assumed power, with full power going to the younger
Anastasio “Tacho II” Somoza after his brother Luis died of a heart attack. According to
Millett (2007, 466), the Somozas used control of the National Guard, manipulation of the
Liberal Party and the image of a close alliance with the United States to maintain their
power.
In the early 1960s, a small Marxist-oriented guerilla movement sprung up in
opposition to the Somoza regime. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was
not well armed or well funded and did not have many members. However, in the mid1970s, the Somoza regime had fallen out of favor with important elements of the civil
and economic leadership in Nicaragua, as well as the leadership of the United States.
The Sandinistas, meanwhile, had begun to temper their Marxist rhetoric and started to
reach out to moderate opposition members. A number of events, including the
evacuation of Somoza to Miami for treatment of his heart, the murder of popular
opposition newspaper publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, and the successful FSLN
capture of the National Palace, where they held a number of legislators and other
government representatives hostage for two days while negotiating the release of many
FSLN captives from prison and a half-million dollar ransom, convinced other
Nicaraguans to oppose the regime more actively under the FSLN umbrella. Somoza
was eventually forced from power in 1979, and the FSLN set up a revolutionary
government composed of a nine-member directorate. The new government embarked
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on a program of restructuring both the political and economic environments, starting
with the nationalization of many of the business holdings of Somoza and his supporters.
The United States under Carter had worked very hard to both force Somoza from
power and bring about a moderate government in his stead. Given the facts on the
ground, the Carter administration offered tentative support to the new Nicaraguan
government. This only lasted until Carter’s defeat to Reagan in the U.S. general
election of 1980. Upon assuming office, Reagan’s administration, fighting the Cold War
more actively, began to work both politically and economically to isolate the leftist
Nicaraguan regime. On the economic front, the United States embargoed trade and
influenced multilateral lending agencies to cut off Nicaragua’s access to loans. The
Nicaraguan government was forced to seek out funding from the Soviet Union, Cuba
and their allies. On the political front, the United States poured aid into a group of exSomoza supporters, former National Guard and Miskito Indians that were angry at the
FSLN-led Nicaraguan government for displacing a number of their people from their
traditional lands. This group was labeled the Contras. When the U.S. Congress,
unhappy with the Contras’ progress and reports of their human rights violations, cut off
funding to the guerillas, the Reagan administration used various backdoor means,
including some illegal ones, to continue supplying the Contras. The United States also
illegally mined Nicaraguan harbors, and conducted espionage within the country.
The civil war took a toll inside Nicaragua and affected both political and economic
development. Despite the military and financial aid received from the United States, the
Contras were not able to mount a challenge that seriously threatened the Sandinistas,
but the need to fund the war diverted government funds away from social reform
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programs that the Sandinistas had envisioned and hampered the economy. Inflation
was rampant and almost unchecked. Despite the civil war and the moribund economy,
the Sandinistas rewrote the constitution, and in 1984 were re-elected in an election
boycotted by opposition groups. However, the war against the Contras and the slipping
economy took its toll. In 1990, the Sandinistas and their charismatic president Daniel
Ortega were widely expected to win election again, but in a closely watched contest
monitored by international observers, a coalition of opposition parties called the UNO
won, propelling Violeta Chamorro into the presidency. The new president and her
allies, despite internal struggles among the disparate opposition elements, rolled back
some of the Sandinista reforms and embraced neoliberal economic policies. Though
the economy did not recover as well as was expected, inflation was brought down to
more manageable levels.
Today, Nicaragua is once again under the presidency of Daniel Ortega, the
Sandinista leader, re-elected after three election defeats to his opponents in the 1990s
and early 2000s. However, Ortega has to contend with an opposition legislature and
has further removed himself from his past embrace of Marxist principles. In particular,
he has promised to maintain private property rights and continue to reach out to foreign
investors.
What effects did these domestic civil wars and the politics surrounding them have
on the development of foreign direct investment policies in Nicaragua and El Salvador?
In turn, was there spillover from these domestic level events into each country’s ability
to attract foreign investment and reach agreement with international firms? Was overall
investment affected?
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In the case of El Salvador, domestic upheaval appears to have had some effect
on the development of FDI policies. El Salvador has not historically received great
amounts of FDI, though it has long had experience with foreign investors in its
economy. In addition, its ability to receive foreign direct investment was inhibited by the
civil war, and by a reliance on foreign and military aid through the 1980s that was
funneled into fighting the FMLN insurrection.
Fighting the war and defeating the guerillas, not foreign investment, was first on
the government’s agenda throughout the 1980s. Foreign investment policies remained
as they were before the civil war. In 1979 when opposition organization began to gain
strength, and in 1981 and 1982, during the first years of the civil war, El Salvador
showed negative inflows of FDI as capital fled the country. Through subsequent years
until 1997, its FDI inflows never rose above around $48 million (constant 2000 U.S.
dollars) despite the end of the civil war in 1989, and the adoption of a number of policies
at the war’s end designed to stimulate foreign investment.
For example, the Foreign Investment Development and Guarantee Law, adopted
in 1988, offered 10 year tax exemptions on income taxes to firms exporting 25 percent
of their non-traditional products, and a 10 year duty exemption on machinery,
equipment and raw materials. Foreign companies in the industrial sector were given
unrestricted remittances of net profits, while those in the commercial and service
sectors were granted remittances of profits up to 50 percent of registered foreign
capital. Other incentives were permission for foreign investors to establish U.S. dollar
accounts and use them to obtain local financing, and unrestricted remittance of funds
from liquidation, royalties and fees for use of foreign patents.
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Two years later, the 1990 Foreign Investment Promotion and Guarantee Law
offered unrestricted remittance of profits and return of capital. The Export Reactivation
Law and the Free Trade Zone Law, both adopted the same year, granted additional
benefits to exporting firms such as a total exemption from the stamp tax, a number of
rebate opportunities, and additional fiscal incentives to companies operating in free
trade zones. However, El Salvador continued to maintain strict controls on foreign
banks, and foreign investment was still prohibited in key utilities and in foreign exchange
houses.
FDI policies and foreign investment inflows have been influenced by the end of
the war and the integration of the former leftist guerrillas of the FMLN into the political
process. In 1992, after more than a decade of civil war, El Salvador’s warring factions
signed peace accords, integrated the FMLN into the political process, and paved the
way for fair and free elections. The 1994 elections were roundly hailed internationally
as fair and free, with the right-wing ARENA party gaining the most seats in the
Assembly and also gaining the presidency, but with the FMLN establishing itself as a
true opposition party. In subsequent elections, the FMLN gained strength. To this point
it has never gained the presidency of the country, but it currently holds more seats in
the Assembly than any other party. The presidency, however, is held by the ARENA
party, and with its smaller party allies in the Assembly is able to pass important
legislation.
While the process appears to be more democratic than during and before the
civil war, there are some questions about the nature of El Salvador’s democracy. Is El
Salvador truly a democracy, or do the trappings of elections conceal something less
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than democratic? And how has this apparent democratization of the country affected its
policies and its investment status?
Let us look at the second question first. Since 1997, Freedom House has rated
El Salvador as “free” despite some misgivings about various aspects of its political and
economic situation. It cites, among positives, the right to freedom of association,
academic and religious freedoms, a decline of human rights violations, and its recent
history of free and fair elections. It cites concerns with corruption, crime, and occasional
discrimination against women. Additionally, the Polity IV project has rated El Salvador
as six and presently a seven on its ten point scale of democracy, indicating that El
Salvador has more work to do if it is to reach a status as a strongly democratic country.
Yet questions remain about the strength of El Salvador’s democracy. While El
Salvador has a basis of strong institutions that can sustain democracy, some important
institutions that are important for democratic development, such as the judiciary, are
perceived as lacking independence from the government and are not highly regarded by
the people (Dodson and Jackson 2004). In addition, El Salvador lacks a political center
in its Assembly, and power is split fairly evenly between the ARENA party and its allies
and the FMLN. Without any strong centrist parties to moderate, stalemate in Assembly
often occurs. This polarization extends down into civil society, with strong groups on
the right and the left supporting the parties that ideologically agree with them.
Barnes (1998) argues that this polarization has created a democratic deficit in El
Salvador. In particular, Barnes laments the absence of a center-left party, which he
argues would blunt the more radical vision of the FMLN and create more areas for
compromise. Without such compromise, El Salvador has been left with years of a ruling
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right-wing that is stymied by an obstructionist left, and as has been occurring, a lack of
interest in the polls at election-time. However, he sees promise in El Salvador’s
attempts to create democracy because of certain institutional structures, such as an
efficient transportation system and a relatively high education rate, that make the
possibility of a real democracy within reach.
In terms of the economy, these conditions tend to create two very different views
of development in the country, with little common ground between them. In addition,
most money for development projects from outside the country, particularly the United
States and international institutions, tends to flow through groups aligned with those on
the right. Development from the right tends to focus on a top-down approach, with
those with economic and political power (often the same people) deciding what is best
for the country’s development. Left-oriented development tends to get its impetus from
community involvement and participation, but is difficult to implement because of a lack
of funding, though some does come from European sources (Foley 1996).
There are differing opinions in the country, particularly on the left. One observer,
Dr. Salvador Árias, an economist and a member of the Assembly with the FMLN,
argues that El Salvador is not a democratic country, because it doesn’t have a “real”
process for transferring power and that there is little separation between the
mechanisms of state under the present ruling ARENA party. He added that the current
government and those on the right tend to favor the quick attraction of foreign
investment. 33 Dr. Guillermo Ramirez Alfaro, an economist at San Salvador’s
Technological University, says that democracy has no effect on foreign direct
investment policies. He cites three other factors, El Salvador’s lack of resources, a lack
33
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of political stability, and the absence of a unitary economy to use investments toward
development, as more important. 34
However, Roberto Góchez, an economist at the University of Central America,
points toward political factors as having an influence on the government’s stance toward
FDI. The rightist government, according to him, is in the process of opening to FDI and
deregulating and has made an agreement to take any investment disputes to
international courts. He says El Salvador has already lost a case in international
tribunals pertaining to electricity distribution. 35 Dr. Álvaro Trigueros of FUSADES, a
non-profit think tank in San Salvador, asserts that the arrival of democracy signaled the
arrival of El Salvador’s new economic model, developed by FUSADES and similar to
the Chilean model. 36 And Juan Carlos Rivas Najarro, of the Ministry of Economy of El
Salvador, argues that the peace treaty with the FMLN, their entry into the political
system and the current balance in government has helped foreign investment. El
Salvador, he points out, has the lowest savings and loan interest rates in Central
America, and provides enterprises with the macro-economic stability they need. 37
The large scale studies in Chapters Three and Four indicated that nationalism
has an effect on FDI, with nationalism positively related to FDI inflows as a percent of
GDP. For El Salvador, nationalism is only just beginning to play a part in domestic
politics with the acceptance of the FMLN into the political system. The governments
that have ruled El Salvador, military, centrist and right wing, have tended to be
outwardly oriented in terms of trade and investment, but reserving most of the benefits
of the economy for the wealthy class at the top of the economic pecking order. In many
34
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ways, El Salvador resembles the tripartite alliance so well described in Evans (1979)
between state, local outwardly oriented elites and international business. With the
addition of the FMLN to politics, however, and the possibility that they will one day take
power, nationalist rhetoric has begun to be heard in the halls and chambers of the
assembly with discussions of reducing ties to foreign investment and increasing
protections for national businesses. While nationalism has not played a part in El
Salvador’s economy since 1976, there are chances that it could in the future. If the
predictions of the model studied here are correct, that may actually increase FDI in El
Salvador in the long run.
Do domestic political factors have an effect on foreign direct investment policies
and on actual investment in El Salvador? It depends on who is commenting. The
conclusions appear to suffer from the same polarization as the politics in the country.
The right wants to tout its economic successes, and points toward democracy and its
own policies as important keys in the development of El Salvador. Right-of-center
commentators say that the government is more open to FDI, and point to its
privatization programs and its open policies. They paint the left as being hostile to
foreign investment. They argue that the left does not care about the business
environment. They argue that the left sees multinational corporations as evil, and
therefore will tax larger businesses, regulate foreign investment and create
disincentives for economic development. The left paints a picture of the emperor having
no clothes. They argue that the Salvadoran government has given away everything to
foreign multinationals which enter El Salvador, but contribute very little to the
development of the economy. They argue that FDI must contribute more than just quick
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profits to the wealthy. They envision a greater role for the state in deciding the country’s
economic future, including making investments in its own social programs.
This debate in El Salvador of whether the state or the private sector should be in
charge of development and even basic services is a very hot issue – recently,
demonstrations broke out when the government announced that it was privatizing the
water system of the town of Suchitoto. Some members of the non-governmental
organization CRIPDES were arrested while driving to a demonstration protesting the
privatization of the water system in the town of Suchitoto and charged with acts of
terrorism carrying possible sentences of 60 years (Mezzacappa and Towarnicky 2007).
The debate will only get stronger in the coming year. In 2009, the presidency of ARENA
party president Antonio Saca will come to an end. For the first time, the FMLN has
united around a candidate that does not hail from the party’s guerrilla old-guard. Their
candidate, Mauricio Funes, is an early favorite for the presidency with a 75 percent
approval rating. 38 The ARENA party does not appear to have united around a cohesive
candidate at this time. If Funes wins the presidency, it will test the right’s commitment
to democracy, and possibly mark the first time since the 1930s that the country will
peacefully transfer power to the left. Should that happen, there could be implications for
FDI, perhaps even a movement away from FDI as a development strategy, as has
happened recently in other Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, Ecuador and
Bolivia, where the left has gained power. However, it will also mark a turning point in El
Salvadoran politics. Whichever side is in power should have a significant impact on the
policies and inflows of FDI in the future El Salvador.
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Like El Salvador, the story of Nicaragua’s investment policies and foreign
investment performance involves a civil war and an opening to FDI following the war’s
end. From 1936 until 1979, Nicaragua was under the personalistic rule of the Somoza
family, which suppressed democratic forces within the country and ran the economy as
if it was their personal estate. Under the Somozas, whose politics were right-wing and
centered on a Nicaraguan nationalism limited to themselves and their friends and allies,
the government pursued state-led industrialization with the Somoza family’s hand in
practically every business venture. The Somozas cultivated ties with the United States
and other foreign aid donors. They also courted U.S. businesses, and most likely dealt
with them like they dealt with any business – granting favors in exchange for personal
gain. In the 1970s, the Somozas began to expand their holdings in domestic agriculture
and industrial activities, crowding out other Nicaraguan businessmen. According to an
article in Business Week (1978), one American businessman operating in Nicaragua put
it very succinctly, commenting that "…you just don't do business here without offering
the general a share in it from the beginning.”
In the 1970s, Nicaragua, like many other Latin American countries, followed the
import-substitution-industrialization model of development, and its foreign investment
policies of the time reflected its goals. In 1976, under the Somoza regime, Nicaragua
actively promoted itself as an offshore assembly location for foreign corporations, and
established free trade zones to lure foreign companies. Nicaragua offered generous
incentives in the free trade zones, including duty exemptions on imported machinery,
tools and parts, unlimited raw materials imports, exemptions from income taxes on
profits from exports, and special concessions for businesses that made commitments
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for 10 to 15 years (Exporters Encyclopedia 1976). However, the Investment Law of
1955 did not specify that 100 percent foreign ownership was allowed, and the Somozas
and their allies controlled or had a hand in the majority of the country’s economic
activity.
In 1979, the Somoza family was forced from power by the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN). The FSLN was one of a number of groups that had arisen to
oppose the Somozas after the 1972 earthquake, when a massive outpouring of aid from
the developed world was pocketed by the Nicaraguan leader. In 1980, the new
Sandinista government nationalized all Somoza family holdings and any abandoned
businesses were claimed by the state. The Sandinistas also declared that Nicaragua’s
natural resources were also property of the state. The following year, the government
nationalized the sugar industry and also export-commodities such as rum and instant
coffee. The government also announced a takeover of any idle land of over 349
hectares in key states and unused land of over 698 hectares elsewhere. Even though
the government wanted to maintain the impression of free enterprise in Nicaragua, as
late as 1988 the government was taking over private businesses (Kinzer 1988).
The Sandinista uprising eliminated the corrupt Somoza era government.
Originally tied to Marxist doctrine, the Sandinistas softened their stance to win more
allies to their cause in the last few years of the Somoza regime. One view is that the
FSLN wanted to prioritize the needs of the working class, while still allowing for
capitalism and the free market (Roche 2006). Regardless, their ascent into power
changed business as usual and led the Reagan administration, worried about Soviet
and Cuban influence, to put economic pressure on the country. Despite their nationalist
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language regarding the economy before they came to power, the Sandinistas tried to
calm foreign investors. “The Nicaraguans, who realize that the smartest thing in the
world for them to do is act responsibly, have been making their payments on time,”
stated an American businessman (Gilpin 1983). To get around the U.S. economic
pressure, the Sandinistas also attempted to diversify their trading sources, according to
the same article, by opening up to greater economic relations with Cuba and the Soviet
bloc.
Regardless of their leftist orientation and their nationalist rhetoric, the Sandinistas
appeared to realize early that they could not simply jettison their ties with foreign
corporations. Despite the Sandinista expropriation of businesses formerly owned by the
Somoza family, the government planned to maintain a private sector, and allow foreign
investment on a controlled basis with guarantees against state takeovers (Economist
1979). Nicaragua, faced with negative growth and declining domestic investment for
the first time since the Sandinistas took power and desperate for foreign investment and
bank credits, took action to try to make the country more attractive to foreign investors
(Business Week 1983). In an effort to stimulate private Western investment and
address a lack of confidence in the economy, the Sandinistas struck a more moderate
tone after the 1985 elections (Volman 1985). They openly courted FDI and trade, but
foreign nations and companies exercised caution (Adkins 1985b). The United States,
due to its fears of a communist takeover in Central America leading to a Soviet foothold,
openly discouraged any type of investment in the country and in 1985 set up a trade
embargo against the country. This did not completely dissuade trade with Nicaragua.
As the only Central American nation that was a member of the General Agreement on
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor to the World Trade Organization, Nicaragua
pushed for hearings at that international body to discuss the legality of the U.S.
embargo and openly courted European, Canadian and Eastern bloc trade (Foster
1985). In 1985, trade with the Soviet Union tripled (Shabad 1985). Despite the caution,
foreign companies, including American firms, that were already established in the
country did not leave. A partial list of foreign companies doing business in Nicaragua in
1985 includes Exxon, IBM, Monsanto, and Nabisco. A spokesman for IBM declared
that the company had “no complaints about doing business in Nicaragua” (Adkins
1985a).
Under the FSLN, the foreign investment law was overhauled in 1987 for the first
time since 1955. The Sandinistas did not bother to change the most basic laws
regarding foreign investment but appeared to make individual deals, and negotiate
individual incentives, with foreign corporations. In 1987, 100 percent foreign ownership
was allowed in some areas, a degree of ownership not even set in law under the
Somozas. Notwithstanding their efforts, the Sandinista takeover caused a complete halt
to foreign investment in Nicaragua. 39 From 1980 to 1991, figures from the World
Development Indicators show that except for 1990, when about $880,000 of inflows
were recorded, no new foreign investment came to Nicaragua – literally, the entries for
foreign direct investment inflows in dollars and in percent of GDP from 1980 -1989 and
1991 show absolutely zero FDI inflows. The Multinational Monitor, a publication of the
Multinational Resource Center, documented the difficulties of the Sandinista
government in convincing foreign capital to invest in the country. Charles Roberts
(1980) writes of the Sandinistas’ cautious attitudes toward foreign investment due to
39
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past experience where, under Somoza, foreign investment mostly produced luxury
goods with high import contents, and where the government made no effort to harness
any returns from foreign investment for the country’s development through taxes and
regulations. Foreign banks were viewed with particular suspicion by the Sandinistas
because they kept Somoza supplied with capital and, as his political opposition
increased, he borrowed more heavily to keep himself in power. The Sandinista
government envisioned at that time a mixed economy, with more controls on FDI.
That mixed economy never came to fruition under their rule. In 1990, the
Sandinistas lost the elections, and the new government moved quickly to enshrine free
market policies in law. The unexpected victory of the coalition of anti-government
parties called the National Opposition Union (UNO) in a tightly fought, free and fair
election brought the first trappings of full democracy to Nicaragua and a moderate
government into power under Violeta Chamorro, but it proved incapable of turning
around the economy. The government embarked on a campaign of privatization of
state-run companies, opening the doors to trade and investment and receiving a
resumption of trade and aid from the United States. Successive governments drifted
farther to the right, but also proved unable to solve Nicaragua’s economic woes. One
administration, led by President Arnoldo Aleman, was so corrupt that he was arrested
under the administration of his hand-picked successor, Enrique Bolanos.
By 1992, a new law on foreign investment had been passed that allowed 100
percent foreign ownership in most areas except telecommunications, energy, insurance,
water and sewage and a few other small sectors. 100 percent remittances of profits
were allowed. While the new government did not give explicit incentives for investment,
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they did provide for dispute settlement through arbitration, specified no export
requirements, and began a privatization process for government-owned agencies where
foreign bidding was allowed. In addition, Nicaragua began opening new free trade
zones, both public and private.
The return of Daniel Ortega to the presidency may signal a leftward shift in the
country in keeping with trends in many other countries in Central and South America.
Unlike before, the Sandinistas do not control the legislature, and so Ortega will have to
deal with a hostile Congress. Ortega has toned down his former Sandinista rhetoric.
After his 2007 election, he was quoted as saying that the launch of a $35 million venture
capital and private equity fund by Latin American Financial Services (Lafise) “…is one
more step that proves we are committed to respecting private property and foreign
investors and that we are a government of reconciliation and national unity" (Repo
2007). He does not sound like a revolutionary Marxist.
In the long run, FDI policies and inward FDI flows were both affected somewhat
differently by the domestic political upheaval. Both countries took slightly different paths
to greater FDI openness. The military government in El Salvador first relied on importsubstitution-industrialization until the civil war. Once the civil war started, it placed
prime importance on defeating the guerillas. Its path to FDI openness did not start until
the conclusion of their civil war, when development began to be a concern again. The
Salvadoran government has managed to push through legislation since the early 1990s
that has been friendly toward foreign investment, but it faces a strengthening left that is
very skeptical and wary of the influence of foreign corporations and their presence in the
Salvadoran economy. And while FDI has been increasing slowly, particularly because
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of privatization efforts initiated by the Salvadoran government, the threat of political
instability and rising problems with gangs and crime continue to inhibit investment. In
addition, competition from other nations both within and outside the region makes it
more difficult for this small nation to make itself noticed.
Nicaragua’s FDI policies were very affected by domestic political factors and its
civil war. The Somozas treated the Nicaraguan economy as their personal business,
and limited foreign investment inasmuch as they could profit from it. The Sandinista
takeover brought in a government that had a Marxist and nationalist view of the
economy, but which had also inherited the economic mess left by the Somozas. These
hard facts first encouraged the Sandinistas to look to the Soviet Union, and when the
Soviets were unable to provide much in the way of economic aid and investment, to try
to develop any way possible. Therefore, Nicaragua began to open to 100 percent
foreign equity ownership during its civil war. These policies were a product of a
government trying to balance a need for development with wariness toward foreign
influence, and all in the face of a hostile guerilla movement funded by one of the most
powerful nations in the international arena. However, these policies had little initial
effect on FDI, and Nicaragua only saw increases after the Sandinistas were ousted from
political power and its successors brought even more openness to the economy. By
that time, Nicaragua had lost its strategic value because of the end of the Cold War, and
like El Salvador, it must now compete for FDI. With foreign investment rising,
Nicaragua must convince investors that its democracy is stable and that it can control
corruption.
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The International Arena and FDI
The domestic political arena was not a solitary influence on FDI policies and
inflows in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Each country has a place in the international
environment. The relationships that each has forged, the institutions that they have
joined, and other aspects of the international arena also have an influence on the
development of FDI policies and the willingness of firms to consider El Salvador and
Nicaragua for investment. In particular, the relationship each country has had with their
closest superpower neighbor, the United States, has made a large difference in how
each country has created its policies. For the decade of the 1980s, each country’s
relationship with the United States was profoundly different, and their policies were as
much a reflection of that relationship as they were a product of the political realities
within each country.
The first factor to be considered is the effects of international institutions on FDI
policies and FDI inflows, examining El Salvador’s and Nicaragua’s relationship to five
international institutions with FDI as a focus. These institutions are the International
Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency, the World Trade
Organization, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and
the World Intellectual Property Organization. Another factor for these two countries is
their proximity and relationship to the United States.
El Salvador has experience with both. While not contiguous with the United
States or its economic zones, El Salvador endures political and economic pressure from
its neighbor to the north. Since around 1900, the United States has exerted profound
political and economic influence in Central America, including El Salvador, directly and

226

indirectly affecting its development. The United States has been a source of foreign
and military aid, the latter coming especially during El Salvador’s civil war and during
the civil war in neighboring Nicaragua. Edwin G. Corr, former chief of mission to El
Salvador, lists a number of reasons the United States was concerned about the civil war
in El Salvador, including that Nicaragua’s Sandinista government was backed and
financed by the USSR and Cuba, and that the El Salvadoran FMLN was trained and
financed by Cuba and supported by the USSR and Nicaragua. He argues that one of
the reasons El Salvador’s conflict became, in the words of an FMLN participant, “the
first revolution in Latin America won through negotiation,” is because the United States
supported a moderate government in El Salvador, supported efforts to consolidate
democracy in the country, worked to end human rights abuses, and foster the country’s
economic growth (Corr 1995). He glosses over the very high amounts of United States
military aid to El Salvador to defeat the FMLN guerrillas. This military aid grew from $10
million in 1980 to $283 million in 1984, and total United States military and development
aid to El Salvador between 1980 and 1988 totaled $3.9 billion (Pearce 1998). While
many left-of-center commentators would dispute Corr’s version of the United States’
efforts, he highlights the important role the United States played during the civil conflict
and in El Salvador’s development strategies. Indeed, some El Salvadoran nationals I
spoke with informally in the country are convinced that if the Salvadoran people elect a
government headed by the FMLN, the United States will invade, or at least use the CIA
to overthrow it, given the United States’ close ties with the right-wing ARENA
government. Suspicions of the United States and its ability to influence events in El
Salvador obviously still run high.
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The United States has had an important role in the El Salvadoran economy
through its Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which grants preferential, duty free entry to
products manufactured in El Salvador and other regional countries. The Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) has replaced CBI with tariff-slashing across
the board. CAFTA has caused much debate in both El Salvador and in the United
States. In a talk with a delegation of students in San Salvador in May of 2007, César
Villalona, a left-leaning Salvadoran economist, said that CAFTA promised four things:
more El Salvadoran exports to the United States, facility for greater foreign investment
in El Salvador, more jobs in El Salvador, and lower prices. He rated the first year of the
agreement in terms of those four promises. In 2006, he said, exports to the United
States from El Salvador went down 2.5 percent because of diminished exports from the
maquiladora sector and greater competition from China. Coffee, sugar and ethylalcohol exports went up slightly, but imports from the United States increased by five
percent, thus increasing the trade deficit with the United States. Foreign investment
went down sixty percent from 2005-2006, from $517 million dollars to $204 million
dollars, though U.S. investment in El Salvador rose by $10 million dollars in 2006. To
compare, he said Costa Rica, which has signed but not implemented the agreement,
gained $1.6 billion in foreign investment. Villalona said that prices increased in El
Salvador after CAFTA was signed, and unemployment increased also. 40
People I interviewed on the left say that CAFTA has damaged El Salvador’s
ability to compete as it must against larger countries in the region such as Mexico and
the United States, and has even hampered El Salvador’s ability to compete out of its
40
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region against countries like China. 41 One self-described centrist said that El Salvador
needs integration with other Central American economies, but not through CAFTA. 42
Interviewees on the right did not specifically mention CAFTA, but pointed out how much
El Salvador has opened its markets and focused on free trade and how these measures
would help El Salvador’s economy overall. 43
Various international institutions also exert a fair amount of influence over El
Salvador’s fortunes. Pearce (1998) identifies a number of ways in which, post civilconflict, the international community uses its authority to sway El Salvadoran policy.
The United Nations was instrumental in monitoring the peace accords and helping
parties move through hurdles and roadblocks. The World Bank and other economic
institutions have supported Salvadoran policies toward economic adjustment,
stabilization and growth. The World Bank has considered and funded 48 projects in El
Salvador since 1949, of which six projects are currently active. Those projects include a
land-tenure administration project, an environmental management program to increase
sustainable conservation and use of El Salvador’s ecosystems and forests, a judicial
modernization project, an earthquake emergency reconstruction project, a project for
biodiversity in coffee growing areas, and a technical assistance project for public sector
modernization. 44 However, World Bank structural adjustment programs may have hurt
El Salvador’s post-war economy (Paris 1997). In particular, they limited El Salvador’s
public expenditures, which constrained its ability to fund its peacebuilding programs,
compromised the government’s social services, and may have even lead to a recession.
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Whether the World Bank helped or hindered El Salvador’s economy, its ability to
influence policy is clear.
Private sector enterprises in El Salvador can receive investment from the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), a program of the World Bank. El Salvador has
been a member of this organization since 1956. The IFC’s stated goals are to promote
sustainable private sector development, address constraints to private sector
investment in infrastructure and social services like health and education, and
developing financial markets. Since 1995, the IFC has invested in sixteen projects in El
Salvador, including a $30 million revolving credit account for Taca Airlines to make predelivery payments on new Airbus A-320 airplanes, a $25 million corporate loan for the
establishment of a new MetroCentro shopping mall in San Salvador, and two loans of
$45 million and $65 million to help fund an AES (a U.S. energy company’s) project to
upgrade rural electric distribution networks. One attractive aspect of the IFC’s funding
is that it does not demand any repayment guarantee from the government. However, it
too exerts an influential position on government policies and investment inflows. Not
only does its financing help establish the validity of investment projects, but it also offers
a range of advisory services that include prescriptions for simplifying business
regulatory structures.
El Salvador became a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) in 1991, which helps guarantee foreign investment projects from political risk. In
2006, MIGA provided $1.8 million in guarantee coverage for a project by a Canadian
biothermal company, Biothermica Energy, Inc., which looks to capture methane gas at a
municipal waste dump in San Salvador, and a $3.15 million guarantee to a Costa Rican
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company, Corporación Interfin S.A., which looks to expand its leasing portfolio in El
Salvador. These guarantees provide the companies with insurance against risk, such
as transfer restrictions, expropriation, and war or civil unrest. Other coverage was
provided in 1996 to Citibank and in 1992 to AVX Corporation. MIGA also provided El
Salvador with technical assistance from 2000-2005 to develop and restructure the
PROESA investment promotion agency.
There appears to be a two-way relationship between MIGA and its member
countries. For example, in El Salvador, MIGA’s coverage and technical assistance are
a result of FDI policies that meet MIGA’s approval that have been passed by El
Salvador’s government. Yet, MIGA assists El Salvador, in terms of the PROESA, for
example, in implementing its policies and even redefining them. In addition, MIGA
influences policy by holding countries accountable to minimum standards by
investigating and sanctioning countries that engage in corrupt or fraudulent practices
when dealing with foreign investors. Such a membership has another effect. It makes
foreign investors more confident in El Salvador, and more likely to invest there.
Since 1984, El Salvador has belonged to the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which was established by the Convention
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States. The ICSID serves as an aid to member states when they or their members
have an investment dispute with foreign investors by offering a location and resources
for arbitration. The arbitration is judged by representatives of other member states, who
are not party to the dispute. While the member states are not required to use the
ICSID, once the case is submitted to the ICSID the member states must see the
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arbitration through and abide by the decision that is rendered. How does this relate to
FDI policy and FDI inflows? Individual country policy must allow for the dispute
mechanism to be used. In the case of ICSID, this dispute mechanism is initially
voluntary. To date, El Salvador has concluded one case in 2004 using the ICSID,
Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador. In that case, an award was
rendered to the company. El Salvador currently has no pending cases with the ICSID. 45
This form of dispute arbitration is increasingly being written into regional and
bilateral trade and investment agreements. The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), for example, removes investor-state disputes from national courts and
resolves them by arbitration. Similarly, the newly signed Dominican Republic-Central
American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) does the same. In fact, in 2007
Guatemala was sued by the Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) for “an indirect
expropriation of [RDC’s] assets and direct interference with its contractual rights.” 46
This action was believed to be the first to invoke Chapter 10 of the CAFTA investorstate dispute resolution process, and it takes the Guatemalan courts out of the
resolution of the dispute. For investors, the dispute arbitration process gives assurance
that the decision will not be decided in national courts, where nationalist tendencies may
hold sway. Rather, an impartial international panel will make a decision, and these
decisions will have the force of law in many countries because, as in the case of El
Salvador, international treaties supersede domestic law. 47 However, national courts are
often the only way for local groups affected by these disputes to be heard. International
45
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arbitrators often do not hear the concerns of these groups and therefore those concerns
are not included in the decisions of the panels. Regardless, those countries that allow
international panels to act as the law, at the expense of their own sovereignty, have
enhanced reputations in the eyes of foreign investors as being friendly to business.
El Salvador has been a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, since 1979. Intellectual property is
defined by WIPO as creations of the mind, and these creations are classified into two
categories: industrial property, which includes inventions, trademarks, designs, and
geographic indications of source; and copyright, which includes literary and artistic
works and architectural design. WIPO exists “with a mandate from its Member States to
promote the protection of IP throughout the world through cooperation among states
and in collaboration with other international organizations.” 48 WIPO has five core goals,
among which are: to promote an intellectual property (IP) culture; to integrate IP into
national development policies and plans; and to develop international IP laws and
standards. This organization, therefore, not only has a mandate to promote and
encourage policies within member countries but also brings the force of the international
community and its opinions and mores to bear. In addition, developing countries that
sign regional agreements, especially with developed countries, may need to accede to
intellectual property requirements. The CAFTA agreement requires its member states
to enforce intellectual property agreements agreed upon in previous international
agreements, including WIPO. 49 Countries like El Salvador take these agreements
seriously in order to be seen as investor friendly. While I was in El Salvador in May of
48
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2007, El Salvador cracked down on pirated CDs and DVDs sold by small vending stalls
in its market area in downtown San Salvador, causing a riot that led to the arrests of a
number of individuals. President Antonio Saca later announced that the arrested rioters
would be tried under the anti-terrorism law. 50
In 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) was formed, building on its
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A number of
agreements addressing intellectual property were already in force, such as the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property dating from 1883, the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works dating from 1886, and the
World Intellectual Property Organization dating from 1979. The Uruguay negotiating
round that brought the WTO into being addressed areas that were inadequately covered
or not addressed by previous agreements. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPs, was part of the final agreements of the
Uruguay Round. El Salvador ratified the agreement in 1995.
The TRIPs agreement expects that governments will both have intellectual
property laws, and also enforce those laws. The agreement gave time limits to
governments that signed it allowing them a period of years in which to phase-in the
proper laws, and additional time for those countries that needed it to deal with specific
difficulties that might occur because of immediate deleterious effects of intellectual
property legislation. In this way, the WTO agreement influenced, and continues to
influence, policy in developing countries. Force of world opinion is important. Those
countries that take the necessary step to pass and implement legislation on intellectual
50

Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, 15 May 2007, “Actúe para poner alto al apoyo de EE.UU. a la represión
en El Salvador: http://www.cispes.org/index.php?option=com_content&task
=view&lang=es&id=201

234

property, and enforce those laws in a timely manner, are seen to be friendly to
investment. In a country like El Salvador, where the constitution mandates that
international agreements trump national legislation, the enforcement of legislation
guaranteeing intellectual property becomes a grave political issue, with the country
caught between maintaining its international obligations on one hand, and dealing with
economic conditions of poverty on the other, where vendors scratch out a living selling
pirated music, video and software.
The international environment has also been a daily concern in the fortunes of
Nicaragua, and has a long and complicated history. International influences take the
form of membership in international institutions and pressure from the United States.
These factors have exerted an influence on Nicaragua’s foreign direct investment, both
policies and inflows. Even more so than El Salvador, Nicaragua’s main international
pressure has come from one source, the United States. The United States has not
hesitated to use most means at its disposal to protect its economic interests in
Nicaragua throughout that country’s history. Its means have included armed invasion
and occupation, maintenance of puppet regimes and using those regimes to force
through laws contrary to Nicaragua’s interests, giving financial and political support to
successive oppressive dictatorships, using covert and overt actions to bring down
governments not to its liking, employing political and economic isolation, manipulating
international organizations in order to adversely influence aid and funding initiatives in
Nicaragua, and funding of Nicaraguan opposition political groups.
Nicaragua’s nascent independence in the early part of the 19th century was
clouded by both territorial and political disputes with its neighbors, and it banded
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together with the other new Central American nations to repel political and territorial
incursions by Mexico. Unlike El Salvador, Nicaragua’s status as the largest of the
Central American states, its position straddling the isthmus from both the Caribbean to
the Pacific, and geographical features favoring easy transit between them made it very
important in the eyes of first British, and then United States business interests in
building a canal. The United States and Britain almost came to armed conflict over
Nicaragua, in the 19th century, and capitalists from both countries competed for
business in the area.
The intervention of the United States in Nicaraguan affairs and the installation of
the Somoza family to preserve Nicaragua’s relationship with the United States and
protect U.S. interests were documented earlier in the chapter. However, by the 1970s,
it became clear that the Somoza regimes excesses were leading to popular unrest and
the United States recognized the danger that communist ideas could gain popular
currency. After 1976, during the last years of the Somoza regime, the United States
under the Carter administration walked a balancing act with Nicaragua, trying to ease
Somoza out of power and replace him with a group of moderate anti-Somoza business
leaders. The United States hoped that with this new regime, the suddenly strong leftist
forces would be kept out of power and the United States would maintain its close
economic and political ties. The rise to power of the Sandinistas destroyed that hope
for the United States, and from 1980 through 1990 under the Reagan and Bush
administrations, it embarked on a ten-year campaign to undermine the Sandinista
regime by funding the Contra rebels and cutting back trade and commerce. The efforts
to support the Contra rebels were ineffective in ending Sandinista rule, but U.S.
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economic measures had greater effects, exacerbating problems in an already shaky
Nicaraguan economy. Largely on the basis of the ordinary Nicaraguan’s economic
woes, the Sandinistas lost the 1990 elections, aided by U.S. funding to anti-Sandinista
political forces.
The subsequent years have seen Nicaragua lose much of the strategic
importance that it had during the Cold War. International institutions began to exert
their pressures on the Nicaraguan government. The IMF, for example, continued to
withhold aid to Nicaragua until the government promised to cut taxes or curtail
government spending (Fidler and Scanlan 1993). The United States, in the meanwhile,
began targeting the region, rather than individual countries, as partners in a regional
trading bloc. In 2005 it hammered out the CAFTA between five Central American
nations and the Dominican Republic. The deal was inked amid promises that the
market for Central American exports in the United States would rise. However, there
may be a number of ways in which the deal benefits the United States at the expense of
countries such as Nicaragua. First, Central American farmers will be competing against
heavily subsidized U.S. farmers. Second, development based on the CAFTA model will
depend on extremely low wages and a lack of enforcement of environmental standards.
Third, governments will have their authority to ensure basic services undermined by
aspects of the agreement. Finally, provisions in the treaty will make it difficult for
countries to escape their debt burdens and recover from financial crises by limiting their
ability to favor domestic creditors at the expense of foreign creditors. This means that
Nicaragua may need to make hard choices between paying wages and salaries, forgo
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using preferential terms to domestic creditors to aid recovery, and may face damaging
“investor-state” lawsuits should they try.
Nicaragua has relationships and memberships with international institutions
related to trade and investment. Nicaragua has been a member of the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) since 1955, the World Intellectual Property Organization
since 1985, the Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency (MIGA) since 1992, the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the World
Trade Organization since 1995.
The International Finance Corporation is a world body that attempts to promote
and address issues pertaining to private sector development in member countries
without demanding repayment guarantees from member governments, and offer
prescriptions for easing government regulatory structures. Since 1998, the IFC has
invested in seven projects in Nicaragua, and there are proposed investments in three
more. 51 The projects involving foreign investment include loans to a German company
that set up micro-financing opportunities for small entrepreneurs, and a proposed loan
to a Guatemalan company, Pantaleon Sugar Holdings, the largest sugar producer in
Central America, that wishes to expand and upgrade its Nicaraguan subsidiary. Unlike
El Salvador, however, most of the IFC projects involve local business enterprises,
possibly indicating the persistent lack of foreign investment in Nicaragua.
Nicaragua also has made use of its membership in the MIGA. MIGA insurance
coverage is an indicator that Nicaragua’s FDI policies meet world standards of
openness and that there is less risk of those factors that would harm investment, such
as civil strife or government expropriation. The relative lateness of foreign investments
51
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covered by MIGA in Nicaragua as compared to El Salvador may attest to the country’s
difficulties in satisfying MIGA in regards to its FDI policies, but since 2000 it seems that
MIGA has been inclined to provide coverage for some foreign investments. 52 MIGA
covered its first foreign investment project in Nicaragua in 2000, an investment by a
Cayman Islands company in a government-owned geothermal plant, Ormat
Momotombo Power Company, for the rights to expand and manage the plant for 15
years. A year later, MIGA guaranteed a $63.3 million loan by an Israeli bank to the
same plant.
In 2002, MIGA guaranteed a Spanish company’s investment in a Nicaraguan
electrical distribution plant as part of the Nicaraguan government’s privatization efforts.
The Spanish company’s investment gave it distribution rights to the western half of
Nicaragua. In 2003, MIGA guaranteed a Costa Rican company’s investment in and
loan to a Nicaraguan company specializing in leasing of industrial, agriculture,
transportation, and construction equipment. In 2006, MIGA issued additional
guarantees for this investment.
In the case of investor-country disputes, Nicaragua has made use of its
membership in the ICSID. To the present, Nicaragua has concluded one case in 2006
with the ICSID, Shell Brands International AG and Shell Nicaragua S.A. v. Republic of
Nicaragua over trademarks, which was discontinued and evidently settled before the
arbitration hearing could end. 53 Nicaragua has no pending cases with the ICSID. Like
El Salvador, Nicaragua is also a party to the DR-CAFTA agreement signed with the
United States, and therefore investor-state disputes within the context of that agreement
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will be submitted to arbitration, pleasing investors but removing cases from Nicaragua’s
national courts and entailing a net loss of sovereignty for Nicaragua over a portion of its
economic fortunes.
Nicaragua’s membership in WIPO indicates the government’s willingness to
protect intellectual property in conforming to the core goals of the organization. Thus,
Nicaragua has some international pressure on this issue. The signing of DR-CAFTA
further puts pressure on Nicaragua, according to a press release by the U.S. State
Department (Africa News 2006). The press release states that the United States will
provide funding to the DR-CAFTA signatories to help them enforce their intellectual
property laws. Intellectual property rights are often brought up in the context of artspecific issues, such as pirated DVDs and CDs, but they can come up in a variety of
situations. The aforementioned dispute resolved by the ICSID, Shell Brands
International AG and Shell Nicaragua S.A. v. Republic of Nicaragua, grew out of a
Nicaraguan court settlement against Shell Oil Company and other defendants such as
Dow Chemical and Dole Foods in favor of farmers harmed by an agricultural chemical
called DBCP. The government later tried to embargo Shell’s products, leading Shell to
file suit against the government under the Netherlands-Nicaragua investment protection
treaty for expropriation of its trademarks. As stated before, the case was brought before
the ICSID but was settled before the arbitration was complete (Pensions Management
2007). Even more recently, Nicaraguan entities have been named in four international
cases involving internet domain names, showing the whole new area of intellectual
property that is on the horizon for developing countries.
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Further adherence to intellectual property concerns comes in the form of
Nicaragua’s membership in the WTO, and its TRIPs agreement, which guarantees a
level of transparency of individual country laws on intellectual property rights. Under the
agreement, the WTO “requires Members to notify the laws and regulations made
effective pertaining to the subject-matter of the Agreement (the availability, scope,
acquisition, enforcement and prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights).” 54
In addition, in 2001 Nicaragua submitted answers to a questionnaire given out by the
WTO on its legal framework for the enforcement of intellectual property rights within the
country. Nicaragua’s good faith adherence to the goals and the requirements of the
WTO, along with a stated willingness to enforce its intellectual property laws, gives it
credibility as a country that is friendly to foreign investment.
International level factors have influenced the foreign direct investment policies of
each country, and the ability of each to draw foreign investment inflows. The presence
of international institutions and powerful neighbors like the United States have meant
that El Salvador and Nicaragua have been steadily pushed toward maintaining open
trade and investment relations with the outside world. In particular, the United States
has lavished much attention on both countries. This attention has been mostly to
defend U.S. economic and international interests. In the 1980s, during each country’s
civil war, the United States played very different roles. In El Salvador, lavish foreign
economic and military aid was meant to maintain the military government as a bulwark
against further leftist gains in Central America. That aid allowed El Salvador to ignore
issues of development and to concentrate its resources toward defeating the guerilla
movement. This meant that little action was taken toward FDI because El Salvador did
54
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not depend on it because of a heavy flow of foreign aid. Policy remained unchanged,
and inflows of FDI stagnated. The conclusion of the civil war and the integration of the
leftist groups into the political process put the spotlight back on development, and the
government began to refine and open its policies in order to satisfy international
commitments. It also considered other ways of bringing in foreign investment, such as
privatization. El Salvador additionally signed the CAFTA agreement, opening trade and
investment between the United States and the countries of Central America, despite the
opposition of many on the left.
In Nicaragua, the fall of Somoza and the takeover of government by the
Sandinistas left the United States in an adversarial role. It funded the opposition
Contras in their civil war against the government, and at the same time tried to
discourage U.S. and Western companies from doing business there. Combined with
the Nicaraguan government’s Marxist orientation and attempts to undo the legacy of the
Somozas, foreign direct investment policy did not change, and investment declined to
zero. Only after the Sandinista government realized that it could not completely divorce
itself from the world economy and that it had few resources of its own to invest in
economic development while fighting the Contras did it begin policy steps to make itself
attractive to foreign investment.
Each country’s relationship with international institutions concerned with trade
and investment has also exerted influence on their FDI policies and inflows. As
members of these institutions, both El Salvador and Nicaragua agree to abide by the
rules and norms of the organizations that they belong to. In general, these
organizations are oriented toward greater openness to global trade and investment.
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Military governments in El Salvador, and later the right-wing ARENA party, have
generally been open to these agreements and institutions, and have therefore enjoyed a
status as a country friendly to foreign investment. Nicaragua has had a more
complicated relationship with these institutions largely because of the Sandinista
government, but the Sandinistas learned early that the agreements signed by the
Somoza regime could not be ignored lest they shred every bit of Nicaragua’s credibility
on the world stage. The post-Sandinista era has seen the government further open its
economy to the world market, particularly through the signing of DR-CAFTA. As both
countries begin the 21st century, pressures on them to maintain open policies toward
trade and investment will likely continue.

The Domestic Economy and FDI
Domestic and international politics are not enough to explain the development of
FDI policies and the rate of FDI inflows in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The domestic
economy also has influence over both policies and inflows. In the case of policies,
economic realities define the scope of the need for development. In this there have
been some similarities and differences between the countries. Both countries have high
foreign debt and stagnant domestic savings, and both have relied heavily on foreign aid.
In El Salvador, the spotlight has been on the extreme disparities of wealth
between classes in society. These disparities have created social conflict, and have
contributed to the growth of crime and gangs, which has the tendency to depress FDI.
The government tends looks at foreign direct investment as necessary for development,
and also as wealth generation for the upper class, and therefore passes FDI policies
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that fit its goals. In Nicaragua, disparities of wealth exist but the country has historically
had a smaller economy than El Salvador and a smaller upper class. Until the rule of the
Sandinistas, wealth tended to be concentrated in the hands of the Somoza family and
its allies, and was redistributed after his fall from power. Still, many problems remain for
Nicaragua. Poverty, rising crime, and lack of investor confidence continue to plague
Nicaragua’s development.
El Salvador began its official existence as a colony of Spain. Its early story was
one of a struggle between criollos, the children of Spaniards and members of the
indigenous populations of the area, and ladinos, pure-blood Spaniards, to control the
decision making process under the Spanish crown. As the Spanish crown became
weaker, many Central American colonies, notably Mexico and Guatemala, became
independent. Both Mexico and Guatemala wanted El Salvador to join them, but El
Salvador rebuffed them in favor of a proposal of a united Central American federation.
While the dream of a federation also did not materialize, El Salvador remained one of
the idea’s most fervent supporters in the subsequent decades.
El Salvador’s initial economy, developed during colonial times, was based on the
cultivation of indigo for dyes in weaving. The introduction of synthetic dyes killed this
industry in the first half of the 19th century. In 1840, coffee was introduced as a
cultivable crop. It thrived especially on the high slopes of El Salvador’s volcanic
landscape, and led to a new structure of power as individuals and families began to
convert their newfound wealth into economic and political power. Coffee has continued
to be El Salvador’s most important export to the present day, even as other cultivable
crops were introduced over the subsequent decades. Presently, cotton, sugar, prawns,
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and cattle all occupy important places in El Salvador’s economy, but still lag behind
coffee as El Salvador’s primary product.
El Salvador has for most of its political history been a fervid supporter of free
trade. After political battles between groups with a liberal, pro-free trade outlook and a
conservative, economic nationalism focus, the liberal position won out in 1871. El
Salvador traded on its comparative advantage in agriculture, and adhered to little
government intervention in the economy, effectively ceding control of the market to the
owners of capital. The government kept tariffs low to ensure a market for British- and,
after 1900, U.S.- manufactured goods which, unfortunately, displaced locally made
goods. El Salvador also took a large amount of foreign loans toward projects such as
an unrealized canal and railroads which established the first of its foreign debts.
However, an abundant supply of labor exceeded demand, and land consolidation by
coffee barons and ranchers left many people landless or with too little land to allow
them to subsist. Any form of organization was not permitted, and often brutally
suppressed, such as the massacre by the military of the lower classes in the 1932
uprising to protest the removal of the democratically elected Araujo from the presidency.
During the 1970s and 1980s, immediately before and during the civil war, the
government, cognizant that economic disparity and landlessness was a political
problem that needed to be resolved, undertook modest efforts at land reform. Some
land was redistributed, but for the most part, the lands of the wealthy were left
untouched. These actions were only enough to delay the civil war, and when it started,
did little to change anything.
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In the late 1990s, El Salvador dollarized its economy, which instantly raised
prices for many ordinary consumers through a process of “rounding up,” making it
difficult for a large segment of the population that already had enough trouble making
ends meet. Indeed, Towers and Borzutzky (2004) write that dollarization was
undertaken so that certain benefits, fiscal discipline, a decline in interest rates, better
terms of trade and increased development through foreign investment would follow.
However, they argue the decision was actually a product of the political polarization now
enshrined in Salvadoran institutions. The government’s unstated reasons for
dollarization were to serve the Salvadoran financial community, particularly supporters
of the ruling party, and the result has been little effect on development and an
exacerbation of inequality in a country that already ranks sixth highest in the world on
indicators of inequality. Indeed, the economic situation for most people has changed
little since the first stirrings of unrest in the 1970s.
As can be ascertained by its history, El Salvador has largely depended on a
monoculture crop for export. This reliance on one crop, first indigo and then coffee,
meant that most arable land was given over to production of the crop and that El
Salvador needed to import most of its basic necessities including foodstuffs. Because
of the expense of imports, the poorer segments of society, mostly landless or living on
subsistence plots, often could not afford them. Today, this situation has hardly
changed. El Salvador still imports most of its food and necessities, which hurts majority
of the population that is poor.
Today, in many ways El Salvador outwardly looks like a modern state. After
three decades of rule by the rightist ARENA party, modern shopping malls have sprung
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up in the major cities and El Salvador is connected with the rest of the world through
finance, high-technology and media. Yet, there are still vast areas that are
underdeveloped and undeveloped. The control of politics still largely rests with those
allied with the most economically well-off in the country. Many people live on very little,
especially in the rural areas. Landlessness is an endemic problem. Large amounts of
the population suffer extreme poverty, which has given rise to exploitation of rural labor,
particularly in the maquiladora sector, and has contributed to an exploding crime
problem. Gangs run rampant in San Salvador and other larger cities, and the U.S.
State Department reports that El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the
world. 55
Yet, El Salvador’s government looks to FDI as a source of development.
Underlying the problems with poverty and relating directly to foreign direct investment
are El Salvador’s precarious positions on macroeconomic issues, such as sub-par
investment levels, a low savings rate, rising external debt and an increasing trade deficit
blunted by large amounts of foreign aid, especially in the 1980s. Even today, El
Salvador receives almost $500 million from the State Department under its Millennium
Challenge Account program, which aims to help alleviate poverty by choosing to aid
countries that score well on key indicators, including political freedoms and rights. 56
More recently remittances from Salvadorans living abroad have contributed almost 20%
of the country’s GDP, aided by the country’s adoption of dollarization which makes
currency conversion unnecessary (Luxner 2007). The country’s savings rates from
1980 onward have plummeted, its foreign debt has risen, and its trade balance has
55
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been negative for the past 30 years. El Salvador has had a long history with FDI, but
historically has not received large amounts of FDI. From 1976 to 2004, El Salvador
averaged only about one-tenth of the mean FDI of sample countries collected for this
study, and if China is excluded, it still only averaged about one-seventh of the mean FDI
inflows for the rest of the countries.
. In particular, foreign debt from outstanding loans is a very significant and
difficult situation for developing countries. For El Salvador, foreign debt has not been a
crippling problem as it has for its neighbors, but it still has had important ramifications
for the country and for its ability to implement economic policies. El Salvador’s first
experience with foreign debt was with British lenders in the 18th century and the
beginning of the 19th century, who made credit available to large coffee growers. The
experience soured the country on foreign lending, but all of the loans by British lenders
were paid off over time. Always an agrarian-based economy concentrating on one
principle crop throughout its history, El Salvador began to try to diversify in the 1940s,
embarking on an economic and modernization and industrialization program. The
economy of El Salvador grew very rapidly in the 1960s, though the benefits of the
growth, like in many Latin American countries, were unevenly distributed across the
economic spectrum of the country (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 98).
However, the slowdown in most of the economies of Central America that began
in the 1970s with the oil crisis and the failure of the ISI policies of the Central American
Common Market led to an important development in regards to El Salvador’s external
debt. Rising oil prices in the 1970s, plus the failure of the Central American Common
Market and import substitution policies led to increased foreign debt across Central
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America. From 1980 to 1990, external debt almost doubled in the Central American
region to $25 billion, and 30 to 40 percent of export income was used to service the
debt in the region (Barry 1991, 15). El Salvador also saw a rise in its external debt,
from 15.9 percent in 1976 to 46.7 percent in 2004, and had to enter into structural
adjustment programs (SAPs) as a condition of re-servicing its debts and maintaining its
access to credit with international lending institutions. These SAPs mandated
government austerity programs. The government cut many public services such as
education and health care as well as putting new taxes in place. Unfortunately, many of
these taxes put more pressure on ordinary consumers. Taxes on the wealthier
segments of society often go unenforced despite government promises to rectify the
situation. The structural adjustment programs, in the words of one author, put the IMF
in the position of supervising economic policy in El Salvador (Murray 1991, 83),
including maintaining open policies toward foreign investment.
Foreign aid has also been a large component of El Salvador’s economy. U.S.
aid has been a staple of the Central American economic puzzle since Kennedy’s
Alliance for Progress programs were established during the 1960s to help maintain
stability in Latin America and thwart Soviet ambitions, Especially from 1979 through
1992, and most specifically during the latter years of the civil war, U.S. economic and
military aid poured into El Salvador. United States policy was geared around concerns
that El Salvador would go the way of neighboring Nicaragua if it fell into the FMLN
hands. U.S. aid ensured that the El Salvadoran government would not fall, and that it
would be able to continue the war and, hopefully for the United States, defeat the
guerillas. However, the end of the Cold War in 1989-90 and the defeat of the
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Sandinistas in Nicaraguan elections meant that the El Salvador lost its importance in
U.S. foreign policy. The United States, along with the rest of the world, pushed for a
negotiated solution.
The importance of foreign aid to El Salvador during the civil war is evident in the
statistics of the period. From the period of 1980 to 1990, El Salvador averaged almost
99 dollars per person per year in foreign aid, most of that from the United States. 57 This
aid represented a jump from 1.3 percent of gross national income (GNI) in 1976 to a
high of 11 percent of GNI in 1987. Currently, foreign aid has fallen to pre-civil war
levels.
El Salvador’s foreign aid during the 1980s served as a replacement for the lack
of investment that occurred during the civil war. However, whether El Salvador’s
government responded to this influx of foreign aid by keeping FDI policies closed is
difficult to know. Most likely the government was more interested in fighting the civil war
and later bringing it to a conclusion than putting a lot of energy into FDI policies. This
use of foreign aid does not necessarily fit with the idea of foreign aid as an alternative to
FDI, even though the result is the same. If foreign aid was put toward building up
domestic entrepreneurship and business, then it would be an alternative to foreign
investment. However, if foreign aid was only used to fund the efforts of the government
to defeat the FMLN, it does not qualify. What is clear is that during the civil war, FDI
policies were not touched. They remained the same somewhat restrictive policies that
were in place before the war began. Only after the war was over and El Salvador’s
right-wing governments began putting neoliberal economic policies in place did FDI
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policies become more open. Even so, FDI inflows took some time to respond to the new
policies, perhaps because of firm wariness about the stability of the country.
Another alternative to foreign investment, domestic savings, has not been much
of an answer for El Salvador. On first glance, one would think that low domestic
savings is the problem. El Salvador’s domestic savings rate has declined in the past
thirty years, from a high of 24 percent of GDP in 1977 to a low of -1.36 percent in 2004.
Why the low savings rate? Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2006), note that the results
of Washington Consensus programs of development are highly varied. The
Washington Consensus was a particular set of prescriptions advocated by neoliberal
economists during the 1990s. They called for governments to scale back their activities
in the market place, promote free market and free-trade policies, and reduce social
welfare programs. The Dominican Republic, for example, has had dynamic growth
since implementing those programs, while Brazil and El Salvador have not. In
examining why El Salvador has not achieved sufficient growth levels, Hausmann et al.
argue that El Salvador does not necessarily have a savings problem. In fact,
remittances provide a possibility for greater savings, but remittances may spur higher
consumption rather than savings (IMF 2005). They believe that El Salvador’s problem
is a lack of productive investment, which makes it a low return country.
The issue of remittances is a potential variable that surface in many
conversations about the economies of Central America. Remittances are wages earned
in one country by migrants and then sent back to relatives in their home country.
Remittances can serve as a development alternative to FDI if they are channeled into
productive investments in the home country. As of 2002, 873,000 Salvadorans lived
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legally in the United States, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, though the number
may be closer to 2.5 million when illegal immigration is taken into account. According to
the U.S. State Department, in 2005 remittances from legal and illegal Salvadorans in
the United States were sent to 22.3 percent of Salvadoran families, and they totaled
$2.8 billion dollars. 58 Total remittances constituted 17 percent of El Salvador’s GDP in
2005. 59 Remittances have become the top income generator for the country.
According to some observers, remittances help make up for the country’s large
trade deficit, and may allow the country to afford more imports.60 However, others do
not see remittances as the answer to the country’s woes, and argue they do not totally
make up for the country’s trade deficit. 61 Indeed, Salvadoran migration splits up
families, with men often leaving their wives and children to travel to the United States to
find work. Women make the arduous trip less often, preferring to stay in El Salvador
and seek work there. They usually move to the city to find work in the maquiladoras.
Salvadorans migrate mostly to make up for the lack of opportunities available in El
Salvador, especially the rural areas, but also to mitigate risk from economic shocks and
natural disasters (Halliday 2006). The amount of remittances usually depends on the
migrant’s job status, education, familial relationships, time spent in another country, and
whether there are other members of the migrant’s immediate family also abroad and
remitting funds home (Funkhouser 1995).
According to Popkin (2003), with 29 percent of the total Salvadoran population
living outside El Salvador, remittances supply hard currency to El Salvador and provide
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the largest source of foreign exchange to the country’s economy. El Salvador’s
government has ample reason to foster this alternative source of development, because
remittances also serve as a way to keep its population alive in the absence of adequate
social programs within the country. El Salvador’s government promotes remittances by
attempting to lobby its migrant population outside the country to help El Salvador’s
economy, encourages migrants to import goods from El Salvador, and urges migrants
to invest in private and government sector development projects in El Salvador. With
the debate of recent anti-immigration laws in Washington, DC, the Salvadoran
government has taken an active role in trying to lobby the U.S. government to allow
Salvadorans to stay in the country lest its access to this vital resource be reduced or dry
up completely.
Would a better trade balance help spur development in El Salvador? Imports
have risen, and El Salvador’s trade deficit with the rest of the world has grown to
consistently average between 15 and 17 percent of its gross domestic product between
2000 and 2004. 62 In particular, its trade deficit with its primary trading partner, the
United States, grew from $585 million in 1998 to $1.08 billion in 2006. 63 A greater
reliance on imports means fewer resources for home-grown development projects. The
World Bank, in a 1996 study, argued for El Salvador to institute more outward-oriented
export policies. Their concern was highlighted by the fact that though imports were not
rising at a large rate, the trade deficit was widening due to declining exports and
increasing remittances leading to consumption of imported goods. The cause of the
declining exports was attributed to lower exports of traditional goods such as coffee,
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cotton, sugar and shrimp. In addition, firms in El Salvador were purchasing a far greater
amount of their inputs from abroad than from home (49 percent to 12 percent) and that
they were not operating at full production capacity because of low demand. More
outward oriented export policies, the World Bank said, would consolidate the peace
process by sustaining current levels of economic growth, lead to more rapid economic
growth, and lead to a better quality of welfare for its population.
However, many of the economists and politicians I spoke with in El Salvador,
particularly those on the left of the political spectrum, were extremely concerned and
critical about the expanding trade deficit. Economist and politician Salvador Arias, for
example, argued that the trade imbalance was not useful at all for development and that
remittances were not enough to either attend the deficit or avert a crisis if there were no
changes. 64 Economist Cesar Villalona argued that the country’s insistence on exporting
its primary agricultural products takes farmland away from local food production, and
means that El Salvador must depend on food imports. He argued that CAFTA actually
increased imports from the United States by 5 percent and increased the trade deficit as
well. 65
Those on the right that I interviewed tended to downplay the trade imbalance.
For example, Alvaro Trigueros of FUSADES argued that the trade deficit is not a
problem because El Salvador does not have the manufacturing output to supply the
country’s demand for goods. In other words, he believes that given El Salvador’s
economy, a trade balance deficit is necessary. He argues that El Salvador’s economy
is the strongest in Central America in terms of macroeconomic stability. He also
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contends that financial stability and attractiveness to investors does not depend on the
trade balance: El Salvador is one of only three countries in Latin America rated by
Moody’s as Investment Grade. He points out that despite the fact that El Salvador’s
debt, largely obtained so that it can purchase the goods it needs from abroad, has
increased by $1 billion it has still decreased by only four percent of GDP. 66
Juan Carlos Rivas Najarro, with the Ministry of Economy, largely concurs. He
argues that most of the imports reflected in the trade deficit are due to imports of oil and
its derivatives, which rose in the first quarter of 2007. He presents statistics showing
that if oil and its derivatives are taken out of the trade deficit equation, the deficit
decreases from roughly $1.04 billion to $710 million from January to March 2007. In
addition, he argues there was a 4.3 percent rise in exports in the first quarter of 2007 as
compared to the first quarter of 2006, which rises to 12.2 percent if one compensates
for the five percent decrease in exports from the maquiladora sector. 67

Despite these

statistical sleights of hand, Navarro’s point largely mirrors Trigueros’: El Salvador must
import goods given its lack of means of production. One way to make up this deficit,
therefore, is to increase production and exports by aggressively courting foreign
investment.
Hausmann and Rodrik (2005) make an overall argument regarding El Salvador’s
potential for growth. They write that factors such as savings rates, taxation, property
rights and education cannot explain El Salvador’s low growth rate because El Salvador
performs pretty well in these categories. They note that growth is fueled by investment,
but investment in traditional sectors is lagging because of fierce competition from
66
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outside the country. Investment in new products is essential for El Salvador, and for its
economy to grow it must create an environment where investment, domestic and
foreign, is encouraged in non-traditional sectors that carry a high risk potential. If some
of those investments do not fail, they could position El Salvador for better growth and
development. Thus, they claim that El Salvador’s policies must not only encourage
openness, they must help remove some of the risk faced by domestic and international
investors when they invest in new products.
Like its neighbors, Nicaragua is a former Spanish colonial territory. Its
indigenous population was depleted by intermarriage with Spanish citizens and by
relocation carried out by the Spanish empire in order to supply labor for mines in Peru.
Unlike its neighbor El Salvador, it still has culturally distinct indigenous populations,
such as the Miskito, which have at various times during Nicaragua’s existence as a
state exerted their independence and autonomy.
Nicaragua’s economy has also largely been agriculturally based. Coffee became
the largest agricultural export in the country after it was introduced commercially in the
1840s, offering businessmen export opportunities as well as prospects for foreigners to
invest. Industrialization proceeded rapidly with the advent of the Somoza family dynasty
in the 1930s and especially in the 1960s and 1970s under the import-substitutionindustrialization focus of the Central American Common Market (CACM) and
encouraged by programs sponsored by the United States under the Alliance for
Progress and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Economic hardship ensued, urbanization increased and the supply of labor outstripped
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the available employment opportunities. By the end of the 1970s, ordinary Nicaraguans
had lost almost a third of their purchasing power.
Nicaragua’s experience with alternatives to FDI is characterized by low
investment levels, a currently low savings rate that has fallen into negative levels many
times in the past thirty years, very high external debt, reliance on foreign aid and
consistent trade deficits. Nicaragua’s foreign direct investment has since 1993
registered between 1.5 and 9 percent of GDP on an annual basis, but its GDP is the
lowest of all the Central American countries. Some of the economic shortcomings in the
country are made up by remittances from Nicaraguans working in the United States,
Costa Rica and El Salvador. According to Jennings and Clarke (2005), remittances
from the United States to Nicaragua are not as much as to El Salvador, and are dwarfed
by remittances from the United States to Mexico but the numbers stand out when one
considers that 24 percent of Nicaragua’s GDP is made up of remittances. That number
is greater than export earnings, equals foreign aid, and is five times higher than foreign
direct investment.
In 1979, after the Sandinista takeover, Nicaragua’s foreign debt was $1.6 billion
dollars which the Sandinistas realized that they would have to assume in order to
maintain the country’s credibility on the world markets (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006,
77). With the agricultural harvest lacking because of the civil war, Nicaragua was faced
with a rising need for imports, especially basic goods, and only foreign aid to pay for
them and service its foreign debt. This need to borrow abroad continued in the 1980s,
as the government continued to use loans from Western banks at high interest rates to
pay for basic goods. The government managed to continue to pay its foreign debt
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obligations, and was considered such a good credit risk that Swiss banks loaned money
to Nicaragua in 1980 (de Onis 1980). In 1982 Nicaragua even managed to secure a
$30 million short term loan from U.S. banks despite the U.S. government’s clear
attempts to isolate the country (Rowe, Jr. 1982). When the United States pressured
multilateral institutions to stop lending to Nicaragua, the government faced high inflation,
trade deficits and an inability to sustain its debt repayment schedule, becoming the first
country ever to fall six months behind on its World Bank debt repayment schedule
(Kristof 1985, Smith 1993, 244). Nicaragua ranks high on lists drawn up for countries
most likely to be granted debt forgiveness, and is included in the World Bank’s Highly
Indebted Poor Countries program which makes it eligible for forgiveness of up to 80
percent of its debt, but rampant corruption and political crises have limited these
possibilities (Campbell 2004). In this case, it appears that for Nicaragua, external debt
has served less as a development strategy and more of a survival strategy.
Foreign aid has been a large component of Nicaragua’s strategy to deal with its
economic shortcomings, and like external debt has been more of a survival strategy for
the country. During the 1980s under the Sandinistas, the strategy of the United States
was to cut off as much funding as possible to the Nicaraguan government in order to
pursue military solutions. However, according to Smith (1993, 283-84), the European
Community saw the problems of Nicaragua and the region as socio-economic problems
and saw economic support as the best way to help Nicaragua out of its difficulties and
to keep it from falling under Soviet influence. European aid came to Nicaragua despite
the fact that the European countries had deep misgivings about the direction that the
Sandinista government’s direction, and especially after Sandinista demonstrators
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disrupted Pope John Paul II’s Mass in Managua in 1983 (Kinzer 1983). Needless to
say, the Soviet Union and its allies provided aid as well. In 1987, Eastern bloc countries
provided some $392 million in credits, $37.5 million in donations and grants, and
600,000 tons of oil to Nicaragua (Kinzer 1987). The Soviet Union accounted for most of
that aid, though by 1987 they began cutting back on their aid, preferring to focus on
their own domestic economic stimulation and exercising caution during arms talks with
the Reagan administration. For post-Sandinista governments, foreign aid continued to
maintain a great importance. In a broadcast on January 19, 1993, Presidency Minister
Antonio Lacaya of Nicaragua singled out foreign aid as a major contributor to the wellbeing of Nicaraguans, stating:
“Out of every dollar imported into our economy [i.e. out of every dollar'sworth of goods imported into the economy], 60 cents comes from foreign
aid funds, grants and soft loans. We obtain approximately 60% of
everything we import - oil, medicine, food, non-perishable consumption
goods, raw materials, etc. - thanks to foreign aid. For those who naively
ask where the foreign aid goes, it is in the electricity that lights our houses,
the food we eat every day, the medicine for the sick, loans for production
and gasoline for cars. I must say clearly that this foreign aid has been well
spent. The international community has told us so. If Nicaraguans were
not using our foreign aid properly, we would not receive any more foreign
aid. (British Broadcasting System, Summary of World Broadcasts)
Lacaya goes on to say that the country cannot continue using foreign aid to finance
consumption, but must invest the aid in the creation of new jobs, production and
economic growth. Nicaragua can thank foreign aid from Europe for the modernization
of its telephone and power systems in the mid-1990s (Blume 1995). However, foreign
aid for development has taken a back seat to other, more pressing needs. According to
Millett (2007, 474), Nicaragua still depends on foreign assistance for such basic
programs as conducting elections.
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Domestic savings for Nicaragua, like many of its Central American neighbors,
has been difficult to maintain and therefore also not much of an alternative path to
development. One reason for the poor savings rate came during the Sandinista years,
when hyperinflation caused by the Nicaraguan government’s efforts to finance itself by
printing greater amounts of money cut into domestic savings of ordinary Nicaraguans
and caused wealthier residents to take their savings out of the country (The Economist,
1989). Some of those savings spirited away began to return in the 1990s after the
Sandinistas left power (Christian 1991). Regardless, domestic savings declined from
about $1.2 billion dollars in 1977, about 20 percent of the country’s GDP, to about $39
million dollars in 2004, or about 0.95 percent of GDP. The savings rate was negative
for nine of the years between 1977 and 2004.
The Nicaraguan government in the 1990s made a large push for foreign
investment, due to the lack of domestic savings to draw upon (Coone 1990). However,
Nicaragua’s ability to draw foreign investment was hampered by its large foreign debt
and its debt-servicing obligations (Germani 1991). Thus, domestic savings has not
served Nicaragua well as an alternative to foreign investment, nor even as a
complement to foreign investment. Both are lacking.
Nicaragua’s trade deficit also contributes to concerns about the country’s ability
to develop, and has not served as an alternative generator of investment capital. Since
1976, Nicaragua has not ended one year with a trade surplus. In some years, this could
not be helped. For example, Hurricane Mitch in 1998 devastated the country’s main
agricultural export crops. In the 1980s, the departure of capital coinciding with
Sandinista rule, along with slow production caused by the war, fueled the trade deficit.
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Large amounts of aid from Eastern bloc countries helped cover the trade deficit for
Nicaragua (Gasperini 1990). However, the ongoing large trade deficits underscore
Nicaragua’s need for productive capacity in order to boost its exports and to provide
some of its own basic goods.
As with El Salvador and other countries in Central America, remittances are a
huge issue in Nicaragua. Funkhouser (1995) estimated that in 1989 labor was the
second largest export in Nicaragua. Funkhouser finds that Nicaraguans behave
differently in their remittance patterns than do Salvadorans, perhaps due to emigration
out of political hostility or family detachment. In examining patterns of migrants from
four countries, Mexico, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, Sana and
Massey (2007) report that Nicaraguans are likely to make less trips to the United States,
but to stay longer. Nicaraguans also travel in heavy numbers to work in Costa Rica,
which is their number one destination. In 2000, remittances made up 14.4 percent of
Nicaragua’s GDP, and remittances to the Central American area as a whole were more
than the total of foreign aid and a third of foreign direct investment (Portes and Hoffman
2003). Sana and Massey report that in 2001, as much as $610 million came to
Nicaragua in the form of remittances, or $124 per capita. Up to 15 percent of
Nicaraguan households receive remittances. In 2002, remittances accounted for thirty
percent of Nicaragua’s GDP (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006). Remittances sent back
by migrants from Nicaragua and other countries far outweighs official aid and is
undiluted by bureaucratic and other obstacles, instead going directly to the poor (Clark
2007). Remittances are the largest source of foreign exchange for both El Salvador and
Nicaragua, and Nicaraguans tend to place more importance on remittances because of
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their higher skill levels than Mexico and other Central American sources of emigration
(Rosenblum 2004).
Remittances in Nicaragua help make up for shortcomings in the rest of
Nicaragua’s economy. However, in the case of Nicaragua, the growing dependence on
remittances, at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic level, seems to serve all
sections of society and government as yet another survival strategy rather than as an
avenue to development and as an alternative to FDI. Nicaragua’s fate has been to lurch
from corrupt dictatorship to civil war to neoliberal economic policies with structural
adjustment demands, with a sprinkling of natural disasters thrown in for good measure.
Along the way, it has become the poorest nation in Central America (Deutsche PresseAgentur 1997). The fact that Nicaragua continues to struggle with governments prone
toward corruption does not inspire the confidence of its own people, much less foreign
investors, and certainly does not bode well for its future.
What effect on foreign investment policies and FDI inflows have these economic
realities had on the two countries? For both El Salvador and Nicaragua, extreme
economic disparities between the wealthy and the rest of the population, lack of
productive investment opportunities for domestic and international investors, and
inadequate sources of development funds have put each country in a situation where
they must try to attract foreign investment to meet their goals. Throughout the past
three decades, FDI policies in both countries have reflected this need toward greater
openness toward investment. However, foreign investment capital at current levels
does not satisfy the need in both countries for development and social funding. In these
cases, the need far outweighs the returns.
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Nicaragua, El Salvador and Two-level Games
Nicaragua and El Salvador both can fit into the two-level games scenario. Recall
that the premise of two-level games was that two countries, to reach agreement over
something, must not only negotiate with each other, but must also negotiate within their
own domestic political environment with politically powerful groups that stand to be
affected by any agreement reached. Each country therefore brings a win-set to any
negotiation. Those countries where opposition to any agreement is strong at home will
have a smaller win-set, or range of agreements that they can accept, whereas those
countries that have less opposition at home have a larger win-set and therefore a larger
range of agreements.
If the scenario is relaxed to allow developing countries to come to agreement
with international firms over foreign direct investment, then we essentially have the
same situation. Developing countries bring their win-sets, their policies, to the table.
Opposition to foreign investment constitutes a smaller win-set, while openness to FDI
constitutes a larger win-set. The result of agreement between firms and developing
countries is reflected in the amount of foreign direct investment inflows.
Policies are therefore passed on the domestic level, and brought to the
negotiating table, at the transnational level. But policies themselves are influenced by
not only the politics of the domestic level, but domestic environmental realities and
factors from the international environment. They constitute the basis by which
developing countries reach agreement with firms. In turn, agreements between firm and
developing countries are indicated by FDI inflows. However, these inflows are not only
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affected by FDI policies, but by domestic politics, domestic economics and international
factors as well.
In the cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua, FDI policies have become more
open. Looking at domestic politics in both countries, some growth in FDI has occurred
with movement toward policies of greater equity openness. El Salvador’s current
political situation, with an investor-friendly right-wing government that is oriented toward
the international trade and investment system, should allow for an expanded range of
agreements that the government can accept with international firms. Some opposition
from the left side of the political spectrum, particularly the FMLN and its status as the
largest party in the Salvadoran Assembly, may limit the range of possible agreement
due to the FMLN’s ability to block some legislation if it can persuade the smaller party
allies of the government to remain neutral or vote against the government position, but
up to this point the government has been able to get much of what it wants. Thus
policies, and the government’s approach toward agreement with international firms on
FDI, are currently very open. Should the FMLN win the presidency in the 2009
elections, the government’s policies could become less open, limiting their range of
possible agreements with international firms if the FMLN looks to scale back the
government’s involvement with FDI. The impression of a country with a friendly
government and open policies also widens the win-sets of international firms, further
allowing for agreements on FDI.
Even so, El Salvador’s memberships in international institutions and its
relationship with the United States will have the potential to keep FDI policies open and
allow for more agreements with international firms, regardless of the government in
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power. Once international agreements are signed and countries become members of
international institutions, it is difficult for countries to back away from them. In particular,
as El Salvador continues its involvement with international institutions, exercising a role
within such organizations and making use of their services, it becomes more
complicated for future governments if they do not wish to honor previous commitments.
Should the FMLN take power in the next election, they might do well to heed the lesson
of the Sandinistas over 20 years earlier: International obligations made by earlier
governments cannot simply be ignored and often governments must continue to abide
by them.
At the transnational level, where governments forge agreements with
international firms, El Salvador’s membership in international organizations appeals to
firms. Such organizations level the playing field for international firms, codifying and
strengthening baseline policies that are similar across all nations, and providing some
guarantees of investment safety. Therefore, these memberships broaden the range of
agreements possible, at least from the firm perspective. At the domestic level, such
memberships have the potential to limit developing country win-sets if politically
powerful groups are opposed to them, but in the case of El Salvador, this has not yet
happened because the left has not gained enough of a position of strength to oppose
involvement with them.
Domestic level economic realities may or may not open opportunities for El
Salvador on the transnational agreement stage under the current political conditions. It
appears to depend on whether the next elections maintain the current political structure,
or bring the left to power. El Salvador’s low savings rate, a rising international debt, and
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a negative trade balance have convinced the current government that foreign
investment is needed to provide jobs to the unemployed and to increase exports. Relief
for the poor is not provided by government, but through a massive amount of
remittances from Salvadorans working in foreign countries, particularly the United
States. The Salvadoran government continues to encourage this practice. When
viewing the same economic landscape, the left argues that the government needs to
invest in social services to relieve poverty conditions and to encourage domestic
business. Such investment by the government will keep El Salvador from losing its
people to countries with greater work opportunities like the United States. Foreign
investment, the left argues, must be scaled back or encouraged to work in combination
with domestic initiatives. So, domestic realities could widen or restrict the areas for
potential agreement with firms on FDI depending on who controls the government, and
in turn, convince international firms to invest or to take caution.
Nicaragua’s political situation gives a possible indication of what the situation
may look like in El Salvador shortly. The parade of centrist and right-wing presidencies
that ruled Nicaragua from 1990 up to 2006 has given way to a new presidency of
Sandinista Daniel Ortega. Even though he has seemingly become friendlier to FDI than
in the past, and has voiced support for foreign investment and free trade, the possibility
exists that even if he does not follow the recent examples of leftist presidents in Latin
America and scale back foreign investment policies, the government’s range of possible
agreements on FDI will be smaller. Restricting new FDI in any case will constrict
Nicaragua’s win-set of agreement opportunities, and foreign firms will watch Nicaraguan
government actions and take their cue from those.
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However, international agreements that Nicaragua is party to, and international
institutions it belongs to, may temper any leftist plans to scale back FDI. The
Sandinistas learned the hard way in the 1980s that they simply could not jettison their
international obligations simply because their enemy Somoza agreed to them. To do so
would have ruined their credibility, making their daunting task to get economic aid even
more difficult. With the United States making things difficult enough for them on the
international stage, the Sandinistas stood by Somoza’s agreements, and played fair
with foreign investment already committed to the country. Nicaragua’s commitments
have only increased under the governments following Sandinista rule, making it much
more difficult for the current government to scale back foreign investment without
suffering some kind of adverse international reaction. They may be able to slow down
new investment, but they will not be able to eliminate it altogether.
Of course, like El Salvador, the domestic economic situation of Nicaragua may
make foreign investment a requirement. Nicaragua’s dependence on a tremendous
amount of foreign aid to accomplish goals that most other countries’ governments are
able to fund themselves, a low savings rate, and the reliance of a large portion of the
populace on remittances from Nicaraguans working abroad to meet daily needs is a
clear indication that development is needed. There is an inadequate amount of
domestic investment to meet development goals. On the transnational agreement level,
the range of possible agreements with foreign firms that Nicaragua is willing to accept
may widen due to these harsh economic realities. Unfortunately, other factors may
inhibit firms’ willingness to agree, including high government corruption. Daniel
Ortega’s readiness to embrace many aspects of the international environment’s focus
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on free trade and investment opportunity may be less of a choice and more of a
necessity.
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Chapter Six
A Summary of the Study
The goal of this dissertation has been to explain the role of foreign direct
investment policies in economic development in developing countries. This area of
research is vital for a number of reasons. On a general scale, answers to questions
about development in the less-industrialized countries have implications in many
academic areas, both inside and outside political science. On an immediate level, those
developing countries that pursue rapid industrialization affect world markets as they
become more and more indispensible to the international economic arena. Their
importance is more apparent even as it is obvious that standards of health, safety, labor
and product quality in developing countries are not on par with the expectations of
industrialized countries. Recent controversies surrounding China’s usage of lead-based
paints in children’s toys, and industrial by-products as fillers in pet foods only
underscores the impact of such industrializing countries on the world stage and the
trade-offs that the developed world faces now that it has become dependent on
developing countries to mass produce goods for consumption. Developing countries
also affect the global environment with greater emissions of greenhouse gases from
their burgeoning manufacturing centers, and many have irrevocably altered and even
harmed their natural environments to meet industrial goals. The repercussions of a few
developing countries reaching industrialized status will have far-reaching impacts into
the distant future.
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The potential and actual effects of development are not only confined to
macroeconomics. As economic development booms or fizzles in less-developed
countries, many people are potentially affected on the most basic levels. Access to
food, housing, jobs, and services hang in the balance. Successful development could
mean a long life for many inhabitants of the developing world. They might gain decent
jobs, be able to put food on the table for their families, receive medical care when
needed, and live in adequate housing. Lack of success in development could leave
millions, or perhaps billions, in a rapidly degrading quality-of-life cycle that promises little
but hardship and misery.
A greater understanding of development can shed light on questions that may or
may not seem connected at a close look, but in wider perspective have everything to do
with issues related to globalization. Globalization promises development, and yet this
promise may turn out to be empty for some. The outcome of globalization can even
have implications for international peace. Successful development for a majority of the
world’s population may alleviate some core causes of international conflict. However, if
development fails, the world may be reduced to several warring countries, each battling
over access to increasingly scarce resources. The hardships of the disenchanted and
miserable, trying to live amid war and chaos, may be the actual effect of globalization.
The international environment could degrade to a few countries with access to all of the
resources they need, and other countries saddled with depleted and dying populations
and scrabbling for the remainders.
Scholarship about development is therefore very important. If the world is to
experience growth in a way that measures up to the ideals that are propounded by
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world leaders, the unevenness of development must be studied, and every finding and
solution discovered by researchers must be fit into its place until full understanding is
reached. This dissertation has been one small attempt to pose questions about one
aspect of development, foreign direct investment, and find some possible answers that
will enlarge the scope of knowledge on this issue.

Review of Findings
What do we know about FDI? From Hymer’s first research on foreign direct
investment until today, a number of theories of FDI have been proposed. These
theories have been created from a number of different perspectives. Research on FDI
grew from studies in economics, which explored firms’ motivations to engage in foreign
investment. Political science followed with its own research into political causes and
effects of FDI. The impact of FDI on economics, markets, politics and the natural
environment have been tackled by researchers, as have been myriads of other factors
theorized to enhance or inhibit FDI. This interest in FDI has helped bring about new
tools for researchers in the study of development. Countries now regularly report FDI
statistics, giving researchers new conceptualizations of FDI to test empirically in
quantitative tests.
I began this dissertation by putting forth some questions; pieces of the
development puzzle that I felt needed to be addressed. In particular, I was curious
about two mysteries that had not been adequately explored. I hoped to contribute to
existing research on FDI, given its importance as a key part of development for the past
thirty years. However, I wanted to look at the FDI story from a different point of view. In
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particular, to better understand the process of FDI, I wanted to examine the role of
policy. I was curious about the following questions. What is FDI policy? What
determines FDI policy? What is FDI policy’s role in attracting foreign direct investment
inflows? I wanted to investigate these questions from the perspective of developing
countries. Why do developing countries use FDI policies? If developing countries want
to industrialize, why is there such variation of their degree of openness to foreign direct
investment? These were questions that I did not think had been answered fully by
existing research from any perspective.
Despite my role as a political scientist, I found that I needed to synthesize many
pieces of the FDI research across disciplines. In other words, political science has told
an important part of the FDI story. It has explored the politics behind FDI and
development in general. However, economics tells another important part of the story,
focusing on the motivations of firms and the transactions that occur between firms and
other actors in order to make FDI a reality. Sociology brings a third area in play,
highlighting effects of FDI and globalization on people. In conducting my research, I
have been indebted to all of these perspectives to help me bring together my own story
of FDI.
I told a narrative that moved across countries and over time, and encompassed
bits of all perspectives. The story began with theories of development in vogue at
various times in the past decades that had influence on developing countries and their
perspectives. Modernization theory and the goals that it professes, despite being
originally proposed as a way to keep developing countries in the Western camp during
the Cold War, has maintained the hope that the world is moving inexorably toward
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modernity and rationality. This new world will consist of all countries, industrialized and
enlightened, with democratic forms of government. The hope has continued to live
through the promises of globalization. Developing countries are guaranteed gains and
benefits from the liberalization of international trade and finance and the free movement
of capital around the globe. However, dependency theory arose to challenge the views
of modernization theory. Dependency theory argued that countries are locked into a
tiered system; those that are farther along in their modernization take advantage of the
system to get the resources they need and to continue their advancement at the
expense of other countries. Developing countries are at best junior partners of the
industrialized countries, and at worst economically colonized by them. Developing
countries give up their precious resources cheaply and receive expensive manufactured
products that benefit only those few in their societies that can afford them. This system
encourages a wealthy few to repress the mass portions of the world’s population that
are less well off, and keeps developing countries in a state of inferiority.
I argued that these two world-views of development were emblematic of attitudes
that developing countries displayed toward FDI, one wary and one open, and that these
attitudes help place their policies on a spectrum that ranges from complete openness to
complete restrictiveness. All developing countries policies are informed by these
attitudes, and therefore their policies fall somewhere in between these two extremes.
I proposed a scenario where developing states look to attract investment to their
degree of comfort. Developing states wish to gain the benefits of FDI without giving up
too much control in the process. They hope to gain new avenues toward
industrialization using the technology, managerial expertise and know-how that foreign
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firms from industrialized countries can bring. They anticipate, over the course of the
relationship, to gain revenue from taxes on foreign firms’ business and to expand
employment for their populations. Their policies walk a delicate line between asking too
much and not asking enough, and are conditioned by their attitudes toward foreign
investment in general. Some policies establish restrictions on foreign investment equity
or entry into economic sectors, while other policies set levels of taxation and types of
regulations on multinational firms.
Firms seek new markets for extraction, manufacturing or their products and
therefore they seek conditions where they can make the maximum amount of profits
with as few costs as possible. Developing countries are attractive because of their
natural resources, their abundance of labor and the untapped potential of their markets.
Multinational firms hope to get the best possible agreement from developing countries in
return for investing there. They want few restrictions on investment, low taxes and few
regulations. Therefore, developing countries’ policies are a first indication to
multinational firms of whether foreign investment in a particular place fits with their
global strategies. If policies are more restrictive, the number of firms willing to invest will
be lower. If policies are more open, more firms will be willing to take the risk of
investment.
As I presented in Chapter Two, the relationship between firms and states can fall
into a scenario like that proposed by Putnam. Putnam outlined the logic of two-level
games in negotiations between states. States negotiate agreements that are affected
on two-levels. Agreements are affected by political negotiations on the domestic level
which establishes a win-set, or a range of possible agreements, which each state can
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accept. When there is overlap between the win-sets, agreement has a greater
probability depending on the size of the overlap. Agreements are also affected on the
international level by the international environment and circumstances during
negotiations. States may need to update domestic groups on the progress of the talks
and field those groups’ reactions. In our case, the negotiating parties are not two
developing states, but a developing state and a firm that operates on the transnational
level. I expanded Putnam’s theory, arguing that states not only negotiate with states,
but with firms as well.
States typically face political negotiation with powerful groups that will be affected
by FDI domestically. The results of these political dealings manifest themselves in
policies of FDI. These policies are then brought to the transnational level to serve as
the basis of agreement. Policies thus represent the win-set of the developing state as it
tries to reach agreement with the firm. Firms have their own win-sets as well – which
were not addressed in this dissertation – and if their win-sets overlap with those of the
developing states, there is a greater possibility of agreement. There is probably less
interaction between the domestic and transnational levels in FDI negotiations than in
international arms agreements, but the principle is the same. The eventual success or
failure of agreements can be observed by the amount of FDI inflows to each state.
Greater inflows mean more success in agreement.
In the opening chapter, I introduced some perplexing examples. Why do China,
Mexico and Brazil get so much investment despite the restrictive nature of their FDI
policies? Why do Niger, Gabon and Swaziland get so little investment despite the open
nature of their policies? The answer is that firms find the potential of investment in
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China, Mexico and Brazil to be profitable and to their benefit. Most likely, those
countries would gain more investment if their policies were more open. In Niger, Gabon
and Swaziland, firms are not as impressed by what those countries have to offer, or
how those countries fit into their global strategies. That does not mean that the open
policies in these countries have no effect – they would probably be at a greater
disadvantage in terms of FDI without them. Open policies allow those countries that
want to gain more FDI to have a better chance of doing so, and restrictive policies allow
other countries to maintain some control over the flow of foreign investment.
The theory that I proposed explained FDI utilizing Putnam’s logic of two-level
games, and tested the relationships in two models. In the first model, the policy model,
I introduced the factors that influence a set of policy outcomes in developing states.
The policies I describe, FDI equity policies, do not constitute the whole range of FDI
policies but are a very important factor in the restrictiveness or openness of developing
states to foreign investment. I treat developing states as collectivities of political actors
act in a unitary fashion through policies when dealing with multinational firms. However,
even though developing states operate in a unitary manner, the influences on
developing states when they construct their policies are many, and come from a range
of sources at both the domestic and international levels. I proposed that policies are
mainly influenced by domestic politics, international political and economic influences,
domestic economic realities, and past experience with FDI.
I found that elements of all of these factors have some influence over FDI
policies. On the domestic politics side, democracies are more likely to pass open
policies, and nationalist governments are also more likely to be open to FDI.
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Democracies are widely seen to be more open and transparent, more willing to promote
and engage in open markets and free trade, and more willing to protect property rights
and extend other protections to foreign investment than authoritarian governments.
Nationalist governments on the other hand, are usually associated with protectionism
and a zero-sum outlook on international economic relations. They are linked with
attitudes that exhibit wariness toward foreign investment, and prefer to foster national
business rather than allowing foreign firms in the market. The finding that nationalist
governments appear to favor policies restricting foreign direct investment is therefore
not surprising. What is surprising is that government ideology does not appear to play a
part in determining FDI policies, because policies from governments on the left and right
showed no difference from each other. However, more studies on ideology and FDI
policies will need to be conducted because of problems with the data classifying
governments into a left-center-right spectrum.
I also found that developing countries’ memberships in international institutions
based on trade and foreign investment contributed to open policies. These institutions
demand agreement with certain principles of foreign investment as a condition for
membership, and failure to abide by those rules carries the risk of implicit or explicit
sanction. This risk constitutes pressure on developing countries to abide by the rules of
the institution. In addition, proximity to developed countries also appears to carry some
weight in pushing developing countries toward greater openness to foreign investment.
Industrialized countries that are contiguous along borders or economic zones with
developing countries may want to extend the reach of their firms and therefore urge
their neighbors to open to investment. A prime example is the United States – Mexico
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relationship, where U.S. firms have, in great numbers, located south of the U.S. border
with Mexico to take advantage of the labor supply and lower wages.
Some potential alternatives to FDI were found. Domestic savings appears to be
an alternative to FDI in that it can provide investment capital for home-grown
businesses and therefore reduce the need to utilize foreign investment for development.
Countries that have higher savings rates can therefore afford to set more restrictive
policies on FDI. External debt appears to be important in countries that rely upon FDI or
where FDI makes up a larger portion of their economies. Larger external debt leads to
more open FDI policies in developing countries, because it may increase the need for
FDI to help bring in greater revenues to service debt payments to lenders. Also, many
developing countries have followed policies of privatization of state-owned industries,
and new foreign investment complements the debt already built up when governments
created those industries or nationalized existing ones.
Market size also appears to play a role in FDI openness with larger market sizes
contribute to more open policies. There may be some regional differences in openness
to FDI, but only a little. All regions except perhaps East and South Asia in the estimated
sample were significant and more open to FDI compared with the comparison category,
so the regional differences may be small.
Given the influences that lead to more restrictive or more open policies, what
countries represent open or closed policies? Guided by the estimations performed in
Chapter Three, the least open countries should have authoritarian and nationalist
governments. They should have a low degree of membership in international
institutions, and not share a border or an economic zone with a developed country.
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They should have a high savings rate and low external debt. Such a scenario describes
Zimbabwe in the late 1980s and Syria in 2003-2004, where policies restricted foreign
investment to minority status.
A very open developing country should have the opposite characteristics. It
should have a democratic, non-nationalist government. It should have a high degree of
membership in international institutions, and be in close proximity to the developed
world. It should have a low savings rate and high external debt. These characteristics,
except for proximity to developed countries, are shared by many countries. Argentina
from 2000-2001, Gambia from 1983-1993, Ghana from 1996-2004, Guyana from 20022004, Madagascar from 1996-2003, Nicaragua from 2000-2004, and Zambia from
1992-2000. No countries that were in proximity to developed countries met the other
criteria.
Do developing countries’ policies make a difference in firm decision-making
about investment there? In other words, do policies affect foreign direct investment
inflows? This question was addressed in the second model. It is certain that FDI
policies have an effect on FDI inflows. Developing countries that are most open to
foreign equity appear to gain more FDI as a percent of their GDPs than those
developing countries that put restrictions on foreign equity. Those countries that want
or depend on FDI as a development tool therefore will gain more foreign investment if
their policies are more open.
Open policies are not the only determinants of FDI inflows. Countries that are
nationalist gain more FDI inflows as a percent of GDP. The explanation may lie party
because the size of nationalist countries in the sample tend to be smaller countries, and
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possibly because nationalist governments cannot ignore the world economy even if they
would prefer to be less involved in it. Once again, surprisingly, the ideological
orientation of the government appears to have no impact on FDI inflows, indicating that
foreign direct investment flows to developing countries regardless of whether they
espouse leftist or right-wing ideologies.
International institutional membership also has a positive effect on countries’ FDI
inflows. Countries that belong to more international institutions that are concerned
about international trade and investment receive more inflows of FDI as a percent of
GDP. This could indicate that institutional membership strengthens the positive
impression that multinational firms have of developing countries. International
institutions promote norms and rules that level the playing field for potential investors,
and provide protections against government actions that could be inimical to foreign
investment. As firms decide whether to invest in developing countries, membership in a
greater number of international institutions may set some countries apart from others
and increase the potential range of possible agreements that firms are willing to accept.
Countries that have more income per capita tend to get less FDI as a percentage
of GDP. This suggests that firms are attracted to lower income countries because they
can cut costs on wages. A low-wage structure could strengthen some countries’
bargaining positions if they have alternatives to FDI for development, but could leave
other countries with few other alternatives in weak bargaining positions. Corruption
appears to dampen FDI inflows, indicating that developing states that control corruption,
regardless of whether they depend on FDI for development, will gain more FDI inflows.
FDI also is attracted to larger developing countries, indicating that larger markets are
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important to firms. Finally, regional differences play a part in the amount of inflows of
FDI that developing countries receive. If a developing country is in Latin America, it
appears that it has a better chance of receiving more FDI than countries in other
regions. This may be due to the United States factor, which has taken a special
economic interest in Latin America, which it considers as its own back yard, and has
negotiated a number of trade and investment deals favorable to U.S. companies.
The findings suggest that those developing countries that are democratic,
nationalist, have open FDI policies, belong to more international institutions, have a low
income per capita, and control corruption will gain more FDI as a percent of GDP than
other countries. In my dataset, Argentina from 1995-2004 (mean inflows 3.3 percent of
GDP), Guyana from 1995-2002 (mean inflows 7.96 percent of GDP), Lesotho from
1995-1998 (mean inflows 29.44 percent of GDP), Malaysia from 1992-2004 (mean
inflows 1.01 percent of GDP), and Trinidad and Tobago from 2003-2004 (mean inflows
7.84 percent of GDP) fit this description. Those countries receiving the least inflows as
a percent of GDP, Algeria from 1994-1996 (mean inflows 0.19 percent of GDP),
Bangladesh from 1981-1983 (mean inflows 0.02 percent of GDP), Ethiopia from 19891991 (mean inflows 0.07 percent of GDP), Gabon from 1989-1995 (mean inflows -1.37
percent of GDP), Haiti from 1977-1987 (mean inflows 0.57 percent of GDP) and from
1993-1994 (mean inflows -0.09 percent of GDP), Indonesia from 1977-1979 (mean
inflows 0.47 percent of GDP), Iran from 1982-1990 (mean inflows -0.08 percent of GDP)
and from 1993-1997 (mean inflows 0.02 percent of GDP), Nicaragua from 1977-1979
(mean inflows 0.32 percent of GDP) and from 1982-1990 (mean inflows 0.01 percent of
GDP), and the Philippines in 1980 (inflows -0.33 percent of GDP), all had non-
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democratic, non-nationalist governments ranking high in corruption and fewer
memberships in international institutions concerned with trade and investment. In this
category especially, there were also some countries that had somewhat higher inflows
as a percent of GDP despite their characteristics. Chad (1992-1998), the Dominican
Republic (1977-1978), and Guatemala 91977-1983) were all examples of countries that
did not quite match predictions.
What are recommendations that can be made to policymakers regarding FDI
policies in developing countries? Policymakers are the subject of many pulls and tugs,
both domestically and internationally. Domestic politics and international pressures are
largely out of policymakers’ control. After all, policymakers do not decide whether their
countries are democratic or authoritarian, nationalist or internationally focused, leftist or
rightist. Domestic politics determines these particular characteristics. Policymakers
should fashion policy according to their country’s characteristics, playing up its strengths
and downplaying its weaknesses.
For example, if a country wants to reduce FDI or reduce its reliance on FDI, it
can do a number of things. First, it can restrict FDI through taxation, regulation and limit
its entry into the market by passing more restrictive FDI policies. Second, it can build
up reasonable alternatives to FDI and tap those for development purposes.
Encouraging savings, for one, helps build up domestic sources of capital and reduces
the need for the country to have open FDI policies. Paying down external debt and
putting the extra capital into national development is another possible, though not easy,
way reduce reliance on FDI. The highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) that are in line
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for significant debt forgiveness in the next few years may be able to benefit from the
advantage of a lower external debt.
Remittances from nationals of developing countries that work in the developed
world are also a significant source of capital, and these remittances can be channeled
into productive capital for investment, as long as the population can be encouraged to
refrain from spending them on wasteful forms of consumption and if governments can
encourage entrepreneurship. In El Salvador, for example, recipients of remittances
tend to spend them on consumer goods, such as shoes, clothes, and televisions. That
money ends up in the pockets of a few wealthy business owners whose interests do not
necessarily coincide with those of the poorer populace.
On the other hand, if a developing country wants to increase its FDI prospects,
such as increasing its importance in the economy or simply increasing the flow of FDI
into its market, there are a number of actions that policymakers can take. First and
foremost they should pass policies that open the economy. Open policies serve as an
indication that a country is interested and serious about foreign investment. If a
developing country is democratic it is already likely to have open FDI policies, but
autocratic governments show more variation in their openness to foreign investment.
Second, reducing corruption in government serves as a sign of encouragement to
foreign investors. Foreign investors do not like cutting through red tape or paying bribes
to set up business, and will prefer to deal with those countries that are more efficient
and transparent in their processes and procedures.
These actions do not guarantee that developing countries can reduce or enhance
their prospects for FDI, but such actions will not hurt their chances of achieving

283

development goals. The main thing for policymakers to remember, however, is that
policies have repercussions on FDI prospects and on development projections in
general. Policymakers in the developing world are in a position to take the resources
that globalization offers them, or to reject them, but ultimately their policies have an
impact on the path their country takes toward development. Globalization may be a
source of pressure on policymakers, but ultimately developing countries can encourage
or discourage globalization. Their economic paths are in their own hands.

Suggestions for Future Research
The process of creating theory, testing hypotheses, and achieving results that
both fit and defy prediction are rewards in themselves, but are meaningless if future
research does not add to and expand on what was learned in earlier research. In the
hope that this dissertation has created a worthwhile avenue for future study, I would like
to offer some thoughts and suggestions about possible future research based on this
avenue of exploration, and the findings that have proceeded from it.
There are still many avenues to explore. I have argued that FDI policy consists
of restrictions on foreign equity, regulation of foreign operations once the investment is
made, and taxation. I introduced a measure of foreign direct investment policy, the FDI
Equity Index, to serve as a measure of FDI policies. This measure is one-dimensional
and only measures restrictions on foreign equity. It does not take regulation of foreign
investment or taxation of foreign firms into account, but in the absence of measures of
foreign direct investment it marks an improvement in the ability to test theories on FDI.
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The next challenge for researchers is to provide alternative, and perhaps more
complete, measures of foreign direct investment policy. Taxation has been quantified.
Are there measures of corporate taxation rates for a large number of countries over a
reasonable number of years? This information is available widely for the developed
world, and for some developing countries, but not all. Categories of business
regulations are spelled out in existing research, but can we quantify this information
across countries and time so that additional studies that meet acceptable standards of
validity and reliability can be performed?
Such information would be most helpful it were available over time. It is possible
to learn much about FDI from a static snapshot of one or two years, and we have
gained unique insights from such studies. However, as I hope has become clear in this
dissertation, foreign direct investment is a dynamic process. Attitudes toward FDI alter,
and flows of FDI move in cycles. Collective mind-sets toward FDI have become more
open in the past twenty years, but they may not always be that way. Recent
nationalizations in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador by leftist governments, for example,
could indicate that the cycle is turning back toward restrictiveness of FDI in Latin
America. The cyclical nature of economics and politics argues for more studies of the
FDI process over time. The longer the dataset and the greater the number of
observations over time, the more understanding will be gained from research.
The overall relationship between firm and state needs further development.
There are a few causality questions that could be explored. Do policies lead to FDI, or
does FDI lead to policies? I’ve tried to model the causality question of policies by first
indicating that policies influence FDI inflows, but that past inflows then influence new
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FDI policies. This circle of causation, however, does not truly uncover the dynamics of
the interrelationship. At earlier points in time, some developing countries did not have
laws that addressed FDI; instead restrictions and regulation of FDI was administered
through bureaucracies and bureaucratic interpretation of leadership attitudes. Do these
methods of dealing with FDI constitute “policy” as we know it? The Dominican Republic
did not codify its investment law until 1978, Honduras until 1992, Panama until 1994
and Lesotho still does not have a law specifically on foreign direct investment on the
books. Why have not some developing countries decided to codify their laws, and what
effect does this have on openness to FDI?
Another issue I’ve not explored, but have suggested in my analysis of the
agreement scenario between firms and states, is that developing countries’ policies
could serve as a signaling mechanism to firms about their development intentions.
Signaling is a concept that has been researched in the international relations field.
Might the signaling literature be explored and adapted into theory that can fit FDI? Do
states signal their intentions to firms through their policies? Do firms respond to
signaling? There is much in this area that can be investigated.
More study on the role of FDI policies should be undertaken, in particular the
economic factors that contribute to FDI policy formation. I proposed that openness to
FDI that makes its way into policy responds to the existence of alternatives to FDI.
These alternatives are avenues to development that can reduce the reliance of
countries on foreign direct investment. The support I found for domestic savings as an
alternative shows that there is at least one other avenue that developing countries can
explore. The others I proposed, external debt, foreign aid, and a positive trade balance,
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did not appear to constitute an alternative. Are there other options that inhibit or
encourage FDI? Are there other ways to measure these concepts? My case studies of
Nicaragua and El Salvador suggest that remittances from migrant workers to families
back in home countries may be a potential alternative to FDI. More research on the
relationship of remittances to FDI needs to be conducted, and data gathered that will
support this research.
In particular, the role of debt and FDI policy needs to made clearer. In proposing
external debt as an alternative to FDI, my thought was that external debt was an avenue
to industrialization because states used loans to invest in national businesses and to
establish state-owned industries. This would allow policy-makers to reduce their
reliance on FDI and therefore allow them to restrict FDI. However, the findings indicate
that higher external debt and open policies are associated. Why might this be? I
suggest that higher external debt creates more demands on the state in the form of
repayments. In times when states are cutting back on social programs to simply make
payments on their debts, FDI becomes essential if states are to continue to industrialize.
Their ability to develop themselves has thus been severely compromised by their debt
repayments, and they must turn to FDI as a mechanism for continued development.
However, more research into the link between these two concepts will be important.
Regional differences in FDI policies should also be studied to a greater extent. I
found regional differences to be largely absent, except perhaps Central Asia. However,
it appears that Latin America receives more FDI inflows as a percent of GDP than other
areas. Why does Latin America receive more inflows, despite the fact that its policies
do not stand out among other regions? Does investment there from the United States
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significantly affect the total amount of FDI inflows? Do European countries invest more
predominantly there than in other regions? Why this disparity?
I also encourage more research on individual countries using the model I have
proposed for FDI. I conducted case studies of two countries in Central America, but
further case studies on other countries will further shed light on the role of FDI policies
in particular economies, and continue to add to the breadth of research on development
issues. The countries I chose, while having differences and similarities on many levels,
are two small markets. There is much variation that can be explored. Large markets
versus small markets, proximity to developed countries versus non-proximity, civil
conflict versus peace, democracy versus authoritarian. Of particular interest would
those countries that did not get into my statistical analysis because of lack of macrodata on various factors of interest. Do they follow the model I propose, or do they vary
in some way?
Finally, I made a conscious choice to limit my investigations to developing
countries. This decision was made because I argue that developing countries need to
be studied separately lest some of the elements that affect only them get lost in the
larger picture of foreign direct investment, globalization and development. This
research was undertaken in the full knowledge that the bulk of the world’s FDI occurs
between developed countries. That leads to two possible avenues of research. First,
does the model I proposed also apply to FDI between developed countries? If not, are
there elements of the theory that can be modified to explain foreign direct investment in
the developed world? The second avenue depends on the first. If such a model can be
applied to the developed world, does it give rise to the possibility that foreign direct
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investment can be explained for the world in general? Or, is there some line that has to
be crossed, some set of factors not yet understood that will eventually transform certain
developing countries (such as China, Mexico, India, and Brazil) into developed
countries through FDI?
We end where we started. The first chapter proposed some mysteries. Why do
some countries that restrict FDI, such as China, Brazil and Mexico, still seem to get so
much, while others that have maintained a very open stance toward foreign investment,
such as Gabon, Niger and Swaziland, get very little? Certainly China, Brazil and
Mexico are attractive to foreign investment, and they could get more if they were to
open their policies. Gabon, Niger and Swaziland are not as attractive to foreign
investment, but where would they be if their policies were not as open? Foreign direct
investment does not simply depend on the resources countries have, or the markets
they offer, or the quality and expense of their labor. As developing countries consider
courting foreign firms, their economic advancement not only depends on their
attractions, but also on policies that indicate how wide they are willing to open the
doorways to development.
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Appendix A
Countries Used in the Study
Algeria

Kenya

Argentina

Lesotho

Bangladesh

Madagascar

Bolivia

Malaysia

Brazil

Mexico

Cameroon

Morocco

Chad

Mozambique

Chile

Nicaragua

China

Niger

Columbia

Nigeria

Costa Rica

Oman

Cote D’Ivoire

Pakistan

Democratic Republic of Congo

Panama

Dominican Republic

Papua New Guinea

Ecuador

Peru

Egypt

Philippines

El Salvador

Senegal

Ethiopia

Sri Lanka

Gabon

Swaziland

Gambia

Syria

Ghana

Thailand

Guatemala

Trinidad & Tobago

Guyana

Tunisia

Haiti

Turkey

Honduras

Uruguay

India

Venezuela

Indonesia

Zambia

Iran

Zimbabwe

Jordan
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Appendix B
Descriptive Statistics – FDI Policy Estimations
Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

FDI Equity Index

1633

1.4868

1.0302

0

3

Category 0 Dummy

1653

0.1760

0.3810

0

1

Category 1 Dummy

1653

0.3345

0.4720

0

1

Category 2 Dummy

1653

0.2232

0.4165

0

1

Regime type

1649

0.1025

7.0089

-10

10

Nationalism

1426

0.1950

0.3963

0

1

Left

1653

0.2601

0.4388

0

1

Center

1653

0.0557

0.2293

0

1

Other

1653

0.4785

0.4997

0

1

International Institutions

1653

0.7621

0.2615

0

1

Proximity

1653

0.1633

0.3698

0

1

Savings/GDP

1629

16.2427

15.0069

-92.7636

72.9801

ODA/DAC*+

1650

1.3249

0.2407

0

2.5685

Trade Balance/GDP

1550

-0.0517

0.3896

-1.6962

6.09

Debt/GDP*

1630

-0.0765

0.8702

-2.9326

2.6984

FDI inflows/GDP (5 yr
avg)*+

1634

2.0085

0.2531

0

3.4925

Population*

1653

16.4355

1.5983

13.1174

20.9827

Sub-Saharan Africa

1653

0.3158

0.4650

0

1

East Asia

1653

0.1053

0.3070

0

1

Latin America

1653

0.3509

0.4774

0

1

South Asia

1653

0.0702

0.2555

0

1

North Africa

1653

0.1579

0.3648

0

1

Variable

* Variable logged for estimation

+ Variable right-shifted
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Appendix C
Descriptive Statistics – FDI Inflows Estimations
Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

FDI inflows/GDP*

1642

2.7158

0.1747

0.3337

4.0881

Regime Typet-1

1594

-0.0163

7.0114

-10

10

Nationalismt-1

1411

0.1970

0.3979

0

1

Leftt-1

1596

0.2632

0.4405

0

1

Centert-1

1596

0.0558

0.2295

0

1

Othert-1

1596

0.5326

0.4991

0

1

Durabilityt-1

1596

14.3346

14.5292

0

83

Internal Wart-1

1596

0.2024

0.4019

0

1

External Wart-1

1596

0.0320

0.1759

0

1

1596

0.7556

0.2629

0

1

1653

0.1633

0.3698

0

1

1540

21.1174

11.7337

1.1694

63.8267

1466

16.0423

7.2324

0.4863

40.7060

1466

3.4905

0.3012

1.6289

4.4893

1540

48.4456

9.9135

16.4766

78.5302

Category 1t-1

1576

0.3496

0.4770

0

1

Category 2t-1

1576

0.2475

0.4317

0

1

1576

0.2056

0.4043

0

1

1632

6.6986

1.0293

3.6990

8.9997

Corruption

1653

-0.4487

0.5297

-1.5504

1.3578

Property Rights

1653

46.4279

14.7983

10

90

Populationt-1*-

1596

16.3043

1.7647

10.8579

20.9763

Sub-Saharan Africa

1653

0.3158

0.4650

0

1

North Africa

1653

0.1579

0.3648

0

1

Latin America

1653

0.3509

0.4774

0

1

East Asia

1653

0.1053

0.3070

0

1

South Asia

1653

0.0702

0.2555

0

1

Variable

International
Institutionst-1
Proximity to Developed
Countries
Agriculture Value-added
/ GDPt-1
Manufacturing Valueadded/GDPt-1
Extractives Valueadded/GDPt-1*+
Services Valueadded/GDPt-1

Category 3t-1
GNI/Capitat-1*

*

+

Variable logged for estimation

+ Variable right-shifted
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- Variable left-shifted

Appendix D
The Foreign Equity Index
The original intent behind this study was to create a variable which employed a
number of different dimensions of FDI policy. Not only was the variable envisioned to
measure equity, but also tax breaks, duty exemptions, screening, and profit and capital
repatriation. However, two things became apparent as the content analysis
commenced. First, the information in the Exporters Encyclopedia had some gaps. All
countries were not covered equally, and even ranges of years within some countries
were not covered adequately. Second, except for foreign equity restrictions, which were
often reported when they changed, there was a lack of “negative” information on the
other components of FDI policy. Tax breaks and customs duties, for example, were
often reported when they existed, but no mention of them was made in other years, and
it could not be assumed that they did not exist in those times. Likewise, the same
situation appeared for screening, and for repatriation.
In the case of foreign equity restrictions, however, it was apparent that long
stretches of an unchanged description of a country’s FDI policy meant that its equity
restrictions also were most likely unchanged. If it was learned, for example, that in 1976
a country only allowed foreigners a minority stake in its domestic businesses, and then
in 1983 a new policy was introduced that allowed 100 percent equity investment for
foreigners in some sectors, it could be assumed that the equity restrictions in 1976
stayed unchanged until 1983. In many cases, there were gaps that made determining
whether a policy changed unclear, and so corroborating information was sought on the
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Internet. A number of sites were helpful in filling gaps in the data or corroborating
existing information from the Exporter’s Encyclopedia, including sites belonging to the
State Department, The Heritage Foundation, regional trade organizations and official
government websites.
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Appendix E
Specification of the FDI Policy Estimations

A multilevel generalized linear model follows the following specification:
L

Ml

η = x β + ∑ ∑ η m( l ) z ml 1
'

l = 2 m =1

where z ml 1 = 1 , allowing for a random intercept at each level. By omitting the random
terms, the equation for a two level generalized linear mixed model becomes:

ν ij = xij' β + η (j 2 )
Following this, fitting the gllamm to an ordered probit is accomplished:
Yij* = ν ij + ε ij

where Yij* = discrete categories of the FDI equity index for observation i in country j,

ν ij = the generalized linear mixed model for observation i in country j

ε ij = a random error term, assumed to follow a standard normal distribution.
The observed and coded discrete dependent variable, Yij , is determined from the
model as follows:

⎧0 if − ∞ ≤ Yij* ≤ μ1
⎪
*
⎪ 1 if μ1 ≤ Yij ≤ μ 2
Yij = ⎨
*
⎪ 2 if μ 2 ≤ Yij ≤ μ 3
⎪ 3 if μ 3 ≤ Yij* ≤ ∞
⎩
where the μ k ’s represent thresholds to be estimated along with the parameter vector

β.
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Probabilities associated with the coded responses of this ordered probit model
are as follows:

Pij (0) = Pr(Yij = 0) = Pr(Yij* ≤ μ1 ) = Pr( xij' β + η (j 2 ) + ε ij ≤ μ1 ) = Pr(η (j 2 ) + ε ij ≤ μ1 − xij' β )
= Φ ( μ1 − xij' β )
Pij (1) = Pr(Yij = 1) = Pr( μ1 ≤ Yij* ≤ μ 2 ) = Pr(η (j 2) + ε ij ≤ μ 2 − xij' β ) − Pr(η (j 2 ) + ε ij ≤ μ1 − xij' β
= Φ ( μ 2 − xij' β ) − Φ ( μ1 − xij' β )
M
Pij (e) = Pr(Yij = e) = Pr( μ k ≤ Yij* ≤ μ k +1 ) = Φ ( μ k +1 − xij' β ) − Φ ( μ k − xij' β )
M
Pij ( E ) = Pr(Yij = E ) = Pr( μ k < Yij* ) = 1 − Φ ( μ k − xij' β )
where i is an individual observation, j is the level of observation, e is the FDI equity
policy alternative, P (Yij = e) is the probability that the policy is e, and Φ( ) is the standard
normal cumulative distribution function.
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